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WAGE DISCRIMINATION, JOB SEGREGATION, AND 
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS. ACT OF 1964 
Ruth G. Blumrosen• 
Federal law has prohibited some forms of employment dis-
crimination with respect to wages since the passage of the Equal 
Pay Act of 1963. 1 However, neither the EPA, nor the more gen-
eral prohibition on employment discrimination because of race, 
sex, religion, or national origin contained in Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 2 has been applied to the question of wage rates 
paid for jobs into which minorities and women have been tradi-
tionally segregated. 
Most of the jobs to which women have been allowed access are 
• Associate Professor, Graduate School of Business Administration, Rutgers University; 
B.A., J.D., University of Michigan; Consultant, Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, 1965, 1979; Assistant to the Dean, Howard Law School, 1966-67. 
'Valuable assistance in the preparation of this paper was provided by Kenneth Shear, Rut-
gers Law School, class of 1978. Unpublished papers prepared by Rutgers Law School stu-
dents Sherry Glazer, John Logan, Emily Bass, Kenneth Shear; Gerry O'Kane, Elaine 
Sederlund, and Denise Reinhardt in a seminar conducted by Professor A. Blumrosen, Rut-
gers Law School in 1977 were also of assistance. Unless otherwise specified, Alfred Blumro-
sen is the author of the law review articles cited herein by that surname. The views expres-
sed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of any government agency. 
1 Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U .S.C. § 206(d)(l) (1976)) [hereinafter cited 
as EPA]. The EPA provides in part: 
No employer having employees subject to any provision of this section shall dis-
criminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, be-
tween employees on the basis of sex by paying W38es to employees in such estab-
lishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays W38eS to employees of the 
opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of 
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed 
under similar working conditions, exce·pt where such payment is made pursuant to 
(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by 
quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor 
other than sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential 
in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of 
this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee. 
'Pub. L. No.88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U .S.C. § 2000e (1976)). The act provides 
in part: 
§ 703(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrim-
inate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin; ... 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive 
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin. 
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different from the jobs which men have traditionally done. 3 
Therefore, the EPA, which has been interpreted to apply only 
where men and women work on similar jobs, has had little impact. 
It has, however, been used by courts to restrict the scope of the 
broad prohibition on discrimination contained in Title VII when 
the question of wage rate·discrimination has been raised. 4 
Consequently, the major problem confronting women at work 
and an important problem confronting minorities - the relatively 
low rates of pay for jobs which have been traditionally reserved 
for women or minorities as compared to rates paid for work tradi-
tionally performed by males or whites - has not been addressed . . 
at all by federal anti-discrimination laws. Yet the low rates of pay 
associated with such segregated jobs constitute the major explan-
ation for the "earnings gap" between minority and female work-
ers on the one hand, and white males on the other. This gap has 
long been considered a major benchmark as to the extent of em-
ployment discrimination. 5 
a Half of all working women work in occupations that are over 70% female. Weisskoff, 
"Women's Place" in the Labor Market, 62 AMER. EcoN. REv. 161, 163 (1972). More than 
one-quarter of all women workers work in jobs that are 95% or more female, WOMEN'S 
BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS, 89-91 (1975). Occupa-
tional sex-typing has been termed '' one of the most pervasive and consequential of all cul-
tural attitudes relating to sex." Bermann & King, Diagnosing Discrimination, in SOME NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: THE A.T. & T. CASE 60 (P. Wallace 
ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY]. See also B. BABCOCK, 
E. NORTON & s. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 193-229 (1975) [hereinafter 
cited as BABCOCK]; J. KREPS, SEX IN THE MARKETPLACE: AMERICAN WOMEN AT WORK 
(1971); Laws, PsYCHOLOOICAL DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN'S WORK FORCE PARTICIPATION, in 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY' supra; Sawhill, The Economics of Discrimination 
Against Women: Some New Findings, 8 J. HUMAN REs. 383 (1973). 
On race segregated jobs see G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (2 vols. paperback ed. 
1964); 1 H. HILL, BLACK LABOUR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1977); R. MAR-
SHALL, THE NEGRO AND ORGANIZED LABOR (1965). For studies of blacks in specific indus-
tries, e.g., construction, rubber, electrical, manufacturing, see W. GouLD, BLACK WORK-
ERS IN WHITE UNIONS, (1977); H. NORTHRUP, THE NEGRO IN THE RUBBER TIRE INDUSTRY 
(1969); U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE: 
A STUDY OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE NATION'S ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITIES. For 
white collar employment, see A. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW (1971); 
Brimmer, Economic Situation of Blacks in the United States, FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN 
(March 1972); Brimmer, The Economic Position of Black Americans: 1976, in Joss FOR 
AMERICANS (E. Ginzberg, ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Joss FoR AMERICANS]. See also 
Steelworkers v. Weber, __ U.S. --, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979) (judicial findings of exclusion 
from crafts on racial grounds are so numerous as to make the exclusion a subject for judicial 
notice). In this recent case the Court upheld the validity of an employer's training program 
for filling craft openings which provided that at least 50% of the trainees were to be black 
until the percentage of black skilled craft workers in the employer's plant approximated the 
percentage of blacks in the local labor force. The respondent, a white production worker, 
alleged that because the affirmative action program resulted in junior black employees re-
ceiving training in preference to more senior white employees, the program discriminated in 
violation of§§ 703(a) and (d) of Title VII. The Court held that Title VII's prohibition does 
not condemn all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans. 
'See cases cited in note 257 irifra. 
5 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-8 (1971); H. REP. No. 92-238, 92d 
Cong., 1st. Sess. 3-5 (1971). These Reports are both part of the legislative history of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 104, amending 
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One reason why this problem has not been addressed is that the 
question of wage discrimination has not been v~ewed as a part of 
the problem of job segregation. Rather, wage discrimination and 
job segregation have usually been viewed as two separate and dis-
tinct matters. Remedies for wage discrimination have been con-
sidered to be available only in cases falling within the EPA. 6 Re-
medies for job segregation have been considered to include pro-
motional opportunities, and back pay for lost opportunities, but 
have not included any consideration of whether the rates paid for 
traditionally segregated jobs were themselves discriminatorily 
depressed. 7 
It is the thesis of this article that job segregation and wage dis-
crimination are not separate problems, but rather are intimately 
related. Wherever there is job segregation, the same forces which 
determine that certain jobs or job categories will be reserved for 
women or minorities also and simultaneously determine that the 
economic value of those jobs is less than if they were "white" or 
"male" jobs. Thus, those women and minorities who are chan-
nelled into segregated jobs are not only deprived of initial hiring 
opportunities in other jobs and meaningful transfer opportunities, 
but are also paid wages for the jobs that they get which are dis-
criminatorily depressed. 
Part I of this article establishes the factual aspects of the thesis 
that wage rates of jobs into which women and minorities have 
been historically segregated are likely to be depressed because 
those jobs are occupied by "disfavored groups." To establish this 
proposition, historical, anthropological, sociological, and 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)). The Reports state that Congress enacted Title VII in order to im-
prove the economic and social conditions of minorities and women by providing equality of 
opportunity in the work place. These conditions were part of a larger pattern of restriction, 
exclusion, discrimination, segregation, and inferior treatment of minorities and women in 
many areas oflife. The legislative histories of Title VII, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, and the 
Equal Employment Act of 1_972 contain extensive analyses of the higher unemployment rate, 
the lesser occupational status, and consequent lower income levels of minorities and wo-
men. EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964 
(1965) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND 
LABOR, 88TH CONG., !ST SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963 
(Comm. Print 1963); SENATE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC 
WELFARE, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OP-
PORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 (Comm. Print 1972, [hereinafter cited as HISTORY OF EEO]. 
6 See cases cited in note 257 infra. 
1 See generally Jones,_Title VJ/, Seniority, and the Supreme Court: Clarification or Re-
treat?, 26 KANSAS L. REV. I (1977); W. GouLD,supra note 3; Blumrosen, Quotas, Common 
Sense and Law in Labor Relations; Three Dimensions of Equal Opportunity, 27 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 675 (1974). See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 
(1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 
422 U.S. 405 (1975); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F. 2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); United 
States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d. 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 
(1972); Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). 
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economic studies of the process of valuation of work done by dis-
favored groups are reviewed and analyzed. The conclusion of this 
review is that it is more probable than not that where jobs have 
been segregated, the valuation of the worth of those jobs has been 
influenced by the fact that they are the jobs of a disfavored group. 
Part II of this article builds on this premise in examining the law 
of employment discrimination, both under the EPA and under 
Title VII. The major conclusion of Part II is that minorities or 
women who demonstrate that they have occupied traditionally 
segregated jobs have established a prima facie case that the wage 
rate paid for those jobs is discriminatoriiy depressed, thus shifting 
the burden of demonstrating that the rate is not influenced by dis-
criminatory factors to the employer. Various defenses which may 
be raised, including the most common assertion that the rate is a 
product of market forces, are examined. Those defenses which 
apparently are influenced by the same discriminatory considera-
tions that set the rate for the job in question are identified. Finally, 
the application of the EPA and its relation to Title VII are 
examined. We conclude that the substantive requirements of the 
EPA do not constitute a limitation on Title VII, but that an em-
ployer with a defense under the EPA may assert it in a Title VII 
context. 
PART I 
A. The Nature and Incidence of Job Segregation 
Despite the express prohibition in Title VII, job segregation by 
race or sex remains a major characteristic of industrial life. For 
the most part, men and women do not do the same kind of work 
and minority males do not do the same kind of work as white 
males. 8 
1. Sex Discrimination-Job segregation by sex has a long his-
tory in the United States, dating back to the New England textile 
mills which had segregated jobs for young women employees who 
both lived and worked at the mill. 9 One commentator has noted 
8 See cases cited in note 257 irifra. It should be noted here that, while the discussion of 
race discrimination in this article refers primarily to discrimination against blacks, the same 
points can be made concerning discrimination on the basis of national origin. In the case of 
some groups, e.g., Hispanics, language differences constitute an additional barrier to non-
discriminatory treatment. The discussion concentrates on blacks because discrimination 
against them is so well documented. 
9 Job segregation is sometimes defined as an occupational result of sex-typing. One fea-
ture is that there is an associated normative expectation that this is how things should be. 
See REPORT OF SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND 
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that ''from the beginning, women factory workers held jobs that 
were identified as 'women's jobs.' " 1° From 1900 to 1970, except 
during wartime, the great majority of female workers were con-
centrated in occupations that were disproportionately female.11 
This pattern persisted as the number of women workers rose from 
5.1 million in 1900 to 34.5 million in 1970, 12 and is related to state 
legislation "protecting" women from certain work situations. 13 
Every state passed legislation regulating what women could do in 
the workplace. These laws ranged from outright banning of 
women from some occupations such as mining and bartending, to 
prohibiting certain activities such as heavy lifting, working at 
nights, or overtime, to requiring the employer to provide benefits 
for women such as couches in the rest room and payment for 
working overtime. 14 This legislation was strongly backed by the 
unions, and was either supported or unopposed by the then do-
minant women's organizations. 15 While sex segregation was out-
WELFARE, WORK IN AMERICA 49 (1973) [hereinafter cited as WORK IN AMERICA]. See also P. 
MANTOUX, THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 204,425 (rev. ed. 
1961) for first signs of the sex and job segregation wage differential relationship at the very 
beginnings of the factory system in England. Mantoux says that even before the factory sys-
tem, in cottage manufactories, jobs had become segregated by sex. (He also notes that there 
was specialization in certain jobs by the family) .. The women and children followed their 
work to the factories where they were paid less than adult men though they could do work 
the men could not do. 
10 The stability of patterns of sex discrimination in occupations was documented·as early 
as 1910 by a United States Senate investigation. See THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE AMERI-
CAN EcoNQMY, REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SENATE (1910). The results of this long 
tradition of sex segregation in the labor market are still apparent today. See A. SIMMONS, A. 
FREEDMAN, M. DUNKLE & F. BLAU, EXPLOITATION FROM 9 TO 5-REPORT OF THE TWEN-
TIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON WOMEN AND EMPLOYMENT 43, 45 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as A. SIMMONS]. For a standard history text on women in the United States, see E. 
FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE (1959). See also -U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, GROWTH OF 
LABOR LAW IN THE UNITED STATES ll (1967). 
11 Kahne & Kohen, Economic Perspectives on the Role of Women in the American 
Economy, l3 J. OF EcoN. LIT. 1249, 1274 (1975). For further documentation of the com-
partmentalization of work women do, see V. OPPENHEIMER, THE FEMALE LABOR FORCE IN 
THE UNITED STATES: DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC FACTORS GOVERNING ITS GROWTH 
AND CHANGING COMPOSITION (Population Monograph Ser. ·5 1970); Bergmann & Adelman, 
The 1973 Report of the President's Council of Economic Advisors: The Economic Role of 
Women. 63 AMER. EcoN. REV. 509 (1973). See also Gross, Plus Ca Change . . . ? The Sex-
ual Structure of Occupations Over Time, SocIAL PROBLEMS 202 (1968). 
u President's Economic Report for 1973, ll WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 101 (Jan. 30, 
1973). 
13 See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (holding that the fourteenth amendment 
was not violated by the limitation of hours women could work in laundries to 10 hours daily, 
even though if the legislation had also affected male employees it would have been invalid). 
14 For an explanation of these protective laws, see WoMEN's BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF 
LABOR, SUMMARY OF STATE LABOR LAWS FOR WOMEN (1969). 
'" See generally W. CHAFE, THE AMERICAN WOMAN ll2-32 (1972), on the struggle be-
tween "reformers" and "feminists" over the value of state protective laws. For insights on 
other aspects of the same conflict, see A. KRADITOR, UP FROM THE PEDESTAL (1968). Al-
though shortly after their adoption it became obvious that the state protective laws also re-
stricted women's employment opportunities, some women's organizations hesitated to re-
commend their demise since they did afford some protection for the most marginal women 
workers against exploitation. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF Wo-
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lawed in 1964, these laws were not declared invalid until the late 
1960's. 16 Their imprint on job patterns remains. 17 
Reflecting the growing importance of paid work in women's 
lives, the paid labor participation of women has risen rapidly 
since World War 11. 18 At the same time the composition of the 
female work force has changed. 19 Marri~d women with children 
have entered the labor market in increasing numbers. Between 
1965 and 1973 participation rates of married women with pre-
school children increased 40%. 20 Although the influx of married 
mothers into the labor market was remarkable, so was the in-
crease in the number of households headed by women, an in-
crease of 46% between 1962 and 1972. Persons living in female-
headed households were more than three times more likely to be 
in poverty than others. 21 
MEN, U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF FEDERAL EM-
PLOYMENT (1963) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF 
WOMEN]. For various views on the role of labor unions in the securing of protective laws, 
see BABCOCK, supra note 6; M. BEARD, THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 192 (1938); 
E. BROWN, INEQUALITY OF PAY (1977); w. CHAFE, supra. 
18 Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that an em-
ployment policy which denied opportunities on the basis of characterizations of physical 
capabilities and endurance violated Title VII). Since 1969 the EEOC Guidelines on Sex 
Discrimination have taken the position that state laws which prohibit or limit employment 
of women violate Title VII and will not be considered a defense to a Title VII charge nor 
the basis for the application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception. 29 
C.F.R. § 1604.2(b)(a) (1978). In 1972, the Commission amended the guidelines, restating 
its position on restrictive laws, but requiring that beneficial state laws such as those deal-
ing with overtime and rest periods be extended to men. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b)(4) 
(1978). By 1971, the Women's Bureau could report that most states had revised their hours 
laws in significant ways. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, STATUS OF STATE 
HOURS LAWS FOR WOMEN SINCE PASSAGE OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 
1964 (1971). 
·17 Indeed, there is some evidence that instead of disappearing, sex polarization is actu-
ally on the increase. See U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOCIAL INDICATORS OF EQUAL-
ITY FOR MINORITIES AND WOMEN 39-46 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SOCIAL INDICATORS]. 
18 The labor force participation rate of women is the percentage, or proportion, of all 
women 16 years of age and over who are in the labor force. Over the past 25 years it has 
risen from 33.9% to 46.3%. WOMEN'S BUREAU, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRA-
TION, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, THE EARNINGS GAP BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN I (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as EARNINGS GAP]. 
19 A. SIMMONS, supra note IO, at 44. Today a profile of working women looks very 
much like the total female population in terms of age, racial composition, educational at-
tainment, marital and family status, and other characteristics. 
20 About one-third of all married women with children under age 6, and 50% of those 
with children 6 to 17 years old, were in the labor force in 1973, an increase from earlier 
rates of 15.5% and 32.2% respectively in 1953. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MANPOWER RE-
PORT OF THE PRESIDENT, 1974. 
21 SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note 17, at 64. The Commission notes that "[f]or women 
and minority men, poverty problems are especially pervasive." In 1974, black people 
were also almost three times more likely to be poor than whites. See also WOMEN'S 
BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, FACTS ABOUT WOMEN HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD AND 
HEADS OF FAMILIES (1973). 
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The pattern of sex segregation in jobs is well known. 22 In a sub-
urban school, for instance, the classroom elementary teachers 
tend to be women, the principal a man, the maintenance workers 
minority males. In a hospital, the doctors typically are majority 
males, the nurses are female, orderlies are minority males, and 
nurses' aides minority (probably black or Hispanic) women. Such 
sharply defined compartmentalization of sex- and race-related 
work may be found in a variety of industries and appears to have 
been even more common in the past. 23 It was not until the late 
1960's that the newspapers stopped running segregated "Help 
Wanted-Male" and "Help Wanted-Female" classified adver-
tisements. 24 Today the extent of occupational segregation is so 
great that for men and women to be doing the same work, about 
two-thirds to three-fourths of the working women would have to 
change occupations. 25 
Most women work in "women's jobs," and despit~ the break-
through for women into non-traditional (male) jobs that has re-
ceived so much media attention, the concentration of women in 
women's jobs seems to be increasing and the range and kinds of 
jobs open to women continue to be restricted. 26 Between 1940 and 
22 SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note 17, at 39. See SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note 17, at 
39, 44 & ll9-20 for an explanation of the "index of dissimilarity" used by the Commission. 
The indicator of occupational segregation allows measurement of the degree to which oc-
cupational segregation exists and has changed in the recent past for minorities and wo-
men. Each group is compared to majority male occupations. See also Gross, supra note 
II. 
23 See ge"nerally SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note 17. 
"See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), in which 
the Court held that help-wanted advertisements are commercial speech and that any first 
amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial pro-
posal was absent. 
The present EEOC Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, which drastically limit use of 
sex-specific classified advertisements, were not adopted until 1968. See 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1604.5 (1978). See also Hernandez, The Women's Movement, EEOC Symposium, 10th 
Anniversary, Rutgers University Law School, 1975 (unpublished manuscript on file at 
Rutgers University Law School). See generally; Note, Elimination of Sexually Segre-
gated Employment Ads: A Step Toward Equal Employment Opportunity, 26 FLA. L. REV. 
577 (1974); Note, Sex Discrimination in Help Wanted Advertising, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 
183 (1974). 
20 SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note 17, at 42, 44-46. The Commission indicators are 
based on 1976 statistics, but there are some indications that sex lines, at least, may be 
wavering. Even if they are, however, it will probably be a long time before there is signifi-
cantly noticeable change. Female admissions to medical, law, and other graduate schools 
from which they have traditionally been excluded or on restricted admission have in-
creased until at many schools one-third of the entering class are women. 
The Commission on Civil Rights also estimates that between one-third and one-half of 
the minority males would have to change occupations to match majority work patterns. It 
has been estimated that it will take approximately seven generations for blacks and whites 
to have similar occupational distributions, even if discrimination were to stop im-
mediately. See Lieberson & Fuguitt, Negro-White Occupational Differences in the Ab-
sence of Discrimination, 73 AMER. J. Soc. 188 (1967). 
28 R. SHAEFFER & E. LYNTON, CORPORATE EXPERIENCES IN IMPROVING WOMEN'S Joe 
OPPORTUNITIES 15-17 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT]. See also 
SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note 17, at 45-46. 
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1970, the number of occupations with a high proportion of women 
(70-80%) and those with a high proportion of men both rose mar-
kedly. 27 While half of the men worked in more than sixty-three 
occupations, half of the women were concentrated in only seven-
teen occupations. 28 In 1974, approximately twenty-four million of 
the thirty million women in non-agricultural employment were in 
· three industry groups: services - 7.4 million; trade - 7 .0 million; 
and government - 6.3 million. 29 Within these industries women 
are sex-segregated into various occupations. 30 
Occupations for women are found closely linked to their 
homemaking role31 or to their socialization as male helpmates. 32 
Such functions include teaching children, nursing the sick, or 
preparing food. 33 It is not surprising that the blue-collar food pro-
cessing industries have large numbers of female-typed jobs, 34 and 
female professionals tend to be employed as non-college 
teachers, nurses, and dieticians;35 or that secretaries are called 
"office wives. " 36 In 1973, nearly two-fifths of all women workers 
worked as secretaries, retail trade sales-workers, bookkeepers, 
private household workers, elementary school teachers, waitress-
27 Kahne & Kohen, supra note 11, at 1272. 
28 See note 40 and accompanying text infra for a list of some of these 17 occupations. 
29 WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, THE ROLE AND STATUS OF WOMEN 
WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 5 (1976) .. 
3° CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 26, at 9, 10. The report says that within the 
corporate sector three-quarters of all women work in female-intensive industries - bank-
ing, insurance, real estate (residential), communications, and manufacturing and retailing 
of non-durable goods - where women have long constituted a larger proportion of the 
work force than in other male-intensive industries such as mining, construction, electric 
and gas utilities, transportation, wholesale trade, and manufacturing and sale of durable 
goods. According to the report, female-intensive industries have large numbers of low-
paying, low-status jobs that have been predominantly filled by women - jobs such as 
clerical employees, retail sales clerks, semi-skilled machine operators, or service work-
ers. Even where women hold most of the jobs, however, the boss is usually a man. Male-
intensive industries, on the other hand, evidently hire fewer women even in traditionally 
female jobs such as clerical jobs than do the female-intensive industries. Id. at 10. 
31 Society's attitude toward housework is divided. On the one hand, it is Mom and apple 
pie, the Madonna and the pedestal, while on the other hand, society thinks it is worth 
exactly what is paid for it. See B. FREIDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963). When simi-
lar work is done out of the home for pay, the latter view is likely to dominate. See the 
discussion of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles vis-a-vis coding and evaluating such 
work, at text accompanying notes 152-53 infra. See also M. WITT & P. NAHERNY, Wo-
MEN's WORK-UP FROM .878 at 13 (1975) [hereinafter cited as UP FROM .878) and John 
Kenneth Galbraith's analysis of the "convenient social virtue" and the function it plays in 
shaping the roles and expectations of women as "crypto-servants" and consumers, J. 
GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 30-37 (1973). 
32 WORK IN AMERICA, supra note 9, at 49. 
33 See generally Waldman & McEaddy, Where Women Work-An Analysis by Industry 
and Occupation, 97 MoN. LAB. REV. 3 (1974). 
34 J. LYLE & J. Ross, WOMEN IN INDUSTRY 74 (1973) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN IN 
INDUSTRY). 
35 BNA DAILY LAB. REP. No. 230, at B-1, Nov. 29, 1976. 
36 See generally BENET, THE SECRETARIAL GHETTO (1972); Ginder, Factors of Sex in 
Office Employment, in OFFICE EXECUTIVE 11 (1961) (suggesting that sex appeal has been a 
qualification for women in more than a few office jobs). 
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es, typists, cashiers, seamstresses and stitchers, and registered 
nurses. 37 One-quarter of all employed women worked in only five 
jobs: secretary-stenographers, household workers, elementary 
school teachers, bookkeepers, and waitresses. 38 
Even when men and women do roughly the same kind of work 
they rarely do so at the same time39 nor do the jobs have the same 
tides. Thus, women are "cooks" while men are "chefs"; women 
are "hostesses" while men are "maitre d's"; women are "sec-
retaries" while men are "administrative assistants. " 40 One 
economic study of male-female wage differentials in professional 
employment has concluded: 
It is difficult for a discriminating organization to give male 
and female employees the same titles and pay them dif-
ferent amounts. It is far easier to assign women to lower 
job levels and then set up a pay structure by level that is 
the same for both sexes .... The assignments to job 
37 WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS 91 
(Bull. No. 197, 1975). 
38 Hedges, Women Workers and Manpower Demands in the J970's, 93 MON. LAB. REV. 
19 (1970). 
39 WORK IN AMERICA, supra note 9, at 50. See also A. SIMMONS, supra note 10, at 51. 
The authors point out the arbitrary manner in which jobs are often sex-typed, noting that 
efforts to justify the exclusion of one sex from a job on the basis of differences in training 
or ability will have to reconcile the ev.idence that in different locales, industries, or com-
panies, a "man's job" may be a "woman's job." The same observation would seem to 
apply to at~empts to reconcile and justify female wage differentials. Moreover, the U.S. 
census data tend to underestimate the extent of sex segregation in the labor market, be-
cause they meld what are really segregated jobs into a single apparently integrated categ-
ory. In the process of reporting, the 35,000 titles recognized in the Dictionary of Occupa-
tional Titles were compressed to 441 for the 1970 census. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, CLASSIFIED INDEX OF Occu-
PATIONS AND INDUSTRIES (1971). For many purposes, moreover, the categories are re-
duced further to 12. See SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note 17, at 34 n.11. 
The Civil Rights Commission notes that "while it may appear that males and females 
have similar occupations, actually this 'equality' is simply an artifact of a classification 
system that combines divergent occupations.'.' Id. 
•o STAfF REPORT, U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WOMEN AND POVERTY 7 (1974) 
[hereinafter cited as WOMEN AND PovERTY]. Different job titles thus may also hide almost 
identical work. Courts under the EPA have recognized that it is appropriate to go behind 
job titles to determine whether jobs with different titles are "substantially equal," as de-
fined in the EPA. See Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970) (holding that a violation of the EPA was established where the 
Secretary of Labor showed that male selector-packers received a pay rate 10% higher than 
female selector-packers); cf. Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1175 (3d 
Cir. 1977) (though the court held that the evidence did not establish a violation of the EPA, 
it observed that "the concept of equality embraces job content.") 
Former EEOC Commissioner Aileen Hernandez has observed: "I learned the dif-
ference between a 'job title' and the 'real job' as I found that men were called administra-
tive assistants and paid at professional salary levels, while women doing exactly the same, 
or more complex work, were called secretaries and paid at much lower clerical salaries." 
Hearing Before the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on Discrimination 
in White Collar Employment, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1968). See also S. TscucHIGANE & 
N. DODGE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 50 
(1974) which studied men and women in the same job titles. 
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levels can most plausibly be interpreted as the mechanism 
by which the discrimination takes place. 41 
Occupational segregation is, however, rarely total. Recently 
there has been some movement of women into traditionally male 
jobs and vice versa. 42 Where a job has been traditionally consid-
ered the province of one sex or the other, however, employers are 
likely to continue to think of it and treat it as they always have. 
The "interlopers" will be treated as deviants, unless and until 
there are so many of them that the job begins to change its charac-
ter. 
During the post-World War II period, one of the most startlingly 
complete "turnings" has been in the job of bank teller. 43 Before 
the war, tellers were almost exclusively white men; the job had 
high prestige, and was a step toward bank officer. Since that time 
banks have begun to hire white women and minorities (male and 
female) as tellers. Tellers' pay has not kept pace with other pre-
dominantly male jobs; further, the promotion ladder has been 
sawed off. Thus, today future bank officers are more likely to be 
hired from recent college or MBA graduates than from among the 
tellers. 
41 Malkiel & Malkiel, Male-Female Pay Differentials in Professional Employment, 63 
AMER. ECON. REV. 693, 704 (1973). 
42 Stone, "A Backlash in the Workplace," N.Y. Times, June II, 1978 § F, at 3,col. l; 
See also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S 
YEAR," ... To FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION ... " 58 (1976) [hereinafter cited as To 
FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION]; Waldman & McEaddy, supra note 33; Hedges & Bemis, 
Sex Stereotyping: Its Decline in Skilled Trades, 97 MoN. LAB. REV. 14 (1974). On May 8, 
1978, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs [hereinafter cited as OFCCP] 
issued guidelines for government contractors under Executive Order 11375, setting 
specific hiring goals for women in construction. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.1-20.6 (1978). 
• 3 WORK IN AMERICA, supra note 9, at 50. The report notes: "[S]chool teaching, tele-
phone operating and clerical work were once male occupations in the United States. More 
recently the occupations of bank teller and school crossing guard have been feminized.'' 
A woman's job may result from a downgrading of what once was a traditional man's 
job. Thus, a job may be "turned" by assigning women to it and discouraging men by 
either lowering the wage rate, or, more often, not raising the rate for that job when other 
job rates are raised. Sometimes minor parts of the job are also changed, and typically the 
job will be disassociated from its former promotion ladder. If the employer has given on-
the-job training, prior educational requirements will often be substituted. To FORM A 
MORE PERFECT UNION, supra note 42. For an example within the insurance industry, see 
WOMEN IN INDUSTRY, supra note 34, at 8 (1973). 
The position of "financial officer," a position once staffed by men who were given con-
siderable responsibility in the signing off of loans, has been transformed into a "woman's 
job." In the process, the job has been relegated to a lower portion of the firm's corporate 
organization chart and to a narrowed range of salary levels. 
"Turning a job" is analogous to "tipping" a residential neighborhood or school. This 
concept has been well recognized and statutes prohibiting "blockbusting" or deliberately 
"tipping" a predominantly white area by suggesting that minorities are moving in are 
common. There seems to be a point at which a block or school is perceived as no longer 
"white," but rather as a "black" neighborhood or school. Historically, this has often 
been accompanied by "white flight," as whites leave and the formerly integrated area be-
comes resegregated as a minority neighborhood. The tipping point for neighborhoods and 
schools is generally accepted to be the ratio of 70 whites to 30 blacks. 
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2. Race Discrimination-Segregation of jobs by race is one as-
pect of the heritage of slavery. In the post-Civil War South, 
blacks were restricted and excluded from the preferred '' white 
work'' and confined to jobs which were considered appropriate to 
their inferior status. 44 This southern pattern of considering as jobs 
suitable for blacks the lower paying, strenuous, and uncomforta-
ble work demonstrates the connection between segregation and 
wage rates. 45 The jobs to which blacks were assigned were, be-
cause of the fact of black assignment, paid at a low rate. 
The extent of occupational segregation by race was docu-
mented in the Truman Committee on Civil Rights Report in 1947: 
Discriminating in hiring has forced many minority work-
ers into low paying and often menial jobs such as common 
laborer and domestic servant .... Farmers, farm labor-
ers and other laborers constituted 62.2% of all employed 
Negro men and only 28.5% of all employed white men 
.... Skilled craftsmen represented 15.6% of employed 
white men [but] only 4.4% of employed Negro men. 46 
The report noted that in Houston, returning Negro veterans had 
average incomes of $30 per week while white veterans averaged 
$49. 47 In 1963, a House Report on the bill which eventually be-
came Title VII stated, inter alia, "among Negroes who are em-
ployed, their jobs are largely concentrated among the semi-s.killed 
... occupations.' '48 This pattern of overt restriction of jobs by 
race persisted openly until the early 1960's. It was made illegal by 
the passage of Title VII in 1964. 
As administered, Title VII remedied job segregation by provid-
ing for promotional opportunities for blacks into previously white 
jobs. But it did not require that blacks who had been hired into 
segregated jobs be allowed to move forthwith into other jobs. It 
was construed to permit movement of blacks, who were qualified, 
to their ''rightful place'' - meaning where they would have been 
but for their color - but only as vacancies arose for which they 
had more length of service than their white counterparts. But this 
degree of mobility was limited by the Supreme Court in 1977. 49 
44 See G. MYRDAL, supra note 3, passim. 
4 • See H. HILL, supra note 3, at ch. I. 
48 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE 
RIGHTS 57 (1947) [hereinafter cited as To SECURE THESE RIGHTS]. 
41 Id. 
48 H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 27 (1963). 
49 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (holding that 
the Teamsters had engaged in a nationwide pattern of employment discrimination against 
minority members in violation of Title VII, and awarding retroactive seniority to those 
minority workers who had been discriminated against). 
410 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 12:3 
3. Current Status of Sex and Race Segregation-In 1978, the 
Civil Rights Commission concluded: 
Minorities and females are segregated from the majority 
in the types of occupation they have. At least one-third of 
the minority males and two-thirds to three-fourths of the 
minority females would have to change their occupations 
in order for their groups to have occupational distribu-
tions similar to the majority males. 50 
Thus, the highest degree of occupational dissimilarity can be 
found between the female groups and majority males. 
Summing up its assessment of the current status of minorities 
and women, the Commission said: 
In the area of education, minorities and women are more 
likely to be . . . educationally overqualified for the work 
they do, and earning less than comparably educated 
majority males .... [W]omen and minority men are more 
likely to be unemployed (especially if they are teenagers), 
to have less prestigious occupations, and to be concen-
trated in different occupations than [sic] majority males. 
With regard to income, minorities and women have less 
per capita household income; lower earnings even after 
such determinants of earnings as education, weeks of 
work, age, and occupational prestige have been adjusted 
to equality among groups [thus inferring that the residual 
differential is due to sex and/or minority status]; smaller 
annual increases in earnings with age; and a greater 
likelihood of being in poverty. 51 
The Commission concluded that minorities and females remain 
segregated from the majority in the types of occupations they 
hpld, and that not only are the jobs women and minorities have 
different, but the jobs which they typically hold are valued less by 
society in general. 
4. Job Segregation and the Male-Female, Black-White Wage 
Differential-Simultaneously with the increase in job segrega-
tion, there has been a widening of the earnings gap between men 
and women. Women are generally over-represented among those 
workers whose earnings are low. Their median full time earnings 
in 1955 totaled 64% of men's income; but by 1973 women earned 
only about 57% of men's earnings. 52 In 1974, they were 3.7 times 
• 0 SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note 17, at 45. 
01 Id. at 45, 86. 
02 UP FROM .878, supra note 31, at 5. See also EARNINGS GAP, supra note 18; WOMEN 
AND POVERTY, supra note 40. 
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as likely as men to be earning between $3,000 and $4,999, ac-
counting for 63% of workers at that pay level, and 3 .0 times as 
likely to be within the $5,000 to $6,999 earnings range, accounting 
at this level for 58% of the workers. Fifty-three percent of wo-
men, but only 18% of men earned less than $7,000; and 82% of 
women, but only 38% of men earned less than $10,000. Of all full 
time, year-round workers earning more than $15,000, only 5% 
were women. 53 Only approximately 18% of these differences have 
been attributed to the lower pay of women doing the same job as 
men.54 
R~cent reports also indicate that during periods of reduced 
economic growth, lower income black families receive a smaller 
proportion of total money income55 than do lower income white 
families, which is due in part to the rapidly increasing proportion 
of black families that are headed by females. There is more simi-
larity in kinds of jobs, degree of segregation, and income earned 
between racial and ethnic groups than between the sexes. The 
earnings gap between men and women in every group is greater 
than is the gap attributable to racial or ethnic differences. 56 
After almost fifteen years of federal legislation prohibiting dis-
crimination in eompensation and segregation of jobs, the wage 
gap is larger now than it was before the legislation. The growing 
gap has been explained by the continuing predominance of 
women in lower status jobs of a traditional nature, and the 
dynamic rise in women's labor force participation which puts 
many new women workers at or near the entry level. 57 But this 
argument assumes that as these new workers stay in the labor 
53 EARNINGS GAP, supra note 18, at 1,6 (table). 
54 See notes 218-20 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of economic studies 
which find only insignificant amounts of "pure" wage discrimination, i.e., lower pay for 
the same job. U.S. News & World Report simply states that the "basic reason for the 
[earnings] gap is occupational segregation." U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., Jan. 15, 1979, at 
64. 
55 "Total money income" refers to the sum of wages, welfare payments, and money 
from other sources. 
58 SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note 17, at 53, 90. See generally EARNINGS GAP, supra 
note 18. 
57 Women were hired for about two-thirds of the 3.4 million new jobs created during 
1978, according to the N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1979, §A, at 10, col. I. Thus, though women 
were replacements in some jobs, the bulk of the new women workers are in new jobs in 
areas historically open to women, see CONFERENCE BoARD REPORT, supra note 16, at 
9-11, or in newly created service industries doing work that was formerly done at home, 
such as restaurants, hospitals, or paid care for the young and.the old. See WOMEN AND 
POVERTY, supra note 40, at 27; UP FROM .878, supra note 31. Thus, much of the new paid 
work in these areas has already been pegged as women's work. The Civil Rights Commis-
sion notes that service occupations are the lowest paid, least likely to be unionized, and 
most heavily female, see WOMEN AND POVERTY, supra note 40, at 27, but that even 
among service workers, women's earnings are substant_ially lower than men's. While 
earnings of male service workers in 1972 were $7,630, female service workers earned only 
$1,833, or only 24% of men's earnings. Id. at 7. 
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force their pay will improve. For workers in men's jobs this is a 
realistic assumption. Most white males over a lifetime do have a 
steadily rising income curve. 58 Minority men also have an 1Jpward 
sloping curve, though their lifetime wage curve tends to be lower 
than that of white males. 59 For most women's jobs, however, 
there has been no financial ladder. 60 The female curve of wages is 
almost flat, indicating that most women's jobs are dead end, with 
little promotional opportunity and few instances in which wages 
increase as a function of time or seniority. 61 As long as women 
continue to be channeled into traditionally structured segregated 
jobs identified as women's work, their entry level pay will probab-
ly continue to approximate their average lifetime real earnings, 
with little prospect of long term relative wage gains. 
In at least one predominately female occupation, as the degree 
of segregation has increased, so has the gap between what men 
and women earn. Coincident with a rapid concentration of women 
in clerical jobs62 women's relative earnings dropped sharply as a 
proportion of men's earnings. In 1973, the median wage for 
women clerical workers was 61% of that for men employed in cler-
ical work; the proportion was 69% in 1962, and 72% in 1956. 63 
Thus, for the largest concentration of women workers, the long 
term trend would indicate a broadening rather than a closing of 
the gap, if the feminization continues unchecked. 
The argument that minorities and women as recent entrants 
into the work force are still at entry pay levels also implies that 
many minorities and women have broken into non-traditional jobs 
where they can expect work and wage histories similar to major-
ity males. In terms of numbers, the significance of most of the 
breakthroughs into the non-traditional jobs appears to be exag-
gerated. While white women have increased their share of the 
higher paying jobs at a rate slightly faster than their representa-
u SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note 17, at 56-60. 
oe 1d. 
60 Id. For some female ethnic groups, the lifetime earnings curve actually tends to drop 
close to age 45. Id. at 60. None of the female groups had annual earning increments above 
25% of those of majority males in 1975, and according to the Civil Rights Commission 
there are no signs that the indicator values will improve in the future. 
61 Id. Compare the statement in the text with the characteristics of women's jobs de-
scribed by V. OPPENHEIMER, THE FEMALE LABOR FORCE IN THE UNITED STATES: 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC FACTORS GOVERNING ITS GROWTH AND CHANGING COM-
POSITION 131 (1970), e.g., low pay, worker must possess skills before taking job, no con-
tinuity, little specialization. See generally, P. DOERINGER & M. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR 
MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS (1971) [hereinafter cited as INTERNAL LABOR MAR-
KETS]. The authors also note the dead-end characteristic of jobs identified for blacks or 
women. 
62 Between 1962 and 1970, the percentage of women in clerical jobs rose from 69% to 
75%. HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS, supra note 3, at 132. 
63 Id. 
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tion in total employment, 64 and for professional workers the pro-
portion of women's to men's earnings rose from 60% in 1960 to 
67 .5% in 1972,65 most women and most minorities are still going 
into traditionally segregated work. 66 
Moreover, many corporations reporting successful efforts to 
place women in non-traditional jobs, including managerial and 
professional positions, have reported that hiring from outside was 
easier and tended to be more successful than upgrading present 
employees. Upgrading clericals, even those with good academic 
credentials was reported to be difficult, because fellow employees 
continued to treat them as clericals. 67 This would suggest that 
even if more women are hired into managerial-professional posi-
tions, women already employed as clericals will stay in those 
jobs. 
Shortly after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, there 
was a dramatic improvement in the rate at which minorities, par-
ticularly black males, became upwardly mobile. 68 However, by 
1975 there were warnings that the change seemed impressive only 
because they had started so far behind. 69 It was further claimed 
that both minority males and females had not done nearly as well 
as had white women in gaining access to professional and man-
agerial jobs. 70 Much of the improvement in black income was at-
tributed to the increased number of families where both husband 
and wife had one or more college degrees and each was work-
ing. 71 Although by 1970 such families' income had reached parity 
with that of two-degreed whi.te families, slightly more black wives 
84 JOBS FOR AMERICANS, supra note 3, at 154. S~e also A. SIMMONS, supra note 10, at 3. 
es Kahne & Kohen, supra note II, at 1274. See also CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, supra 
note 26, at 19-45. The Conference Board noted that while there has apparently been im-
provement in job opportunities open to women, particularly in the lower echelons of the 
managerial, professional, and sales representative categories, very little is known about 
moving sizable numbers of women into higher managerial levels. Most corporations seem 
to be stressing lower management, professional, and sales positions for women. These are 
considered non-traditional jobs for women, and are areas in which representation of 
women was reported improved by at least one full percentage point. Skilled blue collar 
jobs such as truck driver, welder, or apprentice were rarely mentioned as areas in which 
any sizable number of women had been successfully introduced. 
88 See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra. See also CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, 
supra note 26, at 17. 
67 CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 26, at 53-55 & 68-69. 
66 SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note 17, at 44. 
69 Joes FOR AMERICANS, supra note 3, at 154. See also SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note 
17, at 44. The Commission on Civil Rights reports that occupational segregation actually 
increased for all groups studied from 1960-70, except the groups that had experienced the 
greatest initial segregation in 1960 (Blacks, Puerto Ricans and Chinese Americans). 
10 Joes FOR AMERICANS, supra note 3, at 144. 
71 Wattenberg & Scammon, Black Progress and Liberal Rhetoric, 55 toMMENTARY 35, 
41 (April 1973). See also R. FREEMAN, THE CHANGING LABOR MARKET FOR BLACK 
AMERICANS, 148 (1972). See generally BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 67, 
118-20 (1973). 
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worked than did white wives. 72 Improvement in black income 
was also attributed to increases in the number of black craftsmen 
and white collar personnel. 73 Many of these were black women 
who were hired as clericals, jobs previously largely barred to 
blacks. 74 There has also been a noticeable shift of black women 
out of private housework, and of black men and women off the 
farm. Black women still, however, hold more than their share of 
low paying, low status operative, laborer, and service jobs out-
side private homes. 75 
In 1975 the black economic picture over the previous fifteen 
years was described as a "mosaic of both progress and stagna-
tion. " 76 In general, blacks were moving ahead economically, but 
a number of divergent trends were discerned even then. 77 By 
1978-79 fears were being voiced that the upward trend into better 
paying, higher opportunity jobs had slowed or even been re-
versed. 78 
The wage differential has also been attributed to different work 
patterns and attitudes between the sexes: women, it is said, put in 
less overtime, only work part time, have different kinds of train-
ing, education, and counseling, and fewer years of work/life ex-
perience. 79 
However, the earnings gap widens for both majority women 
and minorities when the median number of school years com-
pleted is the same for men and women or minorities. For both 
women and minority males, the return on an investment in educa-
tion is considerably less per year of education than for majority 
males. 80 Available data reveal that women's part time employ-
ment is too limited to account for the earnings gap. 81 For those 
who do work part-time the gap is larger than it initially appears 
71 Wattenberg & Scammon, supra note 71, at 36. 
73 Id. Black workers in those categories went from 2.9 million in 1960 to 5.1 million in 
1970. See also JOBS FOR AMERICANS, supra note 3, at 148-49. 
"Id. at 154. 
75 Id. at 150. 
78 Id. at 142. 
11 Id. 
78 SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note 17' at 45-46. 
79 WOMEN AND POVERTY, supra note 40, at 6. Most of the same arguments and 
stereotypes are also used to explain the earnings gap for minorities. See text accompany-
ing notes 101 - 03 infra for a discussion of the similarity of stereotypes and perceptions of 
minorities and women. 
80 Joint Economic Committee Hea,:ings, Economic Profile of Women, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. pt. 2, at 2 (1973). Women with four years of college in 1974 had lower median in-
comes than men who had only completed the eighth grade. Women's median income was 
far below that for men at every educational level. See EARNINGS GAP, supra note 18, at 
2-3; HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS, supra note 3, at 134. Minorities' income, like wo-
men's, was far below what white males with far less schooling earned. SocIAL INDI-
CATORS, supra note 17, at 27. 
81 WOMEN AND POVERTY, supra note 40, at 6. 
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because part-time work rarely carries fringe benefits, which may 
add over one-third to the value of the pay chec_k. 
The rationale that the lower incomes of minorities and women 
reflect less experience simply restates the belief discussed above 
that wages improve with time worked. This assumption is unwar-
ranted because, in the typical "women's" job, experience is ir-
reievant and unrelated to wages. 
Even those economists' studies that have given full weight to 
experience and have adjusted for these and other factors such as 
age, region, and industrial concentration agree that much of the. 
male-female earnings differential remains unexplained by con-
ventional economic analysis. 82 Even if the pervasive socialization 
and channeling into "proper" occupations that occur for both 
minorities and women through the operations of various institu-
tions, including education and counseling, were to explain why 
women or minorities are found only in certain occupations, this 
would not explain why the wages associated with those occupa-
tions are depressed. 83 If the evidence of the social sciences dis-
cussed in the following section is credible, it is the fact that the 
jobs are segregated, without regard to how the segregation occur-
red, which permits the attitude toward minorities and women with 
whom the jobs are identified to influence the value put on those 
jobs. 
B. Links Between Job Segregation and Wage Discrimination 
1. The Findings of the Social Sciences and Empirical 
Studies-Job segregation remains the most common characteris-
tic of women's work, and continues to be a major factor in the 
work situation of minorities. Furthermore, these segregated jobs 
are concentrated in the lowest paying of the occupations. It is this 
concentration in lower paying segregated jobs which accounts for 
most of the wage differentials between men and women, blacks 
82 See notes 217-20 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the economic 
studies of discrimination. See also SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note 17, at 53-56. Even 
after adjustments for differences in level of education, working time, and other factors 
between minorities and females on one hand and majority men on the other, a gap re-
mains. For women, the ratios after controlling for differences indicate that women earned 
half of what majority males with similar work-related characteristics earned in 1970. 
83 Economists do not recognize such "premarket" discrimination in discussing either 
demand or supply aspects of labor market discrimination. Such factors, however, are rec-
ognized by the law. Where pre-act discrimination is perpetuated by present practices, 
Title VII is violated. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (197_3); 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (for a detailed discussion of Griggs, see 
note 222 infra.). Even where the employer itself has not discriminated, it may take action 
to ameliorate societal discrimination which manifests itself in historically segregated jobs. 
See, e.g., Steelworkers v. Weber, __ U.S. __ , 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979). 
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and whites. It is necessary to determine whether a link can be 
found between the fact that the jobs are segregated and the rates 
of pay associated with them. 
The fact that women have lower social status than men in our 
society and that both sexes tend to value men and male charac-
teristics, values, and activities more highly than those of women, 
has been documented by authorities in a number of disciplines. 84 
It has been well established that a division of labor between the 
sexes exists in every known society, that in every society the 
value put on the work reflects the status of those traditionally al-
located that work, and that work identified with women is always 
considered less valuable than that done by men, regardless of its 
difficulty or its contribution. Psychologists support these conclu-
sions, finding that the socialization process works so well that 
women as well as men tend to perceive work associated with 
women to be of less value than that done by men. 85 
Classical studies in cultural anthropology show that although in 
every culture there is a division of labor and of roles along sex 
lines there is no consistency about which jobs are allocated to 
men and which to women. Thus, although the people in any par-
ticular culture may believe that the way they do things is divinely 
ordained, there is an almost infinite variety of ways of dividing 
labor. The anthropologists of both modern and primitive life have 
found that however work is divided the allocation determines the 
status attached to kinds of labor. 86 
Thus, it is the sex factor that determines the status of the work, 
not the great diversity in the level and pattern of men's and wo-
men's work. It is important to note that this perception of men's 
84 See M. HUGHES, THE SEXUAL BARRIER: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL ASPECTS 
OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1977) [hereinafter cited as THE SEXUAL BARRIER]. This 
prizewinning bibliography has over 117 entries listed under "sex roles" and over 30 under 
"attitudinal data," all but two done since 1970. There are, altogether, 17 chapters of more 
than 8,000 entries. The extent of this bibliography indicates not only the depth of present 
concern about the subject and the pervasiveness of attitudes detrimental to and derogat-
ory of women, but also how recent is the consciousness that such stereotypes and at• 
titudes constitute a problem. 
85 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL/NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Joe EVALUA· 
TION: AN ANALYTIC REVIEW (Interim Report to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission) 52 (1979) [hereinafter cited as NAS REPORT]. 
86 Thus, the anthropological conclusion is that "[i]n a culture where men weave and 
women fish, just as in a culture where men fish and women weave, it is axiomatic that 
whichever activity is assigned to the male is the activity with the greater prestige, power, 
status, and rewards." K. MILLETT, SEXUAL Pouncs 224 (1970) (citation omitted). The 
leading anthropologist Margaret Mead adds, "One aspect of the social valuation of dif-
ferent types of labor is the differential prestige of men's activities and women's activities. 
Whatever men do-even if it is dressing dolls for religious ceremonies-is more prestigi• 
ous than what women do and is treated as a higher achievement." Mead, Prehistory and 
the Woman, Barnard C. Bull., Supp. 7 (April 30, 1969). See generally M. MEAD, SEX AND 
TEMPERAMENT IN THREE PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES (1935) and MEAD, MALE AND FEMALE 
(1949), which apply cultural anthropological insights to modern culture. 
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work as the more important is not confined to our culture. In the 
USSR and Eastern Europe, where there are a greater percentage 
of women, physicians, engineers, and lawyers, lawyers are not a 
high status profession, and the women in medicine and engineer-
ing occupy the lower ranks. 87 
· In a 1975 report, the International Labour Conference stated: 
Almost everywhere there remains a clear division of 
labour by sex with jobs labeled as "men's work" and 
"women's work." While the line of demarcation may 
vary with time and place, what is significant is the persis-
tence of distinctions based on sex stereotypes . . . . [J]ob 
labelling of this kind is both dangerous and discrimina-
tory. It leads to recruitment based on sex rather than on 
capacity, and it perpetuates unproven beliefs about wo-
men's abilities and inabilities. as workers. It creates a 
situation in which work traditionally done by men com-
mands higher pay and prestige while that traditionally 
done by women is accorded lower pay and prestige and is 
consistently undervalued. It has no inherent logic. 88 
The International Labour Conference draws the same conclu-
sion often recognized by social scientists, that unproven and un-
questioned assumptions and prejudices about women's capacities 
and inclinations are held by both men and women. 89 For example, 
in a psychological study in which female college students were 
asked to assess two identical groups of professional articles for 
value, competence, persuasiveness, and writing style, where the 
articles had been attributed to a male author in one group and a 
female author in the other, the articles in the "female-authored" 
group received significantly lower ratings. 90 This result had been 
81 See H. SMITH, THE RUSSIANS 166-95 (1976); Fry, Structure of Medical Care Services 
in the U.S.S.R., 2 INT'L. J. HEALTH SERV. 243 (1972). In Russia, women who constitute 
75% of medical personnel are most often in primary care: 80% of the physicians assigned 
to primary care are women. Storey, USSR People's Court and Women Lawyers, 48 
WOMEN LA w J. 21 (1962) (states that law was one profession that generally was demoted 
in status after the revolution in the tJ .S.S.R.). The status of women in many countries has 
been well documented by the United Nations and others in conjunction with International 
Woman's Year. For a bibliography, see generally THE SEXUAL BARRIER, supra note 84. 
88 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND TREATMENT 
FOR WOMEN WORKERS, REPORT VIII 20 (lnt'I Labour Conference, 60th Sess. 1975). 
88 Jd. 
90 Goldberg, Are Women Prejudiced Against Women?, 5 TRANSACTION 28-30 (1968). 
Professor Goldberg's study was replicated, with the same results, with both male and 
female students. The conclusion which the researchers reached was that men and women 
are likely to exhibit similar. prejudices against women. See Bern & Bern, Training the 
Woman to Know Her Place: The Power of a Nonconscious Ideology, in REPORT OF THE 
NEW YORK CITY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, WOMEN'S ROLE IN CONTEMPORARY 
SOCIETY 101 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NYC HEARINGS]. The hearings provide an excel-
lent review of the state of the art and the understanding of many disciplines. 
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predicted for articles from traditionally "male" fields such as law 
and city planning, but women students surprisingly also 
downgraded articles on dietetics and elementary school education 
when it was assumed they were written by women. 91 
Another study indicates that these attitudes are learned, and 
that development of such attitudes are considered part of a ''nor-
mal" growing up. Thus, although the girls studied made better 
grades in school, their opinions of themselves grew progressively 
worse as they got older, but their opinion of boys and boys' 
abilities grew better. Boys, however, have an increasingly better 
opinion of themselves and worse opinion of girls as they grow 
older. 92 
The fact that women do have lower social status than men in 
91 Goldberg, supra note 90, at 28-30. The conclusions of Goldberg and the Berns have 
since been substantiated by several similar studies. In each, identical work attributed to 
men was better received and given higher ratings than when attributed to a woman. See 
Jones & Moye!, Men's and Women's Affective Response to Photographed Subjects Who 
Differ in Iris-color, Pupil-size, and Sex, 37 PERCEPTUAL AND MOTOR SKILLS 483-87 
(1973). In this study, male and female students were shown photographs of both men and 
women. Both groups were more likely to respond positively to the pictures of men than to 
those of women. In Fidell, Empirical Verification of Sex Discrimination in Hiring Prac-
tices in Psychology, 25 AMER. PSYCHOLOGIST 1094 (1970), descriptions of 10 psychologists 
with varying male and female names affixed to 'the same description were sent to 155 
psychology department chairpersons who were asked to indicate whether and at what 
level each person might be hired. Male names were approximately 10% more likely to be 
evaluated as deserving appointment at the tenured level (associate or full professor) than 
were the female names. See also Rosen & Jerdee, Effects of Applicant's Sex and Diffi-
culty of Job on Evaluations of Candidates for Managerial Positions, 59 J. APPLIED 
PSYCH. 511 (1974). The authors found that when male undergraduate business students 
were asked to rate job applicants with both male and female names, male applicants got 
higher ratings for general suitability, potential for long service, and potential for fitting in 
well in the organization. Sex differences became more pronounced as the jobs under con-
sideration were deemed more demanding. In Rosen, Benson, & Jerdee, Influence of Sex 
Role Stereotypes on Personnel Decisions, 59 J. APPLIED PsYcH. 9 (1974) [hereinafter cited 
as Stereotypes on Personnel Decisions], in order to test the influence of sex role 
stereotypes in organizational situations, male bank managers at a management institute 
were asked to respond to situations requiring managerial judgment. Persons with male 
names were favored for promotion, and were more likely to be chosen to attend a profes-
sional conference and to have their recommendations regarding a supervisor-subordinate 
conflict accepted. A leave of absence for family reasons was seen as more appropriate for 
female than for male employees. In Rosen, Benson, & Jardee, Sex Stereotyping in the 
Executive Suite, 52 HARV. Bus. REV. 45 (1974) [hereinafter cited as HARVARD], a survey 
of HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW subscribers, using a somewhat different and larger set of 
management situations, yielded results similar to those in Stereotypes on Personnel Deci-
sions, indicating that time-worn ideas of what is the proper place for men and women, 
both in the home and at work, suffuse managerial judgments. In another study, Signori & 
Butt, Ratings of the Social Images of Disadvantaged Groups by Males and Females, 30 
PSYCH. REP. 575-80 (1972), both men and women rated women on characteristics relevant 
to employability. Male evaluators r_ated women less favorably than did the women 
evaluators. The authors suggest this indicates that men in hiring positions may be less 
objective in evaluating female applicants. But see Arvey, Passino, & Lounsbury, Job 
Analysis Results as Influenced by Sex of Incumbent and Sex of Analyst, 621. OF APPLIED 
PSYCH. 411 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Joa ANALYSIS.]. 
92 Smith, Age and Sex Differences in Children's Opinion Concerning Sex Differences, 
54 J. OF GENETIC PSYCH. 17 (1939). See also G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 
(1958). 
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our society and that both sexes tend to value men and male 
characteristics, values, and activities more higbly than those of 
women, has been documented by authorities in a number of disci-
plines. 93 The data confirming that sexual bias affects the 
evaluator's perception of the work is now so clear that the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences states that 
the evidence for sex stereotyping in job related contexts 
is certainly strong enough to suggest the likelihood that 
sex stereotyping will pervade the evaluation of jobs 
strongly identified with one sex or the other. That is, it is 
likely that predominately female jobs will be undervalued 
relative to predominately male jobs in the same way that 
women are undervalued relative to men. 94 
Some sociologists have even claimed that the sexual division of 
labor within the family and society together with persisting sexual 
stereotypes establish a caste-like system. In such a system, the 
low-ranking race or sex is not only defined as being unable to per-
form certain types of prestigious work, but propriety is violated if 
it does. 95 Thus, one consistent element in the assignment of jobs 
to men, even in modern societies is that "whatever the strictly 
male tasks are, they are defined as more honorific .... 
Moreover, the task of control, management, decision, appeals to 
the gods - in short the higher level jobs that typically do not re-
quire strength, speed or traveling far from home - are male 
jobs. " 96- The caste analogy has more often been applied to race 
than to sex, and is now widely accepted as an accurate portrayal 
of the racial situation in the United States, particularly in the 
South, prior to the passage of Title VII. 
The dogma of racial inferiority inherited from slavery has satu-
rated all of our legal, social, and economic institutions, and our 
behavior and thought patterns, according to Gunnar Myrdal, a 
leading sociologist. 97 The study suggests that there is a parallel 
between the status and societal expectations for blacks and for 
93 See NYC HEARINGS, supra note 90. See generally THE SEXUAL BARRIER, supra note 
84. 
9 • NAS REPORT, supra note 85, at 52. 
95 W. GOODE, THE FAMILY 70 (1965). Talcott Parsons, dean of American sociology, also 
notes the corollary that in a society like the United States, an individual's occupation, and 
the monetary rewards it commands, are given overwhelming importance in the allocation 
of status and prestige. T. PARSONS, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 95 (1954). For 
further exploration of the idea of sex as a caste, see Freeman, The Legal Basis of the Sexual 
Caste System, 5 VAL. U.L. REV. 203 (1971). Empirical sociologists have recently begun to 
investigate the relationship between male/female occupational, prestige, segregation, and 
wage differentials. See, e.g., S. McLaughlin, Occupational Characteristics and the Male-
Female Income Differential (1975) (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis on file with Washington State 
University). 
96 GooDE, THE FAMILY, supra note 95 (emphasis in the original). 
97 G. MYRDAL, supra note 3, passim. 
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women. 98 Others have also described similarities between the 
characteristics expected of blacks in the society and those ex-
pected of women, 99 and have suggested that these are traits that 
the majority typically expects of the underclass. 100 These expec-
tations, in turn, give rise to stereotypes and distorted perceptions. 
2. The Persistence of Stereotypes-Empirical studies of man-
agement attitudes confirm the analysis of the social scientists. 
The President's Commission on the Status of Women101 reported 
that employer attitudes included beliefs that a woman's primary 
commitment is to her family, which limits her effectiveness on the 
98 Jd. at 110 (Appendix 6). 
•• G. ALLPORT, supra note 92. See also K. MILLETT, supra note 86, at 229, which 
quotes and analyzes studies comparing personality traits of men and women. Millett 
points out that all the traits chosen as desirable are also the traits attributed to men: thus 
passivity, manipulativeness, and slyness are female traits; clear thinking, initiative, can-
dor, and honesty are male traits. 
100 G. ALLPORT, supra note 92. One consequence of being part of a class which is con-
sidered inferior by the majority is that the members of the group develop self-hate. The 
tendency of members of subordinate groups to ward self-hatred may explain the results of 
one study reported by the NAS REPORT. The study was designed to test the hypothesis 
that the sex of a job's incumbent would affect the ratings of the job in a structured job 
analysis. The job tested was administrative assistant. Both men and women evaluators 
rated the same job with both men and women as the administrative assistant. The sex of 
the job holder seemed to make less difference than the sex of the evaluator. Women 
tended to grade more harshly. The authors suggested that if jobs are consistently analyzed 
exclusively by either male or female analysts, there may be over- or under-valuation of 
the jobs, compared to the evaluations if the evaluators are of both sexes. NAS REPORT, 
supra note 85, at 43. See also Job Analysis, supra note 91, at 411. 
While these findings themselves indicate the many ways in which bias can creep into 
the essentially subjective phases of job evaluation, this particular study may not be rele-
vant to whether sex or race stereotyping affects the evaluation of jobs traditionally 
thought of as female or black, since the job of administrative assistant is usually thought 
of as either neutral or as a man's job. 
Other studies indicate that women may be less down-rated if they have been certified as 
exceptionally competent by independent sources. In one study, subjects were shown 
paintings and told they were (1) contest entrants, or (2) winners. _Paintings identified as 
entrants were more favorably regarded if attributed to men, but there was no difference by 
sex of painter for those described as winners. Pheterson, Kiesler, & Goldberg, Evaluation 
of'the Performance of Women as a Function of Their Sex, Achievement, and Personal 
History, 19 J. PERSONALITY Soc. PsYCH. 114 (1971). This "go with a winner" psychology 
may account in part for the Jack of sex difference in ratings of the administrative assistant 
job above. If that job is typically thought of as being a man's job, then in a real sense the 
very fact that a woman is in the job may constitute a certification that she is extraordi-
nary; offsetting any contrary tendency to downgrade the job because the incumbent is a 
woman. See text following note 42 supra, where it is suggested that an employer's views 
and attitudes toward a job will not change with the first entrant of the "wrong" sex or 
race, although it may change after a new identification is established for the job. Two simi-
lar studies, see NAS REPORT, supra note 85, at 51-52, submitted applications to a profes-
sional "job fair" and to colleges. Both studies reported that among applicants with out-
standing qualifications both men and women were chosen, but from among applicants 
with more modest credentials men were more likely to be admitted or asked for an inter-
view. However, neither these studies _nor the study indicating that the sex of the painters 
did not affect attitudes toward paintings identified as winners (though it did for those that 
were only contest entrants) evidently attempted to determine how the sex would affect 
rankings. Would sex make a difference in who was chosen first? The answer to that seems 
to lie in the other group of experiments which indicate that when males and females have 
the same credentials the males are perceived as superior. See NAS REPORT, supra note 
85, at 50-51. 
lOl PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, supra note 15, at 65. 
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job; that a woman is suited by temperament and skill to certain 
jobs such as electronic work, but not others _such as surgery, 
though both demand dexterity; that men should not be subordi-
nate to women; and that intimate groups (except those based on 
family or sexual ties) should be limited to membership of either 
sex, but not both . 
. The belief that woman's real life work is her home and family, 
and that man is the chief breadwinner, also leads to the belief that a 
woman is the secondary source of family income. It then follows 
that since she is only working for "pin money" she doesn't need 
to pe paid much, and that since hers is the secondary income, 
women workers should be fired before male workers in case of an 
economic recession. 
However, findings indicate that differences in productivity, ab-
senteeism, and labor costs between men and women as well as be-
tween the races in reality are quite low. Most differences that the 
stereotypes attribute to sex and race characteristics appear to be 
attributable to the job. Low paying, dead-end, marginaljobs with 
little future prospects have high rates of turnover, absenteeism, 
and tardiness, no matter who is in the job. 102 By restricting the 
demand for women workers and "crowding" them into women's 
jobs, sex stereotyping has kept the wages lower for those jobs. 103 
3. The Factor of Historical Overt Wage Discrimination-While 
the preceding section suggests that unconscious factors have de-
valued work assigned to women and minorities, there are a num-
ber of instances where such devaluation occurred openly. When 
seemingly "neutral" wage setting practices are applied against a 
background of overtly discriminatory wage rates, the effect is to 
perpetuate the differentials into the present. This process is most 
evident in the case of sex discrimination, but may also exist in 
connection with race discrimination. The period of overt wage 
discrimination was prior to the passage of the EPA and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. Until passage of these Acts, management per-
sonnel talked openly about how good their company was to wo-
men, how it had "accommodated" them by structuring jobs so 
they would have to do no heavy work (while paying men dispro-
portionately more for picking up the slack) and by allowing 
IOS See A. SIMMONS, supra note JO, at 52-55; s. TSCUCHIGANE & N. DODGE, supra note 
40; PRESIDENTS' COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN (1963), supra note 15, at 55; 
WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACTS ABOUT WOMEN'S ABSENTEEISM AND 
LABOR TURNOVER 550 (1969). 
103 Weisskoff, supra note 3, at 161. From her empirical studies the author simply con-
cludes that "women earn less because they are in women's jobs." See also F. BLAU, 
EQUAL PAY IN THE OFFICE (1977). 
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women to work at pay that suited them. 104 
During the same period, particularly in the South, segregation 
of black jobs was not only overt, but was often mandated by law. 
The operation of the market was also said to justify paying black 
teachers less than white, and black jobs generally less than 
white. 105 
Industry representatives testifying at hearings prior to the pas-
sage of the EPA admitted and defended the practice of paying 
women less than men for equal work on the ground that it cost 
more to employ women. 106 They also justified their pay practices 
on the basis that the free market rate for women was less than for 
men because women would work for less. 107 In hearings before 
• 0 • W. CHAFE, supra note 15, at 62. The author suggests that even "experts'" who 
should have known better publicly voiced the persistent and widely held belief that 
women worked just to earn pocket money. He quotes Ralph G. Hulin, writing in a report 
on employment for President Hoover's Committee on Recent Social Trends, that women 
looked for jobs "as only semi-casuals, seeking pin money, commonly receiving subsidies 
from home." · 
105 See generally G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRlMINATION 84-100 (2d ed. 1971). 
108 Hearings on H.R. 3861 Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. 
on Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 139, 194, 243, 252, 258-259 (1963); Equal 
Pay Act of 1963: Hearings on S. 882 and S. 910 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Labor of 
the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 142, 145 (1963). See also 
Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) for a discussion of 
the legislative history on the question of whether the additional cost of employing women 
is a defense under the EPA or Title VII. Manhart concerned a female employee's chal-
lenge to the defendant's policy of requiring its female employees to make significantly 
larger pension fund contributions than its male employees, because it had determined 
that, as a class, females outlive males. As a result, female employees took home less pay 
than male employees earning the same salary. The Court held that even though it is true 
that women as a class live longer than men, the defendent's practice violated § 703(a)(l) 
of Title VII since fairness to particular individuals rather than fairness to classes is the 
appropriate focus of§ 703(a)(l), and because the differential was not based on a factor 
"other than sex." The cost justification for male/female wage differentials had been rec-
ognized by the National War Labor Board (NWLB) which during World War II had au-
thority to regulate wage increases in order to correct inequalities. The Board endorsed the 
principle of equal pay for "comparable quality and quantity of work on the same or similar 
operation,'' so long as this did not increase the price ceiling. Thus, the Board rejected the 
then common practice of automatically paying women less in the -belief that no woman 
was worth as much as a man, and required employers to justify differentials by de-
monstrating that females' "production is so different from the male[s] as to result, when 
the rates are the same, in an increased unit cost." Bendix Aviation Corp., 11 WAR LAB. 
REP. 669, 672 (1943). Thus, when women got an extra rest period, they could be paid 4.5 
cents less per hour. Id. at 672. 
107 Cf. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974) (where the challenged col-
lective bargaining agreement provided for perpetuation of differential wage rates, the 
Court held that the employer violated the EPA by paying a lower base wage to female day 
shift inspectors than to male night shift inspectors, and that this violation was not cured 
by permitting women to work as night shift inspectors nor by equalizing day and night 
inspector wage rates but establishing higher "red line" rates for existing employees work-
ing on the night shift). Employers have repeatedly but unsuccessfully urged under the 
EPA and before the EEOC that they should be able to pay women less because labor mar-
ket competition has resulted in higher rates for males than for females. See, e.g., Brennan 
v. Victoria Bank and Trust Company, 493 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974); Brennan v. City Stores, 
Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 241 n.12, 242 (5th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 
F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970). 
SPRING 1979] Wage Discrimination 423 
the National War Labor Board (NWLB) during World War II, 
General Motors (GM) explained that its dual wage structure dated 
back to the days when there was a surplus of female labor. How-
ever, after the hearings, GM continued to pay women less than 
men, simply substituting the categories "heavy" and "light" for 
"male" and "female." 108 
The perpetuation of separate categories was often encouraged 
by the unions. 109 Although the United Auto Workers (UAW) and 
other industrial unions tended to fight for equal pay when women 
took the jobs of men who had gone to war, whenever possible 
they insisted that women be grouped together in distinct job clas-
sifications with separate seniority lists. A 1944 UAW contract 
provided that "men and women shall be divided into separate, 
non-interchangeable occupational groups unless otherwise 
negotiated locally." 110 
Despite the equal pay policy it had adopted, the NWLB was 
concerned with wage differentials between male and female jobs 
only when this issue was a matter of dispute between the em-
ployer and union. 111 Where both requested approval of a wage 
108 General Motors Corp., 11 WAR LAB. REP. 744 (1943). See Section e infra, for a dis-
cussion of economist Barbara Bergmann's "crowding" theory, which relates a surplus of 
black or female labor to depressed wages. See also Aluminum Co. of America; 5 WAR 
LAB. REP. 85 (1943), in which the company argued that the new minimum wage secured in 
an agreement negotiated with the aid of the predecessor board of the NWLB, the National 
Defense Mediation Board, had not been intended to be applied to the female nembers of 
the bargaining unit because the company had an established company policy to maintain a 
differential between men and women, and that to include women in the agreement would 
place the wage schedule in the plant out of line with comparable plants in the area. Stating 
that the intent of the parties should be the controlling factor in deciding whether women 
were covered by the agreement, the referee decided that neither the union nor the com-
pany had paid any attention to female workers in the agreement. Neither, evidently, had 
the government people who had helped reach the wage settlement then in dispute. Id. at 
89. The company's action in adding the negotiated wage increase to the female minimum 
wage rather than introducing the new minimum wage as the floor for everyone, as well as 
the union's failure to act on the discrepancy for nine months, indicated that neither the 
union nor the employer intended to include women. 
109 W. CHAFE, supra note 15, at 155. There is considerable information about this period 
since the equal pay policy focused attention on the discriminations routinely practiced 
against women who had taken jobs in the war industries. Chafe notes other ways in which 
employers continued to discriminate in pay practices against women during the war years. 
At the Brooklyn Navy Yard, for example, women who replaced men were "helper 
trainees" instead of the higher-paid male "mechanic learner." Other companies substi-
tuted "light and repetitive" for "skilled," and paid accordingly. Only one out of four 
Bridgeport, Connecticut manufacturers offered women the same starting salary as men, 
and in some plants women received less pay than males they were training. Forty-one 
steel companies paid female clericals an average of $60 a month less than men doing com-
parable work. Id. at 156. A brief by the United Electrical Workers to the NWLB in 1945 
suggested that many unions supported equal pay for female replacements so that when the 
soldiers came home they would not find their jobs reclassified as women's work with a 
woman's wage. Id. at 158. 
110 W. CHAFE, supra note 15, at 157. 
111 Aluminum Co. of America, 14 WAR LAB. REP. 176 (1944). 
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differential, the NWLB approved it. 112 Moreover, the NWLB 
seems to have applied the doctrine of equal pay primarily to those 
instances where as part of the war effort, women were doing what 
had been a man's job.113 They refused to extend it to jobs tradi-
tionally held by women. 114 Nor did the equal pay principle apply 
to correct wage differences when men in one plant were paid 
more than women doing the same job for the same employer, but 
in another plant. 115 For jobs to which only women had historically 
been assigned, the NWLB would presume "the rates ... to be 
correct in relation to other jobs in the plant. " 116 Applying this ap-
proach, the NWLB held that "the doctrine [of equal pay for equal 
work] is not to be invoked to abolish wage differentials between 
jobs which have historically been performed by women almost 
entirely and jobs which have been recognized in the industries as 
jobs limited for the most part to men." 117 
Thus, what one commentator has called "the worst form of dis-
crimination against female workers, " 118 the differential in wage 
rates paid to women doing historically female work, was almost 
unaffected by wartime equal pay policies. Not only did such prac-
tices continue unabated into the postwar era, but the government 
policies probably encouraged employers to set up special wo-
men's jobs whenever possible to avoid the bite of equal pay. 
Even when a woman's job was evaluated according to an em-
'" In re Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 4 WAR LAB. REP. 435 (1942). See also Grocery 
Warehouse Group of Philadelphia, 5 WAR LAB. REP. 381 (1942). In this case the NWLB 
not only approved a wage differential based on sex, but, in reducing the total cost of the 
wage settlement, decided that the original percentage relationship should be maintained. 
The NWLB also refused to order equal pay where a contract limited rates for women to 
two-thirds of male rates and the contract had no reopener clause. Houston Bakeries, 12 
WAR LAB. REP. 181 (1943). 
113 Aluminum Co. of America, 14 WAR LAB. REP. 176 (1944). 
, .. Equal Pay for Women: Effect of Executive Order 9328 on WLB's General Order 16, 
8 WAR LAB. REP. xxviii (letter from NWLB Chairman to Secretary of Labor, made public 
June 4, 1943). 
m Northwest Match Cos., 13 WAR LAB. REP. 133, 137-38 (1943). 
118 See note 114 supra. 
117 Rotary Cart Box Shook Indus., 12 WAR LAB. REP. 605, 607 (1943). See also Smith 
Wood Products Co., 13 WAR LAB. REP. 16 (1943); Spokane Detail and Stock Shops, 13 
WAR LAB. REP. 33 (1943). 
The presumption that established wages for traditionally female jobs were correct 
could, however, be overcome by affirmative evidence of existence of an intra-plant in-
equity. Such a showing was not easy, nor were many undertaken. See American Viscose 
Corp., 27 WAR LAB. REP. 248 (1945). Women received an entry rate for common labor of 
$ .15, as against male common laborers' entry rate of$ .73. The panel decided that, though 
job content was different so that the equal pay principle did not apply, the jobs did require 
equal skill, and therefore the differential in job content did not justify the wage different-
ial. The panel thus found that an intra-plant inequity existed. See also General Elec. and 
Westinghouse Elec. Cos., 28 WAR LAB. REP. 666 (1945). 
118 W. CHAFE, supra note 15, at 157. Chafe explains the premise underlying the 
NWLB's and many employers' presumptions: "at the root of the disparity was the perva-
sive assumption that any job historically filled by women had less intrinsic value than a 
comparable position held by men." Id. 
SPRING 1979) Wage Discrimination 425 
ployer's own standards to be worth as much as a man's job, the 
premise prevailed. During that era, General Electric (GE) used a 
job evaluation manual which provided for evaluating jobs by as-
sessing points for skill, effort, responsibility, and working condi-
tions without regard to sex. When it came to pricing the job on the 
basis of points assessed, however, the manual specified, "[f]or 
feinale operators the value shall be two-thirds the value for the 
adult male worker. " 119 This one-third discount meant that "all 
but a small fraction of the women's jobs" were rated substantially 
below male common labor despite the fact that many, if not most, 
of these jobs clearly involved more skill, mental aptitude, and re-
sponsibility than the male common labor jobs. 120 
These historical differentials tend to persist into the present, 
according to International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE) re-
ports. The IUE contends that 43% of the women employed in 
plants which it represents still receive less than common labor. In 
1970, the average wage of a female employee at GE was less than 
7O~ of the rate of the male employee at the same company. 121 
Until the late 7O's there had been no substantial change in the 
relationship between male and female rates in many plants since 
the NWLB days because all increases in wages have been based 
on the prior dual pay schedule. In 1978, GE settled with the 
EEOC a nationwide charge of sex discrimination for 30 million 
dollars, according to the company. Fortune Magazine reported 
that some of that settlement covered the company's wage dis-
criminatfon.122 The IUE has also negotiated a number of job rela-
tionship and rate changes with both Westinghouse and GE. In 
every case women's jobs have been upgraded on the basis of 
evaluations. Many women's jobs were re-graded to comparable 
men's jobs. Where the pay difference was attributed to both sex 
bias and to less valuable job content, the jobs were upgraded to 
119 The manual was quoted in General Elec. Co., 28 WAR LAB. REP. 666,681 (1945). The 
price differential between men and women had not changed much since biblical days when 
"a male between 20 and 60 years old shall be valued at 50 shekels .... If it is a female she 
shall be valued at 30 shekels." Leviticus 27:3-4. 
120 General Elec. and Westinghouse Elec. Cos., 28 WAR LAB. REP. 666, 683 (1945). In 
Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 489 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1973), the court noted that most of 
the women there were paid less than common labor. 
121 Weyand, Sex-Biased Wage Rates and Job Assignments, in PROCEEDINGS OF 21ST 
ANNUAL INSTITUTE OF LABOR LAW, THE SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION (1975). 
The IUE has charted the changes made in the pay schedules by General Electric and Wes-
tinghouse since the hearings before the NWLB in 1945. Separate male and female wage 
rates were overtly maintained until 1963. After passage of the EPA, the male and female 
rates were merged into one schedule by placing all the female rates below the lowest male 
rate even when, according to the company's own evaluation, the jobs were worth equal 
points. See also Newman, The Policy Issues, I SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE Soc. 265 
(1976). 
122 Smith, The EEOC' s Bold Foray into Job Evaluation, FORTUNE, Sept. II, 1978, at 58. 
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eliminate the sex bias, but the difference due to content re-
mained.123 
GM, GE, and Westinghouse each employ so many people that 
in most localities where they have plants their pay scales influ-
ence the community wage, which is then relied on by other em-
ployers in wage setting. Each sometimes takes the role of 
''leader'' in the wage setting through collective bargaining. Other 
employers and unions are likely to follow the wage pattern thus 
established. 124 The fact that these major employers, and others 
that in the past followed the same pay practices, overtly set one 
wage for men, and then deliberately marked down the women's 
wages means that probably until the mid-sixties there was not one 
but two community wage rates - one for men and one for wo-
men. Since most wage increases, including cost of living in-
creases, have tended to be either flat cents per hour or percent-
ages of existing wage rates, the relationship between the jobs, and 
the real depressed wage position of women's jobs established 
prior to 1964 and passage of Title VII, remain. It is as much a 
product today of sex-based wage determinations as when it was 
first established. Nor has the recent emphasis on the whole com-
pensation package, in which benefits are substituted for money, 
necessarily altered the depressed character of female compensa-
tion. Indeed, one study indicated that because pensions and other 
benefits are usually calculated as a specific amount, the benefit 
package, too, only widens the gap. Thus the wage patterns based 
on outmoded stereotypes of women workers persist. 
One of the important mechanisms which turns job segregation 
u 3 Newman, supra note 121; conversations of author with W. Newman, 1977•1979. The 
NWLB had also recognized the appropriateness under the equal pay principle ofadjusting 
wages where changes had been made in job content to accommodate women replace-
ments. It would permit "setting of proportionate rates for proportionate work" based on 
"a study of job content or job evaluation." See also note 114 supra. 
u• The steel industry now sets wage rates through industry-wide collective bargaining. 
Pattern ·bargaining is common among other major industries including the rubber tire, 
automobile, garment, and meat packing industries. The UAW has in recent years attemp-
ted to break GM's wage leadership by "target" or "selective" bargaining, i.e., choosing 
to negotiate and settle with one of the other big auto companies first - even if it means 
striking the target - expecting to settle with the others on the model set in the first wage 
round. See]. DUNLOP, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEMS (1958). See also TRADE UNION 
GOVERNMENT AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 241-304 (J. Seidman ed. 1970); Kosters, Re-
lative Wages and Inflation, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION SERIES, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH ANNUAL WINTER MEETING, 193-94 (1977). According to 
one government study of wage determinants following World War II, some executives be-
lieved that wage policies in their companies should conform to broad wage movements 
throughout all industries. Others looked for guidance mainly to particular firms in their 
own industry, to companies that competed directly for sales, were in the same geograph-
ical area, or drew upon the same supply of labor. See the post-World War II study, TEM-
PORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, INDUSTRIAL WAGE RATES, LABOR COSTS 
AND PRICE POLICIES, (Monograph No. 5) XV(l946). See also text at note 207 infra for a 
discussion of the use of community wage in wage setting. 
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into wage discrimination is the practice of relating wage rates of 
black jobs to one another, rather than to comparable white 
jobs. 125 For example, for blacks in the South, this has led to dif-
ferent wage rates for identical jobs, such as elevator operators or 
forklift truck drivers, which are common to black and white de-
partments, with the lower rate applying to the black jobs. These 
jobs were generally in different departments, were carried on 
separate seniority lists prior to 1965, and had different titles. 
Thus, a white might be assigned to the shipping department as a 
fork lift operator, while a black also operating a fork lift truck and 
handling the same loading platform might be assigned to the labor 
department and be called either a helper or simply a laborer. Each 
would be paid in accordance with the status of the job title. 126 
This examination of sociology, anthropology, psychology, and 
history establishes that where jobs are identified as being appro-
priate for minorities or women, the very designation carries with 
it an inference that those jobs are of lesser value than jobs which 
are available for men or whites. The factor of race or sex influ-
ences views about the value of the job. Thus, job segregation has 
as an integral characteristic, the assignment of lower values to the 
jobs which are available to minorities and women than would 
otherwise be the case. This evidence establishes that it is more 
likely than not that where job segregation exists, the wages of 
125 See, '!·8··• Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968) (wage 
differential between similar white and black jobs). 
Some of the mechanisms that turned job segregation into wage discrimination for blacks 
in the South have been identified and analysed in INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS, supra note 
61, at 146. The authors state that, historically, there has been a wider skilled-unskilled 
wage differenti\ll in the South than in any other region of the country. The traditional ex-
planation for this is the relatively greater scarcity of skilled labor in the South, but some 
portion of this differential is also probably due to the depressing effects of black "spill-
over" upon the unskilled wage rate. Id. To the extent that discrimipation leads to a clear 
demarcation between black and white jobs, noncompeting groups of jobs are established. 
Although it is difficult to estimate the extent to which this separation of markets has 
affected relative wages, the result of such a market dichotomy must ultimately be re-
flected in relative wage rates between these groups unless supply and demand change uni-
formly in both markets over time. In addition, once the jobs are compartmentalized by 
race, different standards can be applied. The authors say that frequently job evaluation 
programs would simply omit the black jobs, or would award different points to tasks when 
done by whites or by blacks. Id. at 147. 
The authors conclude that, given prevalent attitudes about the tolerance of blacks for 
unpleasant work, "it wo.uld not be surprising if job classifications held by blacks have 
been undervalued in terms of working conditions .... " Conversations with employc;rs 
and union officials further suggest, they say, that ''problems of wage equity and of wage 
grievances are generally given much less consideration in black jobs than in white jobs.'' 
Id. 
128 See, e.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1969). The most 
rampant "dualness" occurred on the railroads where many jobs differed only in title and 
pay. See, e.g., Railway Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Steele v. Louisville & 
N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Peters v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 483 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal, 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972). 
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those jobs assigned to minorities and women have been depressed 
by virtue of the fact of their minority or female status. 
C. Translation of Discriminatory Devaluation 
Into Lower Pay Rates 
This section will examine the industrial relations practices 
which translate a perception of the lesser value of the work done 
by women or minorities in segregated jobs into specific wage 
rates. The industrial relations practices which accomplish this re-
sult are the standard procedures used in the establishment of 
wage rates. In order to understand how these procedures produce 
a discriminatory wage rate for the segregated jobs, it is first 
necessary to understand their role in modern industrial relations 
and how they operate. 
The objectives of any job compensation policy include (1) at-
tracting and retaining qualified personnel, (2) providing a fair 
day's pay for a fair day's work, (3) granting equal pay for equal 
work, and (4) developing commitment to organizational objec-
tives. The structure should be internally equitable, leaving em-
ployees satisfied with their place in the structure, while being 
competitive enough in the external job market to attract and keep 
people with desired levels of abilities. 127 
All wage setting systems, whether highly structured or very 
simple, involve two principal elements: a ranking of the relative 
values of the various jobs in relation to each other and a method 
of linking the wages within an employer to the wages paid for 
similar work in the labor market. Either element may allow dis-
crimination to infect the resulting wage structure. The compari-
son of jobs within an employer permits subjective valuation of 
jobs by reference to sex and race. The "linkage" to the commun-
ity wage may transmit existing patterns of wage discrimination 
into the employer's pay structure. 128 
We will first examine the internal ranking of jobs, then turn to 
127 R. HENDERSON, COMPENSATION MANAGEMENT 60 (1976). 
Professor Henderson's text represents, and is used to represent, the generally accepted 
principles of compensation management and job evaluation, the currently established 
view of the field, and to indicate what students who are future managers are learning. 
Much of the material on job evaluation in this section has been drawn from Professor 
Henderson's text. 
During the editing of this article, NAS REPORT was published. The report reviews and 
describes current job evaluation practices, and includes a comprehensive reference list at 
64-73. 
128 See notes 171-78 and accompanying text infra for discussion of the community wage 
rate. 
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examine the ".linkage" with the community wage rate.1 29 It is im-
portant, however, to keep in mind that these are merely two as-
pects of a single process. In examining them we will focus on the 
mechanics of job evaluation, which operate in the same way 
whether instituted as part of a collective bargaining agreement or 
unilaterally by management. 
i. How Job Evaluation Systems Compare Jobs-Internal job 
evaluation involves "classification," grouping of families with 
common elements, and "grading," identifying jobs which have 
different content but are similar with respect to skill, effort, re-
sponsibility, and working conditions so as to justify the same 
wage rate. 130 Paying comparable wage rates for jobs of the same 
grade is what is traditionally meant by equal pay for equal 
work.1a1 
The process of comparing dissimilar jobs is the heart of job 
119 Various commonly used synonyms for community wage will be used interchange-
ably, e.g., "going rate," "market rate," "labor market rate." Each refers to an estimate 
of what other employers are paying for similar jobs. "Other employers" are those the 
wage setter considers relevant, and may be in the same geographic location, the same in-
dustry, or the same status in the economic society. The community wage therefore may be 
local, national, or industry-wide, but is probably related to the employers' recruiting area. 
130 See R. HENDERSON, supra note 127, at 151, for a discussion of classification systems 
in the public sector. See also NAS REPORT, supra note 85, at 3, 17-24, discussing public 
job evaluation systems. On-the-job training is often keyed to advancement through the 
steps of a classification, with pay associated with skill levels. In job evaluation systems 
using the "key" or "benchmark" concept, jobs are generally grouped by classification 
and "keyed" within families. In large organizations grouping and comparing classifica-
tions then allows different kinds of jobs to be graded according to skill level across occu-
pations. 
The best known classification system is the federal civil service system. That system, 
which covers most federal white collar jobs, has been predicated on the proposition that 
jobs should be paid according to the qualifications required and the responsibilities en-
tailed in them, without regard to what comparable jobs command in the private sector. 
(Some comparability is built in, however, since applicants are placed in jobs at salary 
levels similar to their last jobs.). The federal blue collar wage system combines a single 
evaluation system with local wage rates. Proposed federal pay reforms would make the 
general schedule more responsive to local wages. See NAS REPORT; supra note 85, at 
19-23. 
131 Since employees judge the fairness of their pay by its relation to pay in other jobs 
rather than by its absolute dollar value, management has interests independent of any 
legal requirement in encouraging a feeling of fairness in compensation and in promoting 
employee satisfaction by grouping dissimilar jobs into relatively few pay grades. Unions 
also have an interest independent of meeting legal requirements in pushing the principle of 
equal pay to eliminate any hint of past personal favor, bias, or accident and to protect 
workers from arbitrary managerial decision-making. Even though unions may consider 
management proposals for formal job evaluations as a subterfuge for increasing produc-
tion rates, they often seek to equalize pay for jobs requiring similar knowledge and re-
sponsibility but dissimilar duties and tasks. 
For instances of union interest in protection from arbitrary managerial decisions as a 
reason for seniority systems, see Cooper & Sobell, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Em-
ployment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 
HARV. L. REV. 1598 (1969). See generally R. HENDERSON, supra note 127, at Ch. 14; IN-
TERNAL LABOR MARKETS, supra note 61, at 173. 
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evaluation methodology. 132 A number of different methods are 
used, but each has the objective of identifying compensation fac-
tors common to all jobs, which c~n be evaluated and com-
pared.1aa 
One premise of compensation systems' is that it is the job, 
rather than the individual who occupies it, that is evaluated. 134 
Thus, if a job requires a high school education in drafting but is 
held by a college trained engineer, it should still be assessed as 
are other jobs requiring but a high school education. This "objec-
tive" evaluation of the job rather than the person characterizes 
most systems, particularly those which evaluate blue collar jobs. 
Occupant specific factors are more likely to be taken into account 
131 F. JOHNSON, R. BOISE & D. PRATT, Joa EVALUATION I (1946). The authors state: 
The purpose of job evaluation is to find out exactly what each job is and to mea-
sure its true value in relation to all other jobs in the company. When this measure 
has been determined, the pay rates for all jobs can be established on the basis of 
equal pay for equal work .... [J]ob evaluation determines ... relative pay 
rates .... 
Other scholars note that "every kind of work must be compensated in accordance with its 
value relative to all other kinds of work in the same organization." E. BENGE, S. BURK & 
E. HAY, MANUAL OF Joa EVALUATION 9 (1941). 
133 The first job evaluation systems depended on non-quantitative variations of simple 
pairings and rankings. However, job evaluation systems have become increasingly quan-
titative, assigning weighted points to each compensation factor deemed important, and 
computing the total score for each job, which score can easily be translated into dollars 
and cents per hour. Points may be assigned a priori or may be derived from the "going 
rate" either by sophisticated regression analysis or by simply estimating the contribution 
of each factor to the "going rate" for key jobs. See text accompanying notes 142-44 infra. 
The "linkage" with the community wage, then, may be made. early in the process or as 
a discrete second phase. "Objective" job values are obtained during the internal phase 
when factor points are determined a priori. Whenever points are related to the community 
wage in this process, existing sex or race differences will be built in. See NAS REPORT, 
supra note 85, at 8. 
For descriptions of some of these systems, see R. HENDERSON, supra note 127, at 
153-56 & 173-78. They include "time span of discretion," E. JAQUES, TIME SPAN HAND· 
BOOK (1964); "problem-solving," Charles, Installing Single-Factor Job Evaluation, 
COMPENSATION REv. 9 (1971); "decision levels," Paterson & Husband, Decision-Making 
Responsibility: YardstickforJob Evaluation, COMPENSATION REv. 21 (1970); "guideline 
method," R. SMYTH & M. MURPHY, THE GUIDELINE METHOD OF JOB EVALUATION 
(n.d.); "position analysis questionnaire," McCormick, Jeanneret, & Mecham, A Study of 
Job Characteristics and Job Dimensions as Based on the Position Analysis Questionnaire 
(PAQ), J. APPLIED PSYCH. 347 (1972); "functional job analysis," Fine & Wiley, An Intro-
duction to Functional Job Analysis: A Scaling of Selected Tasks from the Social Welfare 
Field (Methods for Manpower Analysis Monograph no. 4 1971). The Department of Labor 
also provides a method for analyzing and classifying jobs. U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, DIC· 
TIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES (4th ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as DICTIONARY OF 
OccuPATIONAL TITLES]. The Factor Ranking Benchmark Guidechart Evaluation System, 
used by the U.S. Civil Service, combines job ranking, factor comparison, and the point 
methods of job evaluation. Some of th~ methods above are also described and critiqued in 
the NAS REPORT, supra note 85, at 9-34. 
134 R. HENDERSON, supra note 127, at 199. See also NAS REPORT, supra note 85, at 
28-29. Usually these jobs are measured by relying heavily on personal factors such as age, 
education, degrees, experience, number of pubiications, and the number of times and 
places that articles written by the person in the job being measured have been cited. These 
methods are known as "person-in-the-job" evaluation systems; one such system is the 
maturity curve method which uses age as the chief factor. 
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in connection with evaluation of managerial and professional 
work where, presumably, experience in the p~rformance of the 
job has added value. 135 
The factors which are used to compare different jobs are called 
''compensable factors.'' They are the elements of the jobs which 
are considered important to the specific employer, and are de-
fined as "individual elements or parts of a job that, when put to-
gether, define a job and determine its value. " 136 The functions 
and requirements of the different jobs within the organization de-
termine the choice of factors. The choice of compensable factors 
and the weight given to each component is crucial to the system's 
operation, because the omission of any relevant element could 
cause certain jobs to be significantly under-valued relative to 
other jobs, which would destroy the legitimacy of the entire 
evaluation program. 137 
This first step in a job evaluation is a job analysis, which is an 
examination to identify the job's duties and responsibilities, to de-
termine its relationship to technology and other jobs, and to 
examine the knowledge, employment standards, accountabilities 
and other job holder requirements necessary to perform it. 138 
From the job analysis, descriptions of each job are prepared 
which provide a word picture of the job. From these descriptions 
commonjob elements will be identified and comparisons made for 
purposes of evaluation to develop classes and families of jobs and 
to grade jobs across the plant. The job descriptions accompany 
requests for pay information made to other employers and are 
used to define the required qualifications for recruiting anci hiring 
purposes. 
The choice of compensable factors to be considered can and 
135 R. HENDERSON, supra note 127, at 118. Compensable facto~s are those job charac-
teristics that are regarded as contributing to the overall worth of the job, NAS REPORT, 
supra note 85, at 7, as are the factors that create pay differentials, R. HENDERSON, supra 
note 127, at 152. 
138 R. HENDERSON, supra note 127' at 118. 
137 R. HENDERSON, supra note 127, at 118. Installing a job evaluation system is a major 
and important project in any organization that will usually involve not only the internal 
compensation and personnel staffs, but outside consultants and representatives from 
every part of the enterprise to be covered by the system. Policy- and decision-making is 
always done by a job evaluation committee, made up of top senior management, top 
operating managers, and their union counterparts. The most successful systems also in-
volve employee participation, NAS REPORT, supra note 85, at 5. Professor Henderson 
suggests that all evaluation systems share a need for expert judgments; success "relates 
directly to the quality of decision made by those responsible for the design and implemen-
tation of the program." R. HENDERSON, supra note 127, at 157. The thrust of the NAS 
critique is to the same effect: the perceptions and judgment of the participants are crucial 
to the way the jobs are evaluated. 
138 R. HENDERSON, supra note 127, at 86-87. Professor Henderson observes that "in job 
analysis every effort is made to remove the human factor from the job, what is done, not 
how . ... " Id. at 92 (emphasis in original). 
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does vary widely in different job evaluation plans. Since the fac-
tor comparison method was first developed in 1926, a primary ob-
jective of job evaluation experts has been to identify common 
elements that are inherent in the general nature of all jobs. 139 
There is general agreement that three to five such factors, called 
"universal factors," can be identified: the knowledge required by 
the job, its mental and physical demands, and the amount and 
kind of attendant responsibility. 140 
While knowledge, effort, and responsibility are components of 
all jobs, these factors must be subdivided in order to define the 
similarities or distinctions that a pay scale should recognize. For 
instance, skill may be measured by the amount of formal educa-
tion necessary to the job, the amount of formal specialized skill 
training, length of on-the-job training necessary to become fully 
competent, extent of trade knowledge, length and kinds of prior 
work experience, motor and manual skills required, amount of 
judgment required, and amount of discretion provided in perform-
ing thejob. 141 The sub-factors may be further refined by recogniz-
139 Id. at 456. Another of the earliest approaches to quantifying a value for each job is 
M. LOTT, WAGE SCALES AND JOB EVALUATION (1926). See also E. BENGE, )OB EVALUA-
TION AND MERIT RATING (1946). 
14° For a discussion of the factors which count as "universal factors," see NAS RE-
PORT, supra note 85, at 40-46. Some researchers do not include working conditions as 
universal factors. See, e.g., Hay & Purves, A New Method of Job Evaluation: The Guide 
Chart-Profile Method, PERSONNEL (July, 1954) [hereinafter cited as Guide Chart 
Method]; R. HENDERSON, supra note 127, at 114-16. They prefer to award job hardship or 
hazard pay in a flat sum, regardless of the specific job, for working under dangerous con-
ditions, rather than to give weight to bad working conditions in calculating base pay. Fac-
tors considered compensable .in job evaluation systems differ considerably from the 
task-oriented description used by time and motion engineers where job content and de-
scription of work methods for performing the various tasks that constitute the job are the 
subject on inquiry. For job evaluation purposes, the compensation manager considers the 
"human qualities, characteristics, and knowledge required to perform the job, to establish 
standards in this area, which eventually determine the base wage for the job and the wage 
structure for the organization." R. HENDERSON, supra note 127, at 49. Many lower 
courts, in attempting to assess whether jobs are "equal" under EPA standards, seem to 
look at the kind of information an industrial engineer would use to design a job or do a 
time and motion study, not the information which experts in the field of job evaluation 
think pertinent for evaluation purposes. This has happened despite the Supreme Court's 
statement in Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 201 (1974), that Congress in-
tended to adopt the words "skill, effort, responsibility and similar working conditions" as 
terms of art, so that the job evaluation profession should be looked to for the proper con-
struction of these technical terms. 
141 The original job evaluation systems using a method of factor comparison was de-
signed to evaluate production jobs in machine shops, which are still the least complicated 
to analyze and evaluate. The choice of factors reflects their origins in traditional male fac-
tory work. Professor Henderson chooses factors aimed at tool use, emphasizing skill fac-
tors of experience and manual ability. to use tools rather than dexterity. Little attention is 
paid to mental or visual demands and none to learning time, or human skills. On the other 
hand, some recent systems have emphasized evaluation of high-level jobs-office or 
people-oriented jobs-and have emphasized quite different traits. See Guide Chart 
Method, supra note 140, at 72-80. This method is designed for higher level professional 
and managerial jobs. See also Fine & Wiley, supra note 133, at 34-37. For a comparison of 
National Metal Trades Association (NMTA) office and shop plans, see NAS REPORT, 
supra note 85, at 9-10. 
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ing the relative magnitude of the factor in different jobs. This 
permits a comparison, for example, of the importance of manual 
dexterity in electronic assembly with the importance of manual 
dexterity required by truck driving or neurosurgery. 
Once the factors to be considered are chosen, a "compensable 
rating scale'' is established by which the different levels or de-
grees of each factor is represented and a score assigned. Each 
compensable factor is then weighted for its importance to the job 
and its importance to the company. The job score is the sum of all 
the factor points for thatjob. 142 Because the compensable factors 
are chosen, ranked, and weighted by an internal job evaluation 
committee or come pre-packaged from an outside consultant, 
both of which use their best subjective judgment, it is clear that, 
to the extent that compensable factors chosen are associated with 
traditional women's or minority work, the ranking of those fac-
tors could be expected to reflect the attitudes and values of the 
committee members. When the compensable factor rating· scale 
has been developed by an outside consultant, the evaluation 
committee's chief function is to evaluate and rank the jobs. The 
way this is done varies with the system used. 143 
•~ 2 NAS REPORT, supra note 85, at 8. The effect of the choice of weights can be seen, 
for instance, in the weighting of the subfactors of skill in the AAIM plan, R. HENDERSON, 
supra note 127, at 120. That plan emphasizes experience; the difference between the low-
est and highest "experience" degree is 88 points, while the difference between the highest 
and lowest .degrees for "responsibility" or "mental or visual demand" is 20 points. Phys-
ical effort and working conditions both have a range of 40 points. See also NAS REPORT, 
supra note 85, at appendix I. The total number of points that is needed to evaluate all the 
jobs is determined by the present dollar spread between the highest and lowest paid jobs. 
This insures that the total labor cost is within the budget and the basic hierarchy. The 
point spread used in the evaluation study should be sufficient to reflect the magnitude of 
this differential, as well as to provide differences between pay steps to reflect perceived 
differences in the work. 
143 The Hayes system was designed to evaluate and rank exempt non-teaching positions at 
colleges and universities. See, e.g., Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977). This 
system consists of a series of questions about each classification to be evaluated, with 
predetermined point values for each answer. The questions concern several factors with 
respect to each job. The points associated with a given factor are weighted to reflect the 
approximate relative importance of the factor for institutions of higher education. An in-
side evaluation committee determines the answers guided by explanatory definitions for 
each question. The total number of points for a given classification is the measure of the 
relationship of that job to all others within the organization covered by the study. This, in 
tum, is supposed to guide the assignment of the classification to a salary grade. 
The original Benge system, also called the "weighted-in-money" method, uses a 
"key" job as the model instead of a point system. The evaluation committee first selects 
15-20 key jobs representing the entire range of jobs included in the study. These are then 
ranked for their importance to the company and dollar amounts are assigned to each job 
on the basis of a community wage survey. Professor Henderson points out that the indi-
vidual money value put on each factor is not mathematically derived, but rather is a 
"meeting of the minds" average. R. HENDERSON, supra note 127, at 460. 
Having priced each factor, a factor-by-factor monetary scale is set up so that all other 
jobs can be slotted into the scale as each factor relates to that factor in the key job. The 
wage for each is then determined by summing the monetary values attributed to each of its 
factors. For example, if the classification of "doffer" in a textile mill is deemed to rank 
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While it is theoretically possible to factor, evaluate, and rank 
each job, this is rarely done. Rather, a full scale inquiry is done 
for only a relatively few "key" or "benchmark" jobs, and the 
other jobs are ranked in relation to the key job. Jobs are generally 
grouped by classification and job family with key jobs represent-
ing each grouping. The key jobs are also usually selected by the 
job evaluation committee on the basis of agreement among mem-
bers of the committee on the ranking and point worth. In the 
Benge system, for example, the committee is instructed that jobs 
selected for the "key" designation must be susceptible of exact 
and well-understood definitions, and that no job should be in-
cluded in the key position list if there is any disagreement about 
the existing rate. 144 
2. How Internal Phases of Evaluation Systems May Be. 
Discriminatory-The foregoing analysis identifies at least four 
stages where the internal evaluation process may incorporate sub-
jective and biased views as to the nature of the job or its relative 
importance. The job evaluation process is based on the subjective 
judgments of those who participate in the process. The lack of ob-
jectivity is recognized within the profession. 145 The areas in the 
job evaluation process in which. subjective judgments are critical 
tenth in skill, sixth in effort, second in responsibility, and sixth as to working conditions 
among all jobs on the assembly line, its wage elements might take the following configura-
tion. Assuming an average wage of $2.70 an hour, 24 cents would be ascribed to skills 
(''s"), 49 cents to effort ("e"), $1.45 to responsibility ("r"), and 49 cents to working con-
ditions ("w"). Thus, the compensable factor percentage formula would be approxi-
mately: 10% for "s", 18% for "e", 54% for "r" and 18% for "w" as they compare with the 
"key job. "Id. 
One primary distinction between the Benge system and some of the later models is the 
timing of the use of the prevailing wage rates. The Benge system first identifies the pre-
vailing wage for the key job and-then establishes the relative worth of each compensable 
factor as a proportion of that wage. More recently developed systems usually defer com-
parison with the prevailing wage until an internal "objective" value of the jobs in both 
absolute and relative terms has been determined. This is done through the a priori assign-
ment of points. Only after the internal evaluation and ranking is completed do these sys-
tems go to the third step, a community wage survey. Id. at 153-56. 
144 R. HENDERSON, supra note 127, at 113 & 160. 
145 Professor Henderson warns that "[t]he entire area of compensation is and always 
will be one in which subjectivity predominates." Id. at lll. 
Particularly when there are reasons to believe that discrimination does exist, the trap-
pings of objective scientific quantifications should not obscure the basic nature of the pro-
cess. On the other hand, where the internal worth of jobs is established through a formal 
job evaluation system which makes each step explicit, the people involved are more likely 
to make reasoned judgments than those who evaluate jobs in a wholly informal manner. 
There is, therefore, some prospect that the results of a job evaluation system may be less 
biased than a wage structure established in a random manner in a discriminatory environ-
ment. 
One leading firm, to avoid violations of Title VII and the EPA in job evaluations, omits 
factors which consistently give higher ratings to predominately male classifications than 
to predominately female classifications and vice versa. In practice, this policy has re-
sulted in recommendations not to use such factors as physical effort or working condi-
tions, since the traditional definition of these terms gives more weight to classifications 
where males predominate. 
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have already been mentioned: job analysis, job description, and 
the selection and weighting of compensable fac(ors. 
a. Job Analysis-Because the data collected in a job analysis 
are basic building blocks of the evaluation process, all subsequent 
steps in evaluation depend on the information gathered through 
the job analysis. 146 The value system and related perceptions of 
the job analyst influence what information is collected and there-
fore what is available in later stages of the process. Inaccuracies 
can be caused intentionally by emphasizing duties seldom, if ever, 
performed to ensure a high rate of pay for an encumbent, or by 
making a job look more important than it is, or to assist a manager 
maintain an "empire. " 147 Unconscious bias can also make male 
or white jobs look harder or can cause the analyst to underesti-
mate difficulties in women's or blackjobs or to omit information 
that could influence decisions as to the relative value of the 
job.14s 
The manner in which inf orma:tion is requested can also affect 
the analyst's understanding of a job. For instance, Professor 
Henderson provides a sample questionnaire that inquires about 
on-the-job demands by asking the employee to check all undesir-
able physical demands required on hisjob. 149 Items to be checked 
include: (1) handling heavy material, (2) awkward or cramped pos-
itions, (3) excessive working speeds, (4) excessive sensory re-
quirements (seeing, hearing, tquching, smelling, speaking), (5) 
vibrating. There are no specific questions about manual dexterity 
or skill in handling intricate and delicate instruments which, for 
example, typify women's work in the electronic industry. Nor are 
there questions about the fatigue which results from boring re-
petitious work that requires constant attention, such as inspection 
or sewing. A question concerning "emotional demands" asks 
only that undesirable emotional demands be checked, including: 
(1) contact with general public, (2) customer contact, (3) close 
supervision, (4) deadlines under pressure, (5) irregular activity 
schedules, (6) working alone, and (7) excessive traveling. These 
questions do not consider the possibility that some of these ac-
148 See R. HENDERSON, supra note 127, at 85-110 (Ch. 6 on Job Analysis); NAS REPORT, 
supra note 85, at 46-54. 
147 R. HENDERSON, supra note 127' at 95. 
148 NAS REPORT, supra note 85, at 39. The Report, which asks how many bosses know 
in detail what their secretaries do, suggests that clerical jobs in particular are not well un-
derstood by their supervisors.One study suggests that men and women analysts may re-
spond differently so that sexually mixed teams should be employed for job analysis. Id. at 
43. 
, •• R. HENDERSON, supra note 127, at 100. 
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tivities may be viewed as assets rather than as liabilities. 150 
b. Job Description. The same problems of biased perception 
and selectivity are applicable to the preparation of job descrip-
tions. Since the job description is based on the information de-
veloped in the job analysis, if the same persons do both, or if 
those who do both each have similar points of view on what is im-
portant, any bias in the analysis will appear in the description. 151 
Any element of the job not mentioned in the job description is not 
likely to be credited to it. 
The job description establishes the qualifications for the job. 
Stereotypes may influence job qualifications such as education or 
prior experience. An investigation of the Dictionary of Occupa-
tional Titles152 evaluation of women's jobs such as "foster 
mother," "homemaker," or "nursery school teacher" found that 
the jobs had been undervalued. The evaluators had disregarded 
skills learned in non-paid work or at home, and had defined "re-
quired education and training'' to include only formal educational 
programs. 153 
The inclusion of formal education as a qualification for filling 
the job not only tends to exclude blacks, but may also lead to a 
lower wage for the jobs which do not require formal education 
(which blacks are more likely to fill) if the job evaluators believe 
jobs requiring a high school diploma are worth more than jobs not 
requiring one. 154 
c. Selecting Compensable Factors. Not all elements mentioned 
in a job description will be included in the selection of compensa-
ble factors. The choice of compensable factors may ignore the 
skills involved in typically women's work. The choice of factors 
and factor weights can have strong effects on the relative ranking 
150 The Uniform Guidelines for Employee Selection Procedures, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,308 
(1978) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. Part 1607) [hereinafter cited as UUESP], explicitly 
recognize the problem of biased perception in connection with employee selection proce-
dures. See note 274 infra. 
151 See UGESP § 14(b) '(2). 
152 DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES, supra note 133. 
153 The bias toward formal education and experience and against informal education is 
illustrated in Leisner v. New York Tel. Co., 358 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N. Y. 1973) in which the 
court stated: 
There is also evidence of the use of criteria, such as prior supervisory experience 
(apparently not including teaching) and technical degrees, although not required, 
which would appear to disadvantage women .... Thus, Mr. Carbone was asked 
how he knew that experience as a military officer was more valuable than experi-
ence as a teacher. He replied, "I guess I'm paid to make this type of judgment." 
Id. at 368-69. 
154 Unless justified, this would seem to be an unfair employment practice. See note 281 
and accompanying text infra. 
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of jobs and thus ultimately on the pay received for the job. 155 
Charges leveled at the Dictionary of Occupational Titles indicate 
the selective recognition of job factors. 156 Thus, including lifting 
in the definition of "physical effort" might advantage certain 
male titles, while failure to include manual dexterity in the defini-
tion of "physical effort" in a plant where women do light assem-
bly will disadvantage the women. Emphasizing strength required 
rather than fatigue factors may have the same effect. The Diction-
ary also includes, as a highly-rated skill related to people, 
"negotiating," which is usually thought to be a man's role, while 
it disregards people-related skills which are more associated with 
women, such as "counseling. " 157 
Even when a factor is identified and selected, the importance of 
that factor in the job is subject to the vagaries of perception. 158 
White or male evaluators are more likely to better understand and 
appreciate the difficulties of traditional white or male jobs than 
traditional minority or women's jobs, and are likely to have a tra-
ditional disdain for "women's work" or "black jobs. " 159 
d. Weighting Compensable Factors. Subjective judgment is 
also involved in determining the relative importance of each fac-
tor selected and assigning points indicating the relative worth of 
each factor. For example, the relative values accorded physical 
effort and working conditions which include heavy, dirty, or un-
pleasant physical labor as compared with the values accorded 
skill and responsibility afford such an opportunity for bias since 
these factors tend to distinguish male and female jobs. 
In many establishments, jobs have been designed to take ac-
count of state laws which prohibited women from lifting more 
10• NAS REPORT, supra note 85, at 35. The choice of factors may permit more dif-
ferentiation among male than among female jobs, resulting in women's jobs being entered 
at the bottom while men's jobs are distributed throughout the pay structure. Id. at 37. 
108 UP FROM .878, supra note 31, at 13. 
157 See NAS REPORT, supra note 85, at 37-38. 
108 Id. at 38-45. 
109 Hodgson v. Daisy Manufacturing Co., 317 F. Supp. 538 (D. Ark. 1970), aff 'din part 
and rev' d in part, 445 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1971), involved such a biased perception of com-
pensable factors. In setting the pay of male and female press operators, the employer had 
credited the men with additional "job responsibility" points on the ground that negligence 
in the moving of parts and equipment could result in accidents and lost time. The district 
court held that the possibility of carelessness was not properly subsumed under the rubric 
of "job responsibility." Moreover, the plant in question had an accident-free history in 
that job line. Female press operators, on the other hand, were the sole operators of the 
high-speed press and were constantly exposed to a high risk of injury. Such a risk, the 
district court observed, causes "mental stress and fatigue" and necessitates a "high de-
gree of mental and visual attention.'' This mental exertion was not required of their male 
counterparts and should render the differences in job requirements between them "inci-
dental and insubstantial." Id. at 544. Having reached this conclusion, the court reduced 
the allowance for "job responsibility" given the male press operators and increased the 
point valuation for "effort" allowed the women. This new approach rendered the male 
and female jobs substantially equal and thus they required equal pay. 
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than minimal weights, and from working overtime or at night. 160 
These jobs were labeled "women's jobs," and women were con-
fined to them. In assessing the value of various jobs to an em-
ployer who had engaged in these practices, emphasis on "male" 
factors such as physical labor, strength, gross manual operations, 
or even routine operations, rather than on manual dexterity, vis-
ual acuity, stress, and fatigue characteristic of the light assembly 
or high speed press operations - tasks assigned to women161 -
would result in higher rates for "male" jobs. 
Employers have had wide leeway in deciding the extent to 
which mechanical aids should supplement physical strength. 
Machine design can reflect the assumption that men will be the 
operators. For example, any machine scaled to the average 
height, reach, and physical strength of men allows most men to 
clear jams, whereas most women require a platform or other 
help. 162 The point to be considered, however, is not whether the 
failure to provide mechanical aids to overcome physical limita-
tions itself constitutes sex discrimination, but what values are as-
signed to various factors because of resulting sex segregation. If a 
job has been structured in such a way that it is segregated, the 
subjective judgment about its value is likely to be affected by the 
evaluator's attitudes toward the value of men's work and wo-
men's work as much as by their views on physical labor versus 
use of tools. 
In plants where there has historically been a division of labor 
along sex lines, regardless of their designations as men's and wo-
men's jobs, heavy and light work, or other sex identified labels, a 
premium is often paid for the physical labor element of the men's 
job. This contrasts sharply with the value of physical labor or the 
discomfort of dirty work in Southern industry. There, instead of 
being white male jobs, these dirty, physically demanding jobs 
have historically been black jobs. There they are the lowest pay-
160 See Equal Pay Act of 1963: Hearings on S. 882 and S. 910 Before the Senate Sub-
comm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 149 
(1963) (testimony of Fred Edwards, Armstrong Cork Co.). 
161 See WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, APPRENTICESHIP FOR WOMEN, WHY 
NoT? (n.d.) which reports that most machine production shops visited had one exclu-
sively female department. 
162 
The ingenuity and flexibility with which industry avails itself of labor saving 
devices have often been applied to supplement the physical limitations of 
males .... The fact that in most factories the level at which machines cease to do 
the job and human effort takes over is based on the assumed male height and 
physical strength suggests that this level is fixed on a sex discriminatory basis. 
Weyand, supra note 121, at 70. 
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ing, lowest prestige jobs. 163 Between white males, moreover, 
heavy material handling is valued less when. done by muscle 
power than by mechanical aids such as fork lifts. 
The actual design of the job is also within the control of the em-
ployer. Several different operations may be combined into one 
job, only one non-essential part of which is physically demanding. 
Given a favored view of "physical labor," that part can add 
points and therefore dollars to the value of that "heavy" job. For 
example, a job may involve assembling, machine operation, or 
welding, all of which require little strength. The employer, how-
ever, may have structured the job to require the operator to bring 
boxes of material to the workplace or to carry away boxes of the 
finished product. The men doing the job receive higher wages be-
cause of the "extra points" that physical effort receives as com-
pared to a job structured for women which does not have the addi-
tional element. Even the possibility of having to perform tasks 
forbidden to women by state laws, though rarely, if ever, re-
quired, often results in additional pay for men on the grounds that 
they give the employer ''flexibility.'' 
' The use of the ''key job'' system for ranking and valuing of jobs 
permits differential treatment of factors which are common to 
men's and women's jobs. 164 Women's jobs are compared with 
other women's jobs and men's with other men's. For example, 
nurses might be compared to dieticians or electricians compared 
to plumbers, but nurses and plumbers would not be compared. 
Thus, even if the same compensable factors would be aprlied 
183 See James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978), on wage disparities and the different kinds of work blacks 
and whites are assigned. 
m Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 
(1970), involves one rather obvious example of the assignment of different values to the 
factor of "lifting," depending on which sex is involved. The entire job of the female in-
spector packers and the principal job of the male inspector packers in Schultz was to in-
spect each bottle as it came from the oven, discard the defectives, and pack the good bot-
tles in cartons. Men performed 16 tasks that women did not, consisting entirely of material 
handling: bringing up empty cartons, lifting and stacking filled cartons, and lifting and 
carting away filled containers of discards. A separate classification of employee, known 
as "snap-up boy," performed these duties for the female inspector packers. The men in-
spector packers received a wage rate 10% higher than the women. The wage of the 
"snap-up boys" was about the same as that of the women packers. Among male workers, 
. lifting was thus valued less than packing, with packers accorded a higher rank in the job 
hierarchy and therefore a higher wage. However, between women who were full time 
packers and men who divided their time between packing and the less valued task of lift-
ing, the latter duty was advanced by the employer as justification for a higher, not a lower, 
wage. The court rejected the justification and held the wage differential invalid under the 
EPA. 
It is useful to compare problems of perception and subjective judgments vis-a-vis men's 
and women's work with Becker's and Arrow's formulation of the economics of discrimi-
nation, based on a "taste for discrimination" or on "perceptions." See notes 189-93 and 
accompanying text infra. 
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across the board, it is easy to apply them differently to male and 
female jobs. It is difficult to keep in mind how the same factors 
apply to jobs in different categories, even if malice or deliberate 
devaluing is not intended. 165 Also, if a woman's job is keyed to 
other women's jobs, any undervaluation of that key job will be 
transmitted to all jobs keyed to it. 
On the other hand, using different factors, weighting factors 
differently, or simply using different evaluation systems, though 
these tactics may recognize the inappropriateness of a "shop" 
plan to evaluate office jobs, also means that no direct comparison 
can be made of the worth of jobs across occupational categories. 
Since many occupational categories are sex- or race-identified 
and segregated, the use of separate evaluation systems precludes 
direct comparisons of traditionally male and female or black and 
white jobs. 166 The problem is exacerbated where a company has a 
single wage schedule. Jobs may be evaluated according to dif-
ferent systems such as office and shop jobs, 167 and then pegged 
into the wage structure according to the "going wage" for the key 
jobs. This has the same effect as if the compensable factors had 
been chosen or weighted to reflect directly the going wage. Any 
historical or community bias is thus imparted into the wage struc-
ture. The concept that the ranking of jobs should reflect their ob-
jective worth is simply not applied as between groups of dissimi-
lar jobs. 
Where multiple evaluation systems are used, jobs may be 
ranked by: (1) using the community wage as a guide to where the 
jobs should be slotted in the employer's schedule; (2) intuitively 
trying to achieve equity (which is subject to all the dangers of 
stereotyped thinking examined above); or (3) by using the job 
evaluation technique of classifying and grading - this third sys-
tem is used by the federal government, many states, and some 
large private employers to permit cross category comparisons. 168 
An alternative to rationalizing and comparing jobs evaluated by 
different standards is simply to have multiple wage schedules, in 
which jobs are· internally related only to key jobs which can be 
said to fall within the same labor market. 169 In this alternative, 
nurses, dieticians, and librarians may be on one schedule, trades 
160 NAS REPORT, supra note 85, at 35 & 53. 
166 Id. at 53-54. See descriptions of job evaluation systems in the NAS REPORT, supra 
note 85, at 9-34 (particularly at 29). 
167 See note 143 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the Benge System. 
168 R. HENDERSON, supra note 127, at 183-87. Jobs are classified (grouped by key job), 
and key classifications are ranked and paired to determine pay grades. Since ranking and 
pairing is merely formalized intuition, such grading across categories should be 
scrutinized as carefully as informal methods. 
169 Id. at 230. 
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and maintenance on another, and physicians on still a ~hird.1 70 -
Multiple schedules can thus obfuscate wage discrimination. 
3. The "Prevailing" or "Community" Wage Rate and its Influ-
ence on Employer Wage Structures -
a. Use of Community Wage Rates. Every wage setting process 
necessarily involves a comparison by the employer of the wages 
which it proposes to pay for a job and the community or market 
rates for similar or comparable jobs. Even the smallest employer 
who sets a rate for a job will inquire what others pay for similar 
work, often by asking neighbors, checking want ads, or discus-
sing the matter with the local employment service. Formal job 
evaluation systems used by larger employers approach the pro-
cess of comparison in two different ways. Some systems first 
identify the market price of key jobs and then rank the jobs so that 
the wage structure of the employer closely reflects the market 
values. Others rank the jobs according to their internal worth and 
then take the market rates into account in setting the final wage 
rate. Some employers pay more to establish or maintain a corpo-
rate image as a wage leader; some distribute the total wage pack-
age differently as between money and fringe benefits; some em-
ployers because of their internal needs set wages for many jobs in 
relation to each other, setting only the entry rate at a level in rela-
tion to the market to attract the caliber of personnel desired. 171 
However it is done, the wages paid in the market which the em-
ployer considers relevant for jobs which are considered compara-
ble will· inevitably influence the wage rate which the employer 
pays. 
b. How the Community Rate Is Established. The prevailing 
wage is sometimes established by a formal community wage sur-
vey, or by reference to surveys produced by federal or commer-
cial agencies or to reports of collective bargaining agreements, 
which are relied on routinely not only by unions and employ-
ers, 172 but also by arbitrators to settle wage disputes in interest 
arbitrations. 173 
An enormous amount of information concerning the prevailing 
wage rates is routinely used by management and unions in the 
wage setting process. 174 The prevailing community wage is thus 
110 See Lemons v. City of Denver, CA No. 76-w-1156 (D. Colo. April 28, 1978). 
171 But see INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS, supra note 61. See generally note 236 and accom-
panying text infra. 
172 R. HENDERSON, supra note 127, at Ch. 10 (community wage surveys). 
173 I. BERNSTEIN, ARBITRATION OF WAGES, Ch. IV (1954). 
174 The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) publishes surveys at regular intervals. BLS 
survey information includes as part of its continuing program of reviewing wage gains in-
formation on earnings by sex of selected occupational groups in various cities. These in-
clude: (a) area wage surveys covering the standard metropolitan statistical areas; (b) in-
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an integral factor in determining what any specific wage rate shall 
be and at what level a specific wage structure should operate. 
The process of relating the jobs in the establishment to the gen-
eral community wage structure transmits any bias which is built 
into the general wage structure in direct or indirect form to the 
wage structure of the particular employer. Moreover, if bias has 
crept into the internal wage setting process of an employer, that 
bias will become a part of the community wage structure when the 
employer reports its wage rates to various surveys. The commun-
ity wage to which the employer relates may be partially a function 
of its own race- or sex-differentiated wage scales. By integrating 
that standard into its own wage calculations, the employer not 
only reproduces the biases of the external labor market, but also 
contributes to and reinforces those biases. Each employer reli~s 
on the available information about the prevailing community 
wage, contributes to that information pool, and knows that other 
employers will also set their rates according to the same inf orma-
tion.1 75 The community wage thus perpetuates patterns of wage 
differentiation based on sex or race, which may be based on either 
subjective attitudes toward sex or race roles, 176 past intentional 
discrimination which affected wage rates, 177 or the continuation 
dustrial wage surveys covering fifty manufacturing and twenty non-manufacturing indus-
tries in three-and five-year cycles; (c) surveys of professional, administrative, technical, 
and clerical jobs classified into eighty occupational work levels that relate to specific pay 
grades in the federal civil service system, so public jobs can be compared with jobs in 
private industry. BLS surveys provide a wealth of pay data, including weekly work 
schedules, straight-time rates, rates per hour, hours per week, employer contributions to 
pension and insurance funds, production earnings, bonuses, commissions, and collective 
bargaining agreement terms by industry, occupation, and class of job. Such comparative 
wage information is used by government construction contractors who are required by the 
Davis-Bacon Act to pay the prevailing community wage, but it is available to any em-
ployer. A basic guide for community wage surveys is U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BLS HAND-
BOOK OF METHODS FOR SURVEYS AND STUDIES (Bull. No. 1711) (1971). 
The Bureau of the Census publishes data on yearly earnings of full time workers by, 
inter alia, race, sex, age, and education covering over four hundred occupational titles as 
defined by the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF 
THE CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, CLASSIFIED INDEX OF OCCUPATIONS AND 
INDUSTRIES (1971). 
To carry out the Federal Reserve Board policy that the pay of their employees be com-
petitive with private employers, each of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks conduct regu-
lar compensation surveys of their districts, comparing their most common jobs with com-
parable jobs in the private sector. These surveys are automatically given to participants 
and are available to others upon request. 
In addition, compensation data is compiled and is available through commercial sur-
veys and professional and trade associations, including the American Management Soci-
ety and the American Management Association. See R. HENDERSON, supra note 127, at 
202-07, where he describes these surveys and in addition lists three pages of sources for 
compensation data. 
175 Where there is a union, the same reliance occurs in the collective bargaining pro-
cess. See text following note 183 infra. 
176 See notes 84.$6 and accompanying text supra. 
177 See notes 104-08 and accompanying text supra. 
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of an understanding among employers that they will refrain from 
"spoiling the market" by bidding up the price of labor. 178 
4. Wage Relationships That Perpetuate the Effect of Prior Dual 
Pay Systems-Prior to passage of the EPA and Title VII, it was 
common in industry to have dual pay structures for blacks and 
whites, and for men and women. 179 Such pay structures which 
discriminate between men and women have been clearly illegal 
since 1963, and all forms of discrimination in wage rates have been 
illegal since 1964. It is possible, however, that the relationships 
between men's and women's job rates and between black and 
white job rates still exist, hidden in the interstices of statistical 
graphs. Professor Henderson suggests that while multiple pay 
schedules may be desirable to provide a different scale for pro-
duction workers and managerial personnel, 180 they can be disrup-
tive of employee morale. A company which wishes to maintain 
separate pay structures without seeming to do so may adopt 
"some form of curvi-linear relationship among pay levels 
"181 .... 
This technique may also be used to perpetuate prior dis-
criminatory wage patterns. The establishment of separate wage 
structures for blacks and whites or male and female jobs accord-
ing to a mathematical model which retains the same effect is as 
discriminatory as using segregated lists, though it may be more 
difficult to detect. 
If a structure of this sort is used in a segregated job situation 
where minority or women's jobs are at the bottom of the pay scale 
and white or men's jobs are above them, a statistical substitution 
for a previous dual pay system has taken place and the substituted 
structure perpetuates past discrimination. An historical analysis 
of the method by which the relationships were established may 
reveal that a curvilinear pay structure is a pretext for sex- or 
race-based wage determinations. 
Dual pay structures have also been merged while retaining the 
subordination of black or female jobs by using a job evaluation 
178 See generally E. BROWN, supra note 15. 
179 For a brief discussion of dual pay structures during World War 11, see note 109 supra. 
180 R. HENDERSON, supra note 127, at 230. 
181 Id. The author states: ''The use ofa geometric progression develops a pay scale that 
turns upward on the right hand scale, providing higher grades within one continuous pay 
structure. This assists in avoiding the disruptive effects of multipay structure systems." 
In these models, job points are placed on a linear scale in which equal distances repre-
sent equal amounts, but pay scales are on a logarithmic basis in which equal distances 
represent increasing differences. Thus the pay structure could be plotted in a straight line 
which on superficial inspection, or to statistically unsophisticated eyes, reflects equality, 
while in reality the higher the pay the more rapid is the rise and the greater the gap. 
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system which accepts and uses community wage relationships. 182 
Where black or women's jobs are clustered at the low end of the 
employer's wage scale, a single system could also require no 
more than that the pay lists, job titles, and grades be merged ac-
cording to current wage rates, thus maintaining the subordination 
of women's or black job rates in a single system. 183 
5. Wage Setting in Collective Bargaining-One of the factors 
which has been instrumental in setting wage rates in the last half 
century has been the decisions of labor organizations in shaping 
their bargaining demands. The testing of "economic muscle" be-
tween labor and management in the collective bargaining sector 
usually concerns the total size of the "wage package" which the 
employer will pay in the future and only rarely concerns a specific 
nonmonetary issue. Thus, the exercise of the workers' collective 
right to strike usually relates primarily to the overall cost of union 
proposals to employers. Within this framework, however, there is 
a broad range of choices as to how to split up the wage package. 
Choices must be made as to allocation between direct wages and 
fringe benefits and the nature of fringe benefits to be sought. In 
connection with direct wages, choices include whether to seek a 
percentage increase for all employees or an equal amount in-
crease for each employee,. or whether to set different base rates 
for distinct jobs, or to provide incentive rates for some jobs and 
flat rates for others. 
These choices obviously are not made by unions alone. The 
employer may have an intense interest, for example, in the ques-
tion of whether or not an incentive system is available and what 
proportion of the wage package goes into fringe benefits instead 
of wages. The outcome of these choices in a particular setting is a 
resolution of the union's and employer's interests. In addition, 
labor organizations frequently come onto a scene when basic 
wage relationships between jobs have already been established by 
unilateral employer action. As the union grapples to secure 
worker support, it is not likely to want to disturb basic relation-
ships. If these relationships were established with discrimination 
in mind, union acquiescence in the relationships as a basis for 
further collective bargaining may tend to perpetuate the relation-
ships. 
182 See NAS REPORT, supra note 85, at 8. Thus, a dual system is also perpetuated by 
weighting the compensable factors to approximate the existing wage for key jobs, by key-
ing men's jobs to men's and women's jobs to women's or whites' jobs to whites' and 
blacks' jobs to blacks' and, if necessary, by using different weights or different factors for 
different kinds of jobs. 
183 See text accompanying notes 213-15 infra. 
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While for 35 years unions have had a duty to represent fairly all 
employees for whom they bargain, 184 this duty did not apply to 
sex discrimination before the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 185 Prior to 
1964, the duty of fair representation did not require the admission 
into unions of minorities or women, even though the union had 
the exclusive authority to bargain for them. 186 In the many in-
stances of historic exclusion of minorities and women, the bar-
gaining committee which shaped the union's perception of alter-
natives which could go into the wage package would be composed 
not only of whites/males, but of whites/males who had been 
sele~ted in a context of official exclusion, and hence devaluation, 
of the worth of minorities and women. If minorities and women 
were not worthy of being in the union, it seems unlikely that their 
worth in collective negotiations would have been highly valued. 
Our discussion of the manner of setting of wage rates under col-
lective bargaining leads us to conclude that, to the extent that 
minorities and women were excluded from meaningful participa-
tion in the collective bargaining process, their interests were val-
ued less than would have been the case had they .been included. 
This devaluation could be applied with relative ease to the ques-
tions of wage increases .where jobs were segregated by race or 
sex. 187 In the case of segregated jobs and segregated unions, the 
joint judgments of the union and the employer almost invariably 
placed minorities' and women's wages below those of whites and 
males. 
6. Is ihe "Market Rate" Discriminatory?-The influence of 
discrimination on wage structures is well-recognized by virtually 
all modern economists. They have concluded that the classical 
economic model which assumed that the market reflected only 
184 Steel v. Louisville and N. R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See also H. HILL, supra 
note 3, at 106-33. 
180 See, e.g., Hartley v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 283 Mich. 201,277 N.W. 885 
(1938), in which the court approved of the railroad policy which permitted layoffs of mar-
ried women. 
186 See H. HILL, supra note 3, at 260. See also Blumrosen, Legal Protection Against 
Exclusion from Union Activities, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 21 (1961). Section 703(c)(I) of Title VII 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(I) (1976)) prohibits exclusion from unions on grounds 
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Section 703(c)(2) (codified at 42 U .S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(c)(2) (1976)) prohibits segregation within unions, and § 703(c)(3) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(3) (1976)) prohibits union pressure to cause an employer to vio-
late the statute. This section would proscribe a union demand that a group of workers be 
paid less than another group because of their race, sex, religion, or national origin. See 
Denicola v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1977), in which a union rejected the 
employer's offer to eliminate discriminatory wage differential. It also would proscribe any 
demand which would otherwise adversely affect any group. See Allen v. Amalgamated 
Transit Union, 554 F.2d 876 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891 (1977), in which a union 
refused to waive the initiation fee and to give seniority credit for prior employment to 
black workers upon a merger. 
187 See Denicola v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1977). 
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"pure" competitive factors, is simply inadequate to explain the 
wage setting process. 
a. Wage Discrimination and the Competitive Model. The class-
ical economic model held that wage discrimination in a free com-
petitive market is impossible. According to this model, the com-
munity wage reflects labor market factors of supply and demand, 
and constitutes an index of job value based on productivity. 
Under conditions of perfect competition, the wage rate equals the 
marginal productivity of the last worker hired. The wage rate is 
supposedly the result of an individual negotiation, and reflects the 
bargaining strength of the negotiators, with the employer trying to 
pay the least possible and the worker seeking the most. For each 
there are built-in limits to the trade-off. For the employee, the 
wage must be sufficient to make it worthwhile to give up alterna-
tives, such as leisure time, while for the employer, the wage 
should be no more than the marginal revenue product or the com-
pany loses money with each piece produced. Under competitive 
circumstances, the employer also loses money if production is not 
expanded to the point that the increase due to the last worker 
equals his wage. That is, if increasing the number of workers by 
one person would increase output by $7,000 (all other factors 
being held constant), then the worker should be paid $7,000. In 
this theory, it is axiomatic that higher earnings reflect higher pro-
ductivity of labor and that low pay is indicative of low productiv-
ity. 
Theoretically, then, the prevailing wage simply tells the em-
ployer what price it must pay to hire all the workers it needs. A 
company then only has to know the sale price for its product in 
order to know how many workers it should hire. Under these 
simplified conditions of free competitive markets, the assertion 
that an employer applying the "going rate" is discriminating 
would be viewed as sheer nonsense. Any question about what the 
job is worth would be equally meaningless, since it is worth the 
price it brings. 
b. A "Taste" for Discrimination. Economists no longer hold 
the competitive view. Even classical economists recognize that 
there are imperfections in the market and that discrimination is 
one such imperfection. Beginning in the late 1950's, economists 
began to recognize that discrimination may affect wage structures 
and to develop theories to explain such discrimination. 188 Ac-
cording to one economist of the neoclassical school of pure com-
188 See generally R. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS·(4th ed. 1972); P. 
SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS (10th ed. 1948); L. SILK, THE 
ECONOMISTS (1976). 
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petition, employers and employees have a ''taste for discrimina-
tion" which enters into their calculations of what jobs are 
worth. 189 Thus race or sex becomes a factor in determining wage 
rates even within the neoclassical competitive economic model. 
The community wage in this view is more than an index of job 
values based.on productivity, the supply oflabor, and demand for 
the product. It is also a reflection of the price of popular pre-
judices and ill will toward disfavored groups and a mechanism for 
their perpetuation. 190 
c. Perceptions and Statistics. This neoclassical model has been 
extended by the suggestion that employers who did not personally 
object to hiring or working with women or blacks would, 
nevertheless, differentiate on the basis of race or sex because of 
the "perceptions" of the group. The idea that these preconcep-
tions, even if inaccurate, motivate employers in their employment 
decisions led to the theory of "statistical discrimination." 191 
Under this theory, employers seek to minimize risk of uncertainty 
inherent in the hiring process. If employers believe women or 
blacks are less productive than majority men, they will hire blacks 
or women only if their wage rate is lower than that of white men. 
An employer has no idea if any particular worker is qualified for 
the job but believes that the probability that a random white male 
worker is qualified is greater than the probability that a woman or 
black is. To avoid costs involved in estimating the potential em-
ployee's productivity, the employer assesses the applicant on the 
basis of preconceptions and stereotypes about the group to which 
the applicant belongs rather than on the basis of an individualized 
judgment. Thus, if the employer believes that women or blacks 
have a looser attachment to the labor market, are likely to be 
more casual about the job, are more likely to be late or absent, 
that th~ir turnover will be higher, or that women with preschool 
children are unreliable employees, they will act on those percep-
189 G. BECKER, supra note 105. The literature on race and sex discrfmination has re-
cently been surveyed in three excellent articles. See generally Kahne & Kohen, supra 
note II (sex); Marshall, The Economics of Racial Discrimination: A Survey, 12 J. EcoN. 
LITERATURE 849 (1974); Oaxaca, Theory and Measurement in the Economics of Discrimi-
nation, in EQUAL RIGHTS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (L. Hausman, 0. Ashenfelter; B. 
Rustin, R. Schubert & D. Slaiman eds. 1977). 
190 G. BECKER, supra note 105, at 15. In focusing on race, Becker theorized that em-
ployers, employees, and consumers take account of the psychic cost of being physically 
close to those they would prefer to avoid, resulting ultimately in segregated work places, but 
no wage differentials. Cf. Flanagan, Racial Wage Discrimination and Employment Segrega-
tion, 8 J. of Human Resources .456 (1973). 
191 The statistical theory of discrimination was developed independently by Professors 
Arrow and Phelps. See Arrow, Models of Job Discrimination, and Some Models of Race 
in the Labor Market, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE (A. Pascal ed. 1972); 
Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION LABOR MARKETS 3-42 (0. 
Ashenfelter and A. Rees eds. 1973); Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 
62 AM. ECON. REV. 659 (1972). 
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tions regardless of their accuracy. 192 . 
If workers are paid according to their expected productivity, 
minorities or women would receive a lo~er' wage. 'than WQite 
males with the same ''true'' productivity. Once these.persons ~re . . . '" - . . - ~ 
on the job, such misconceptions.about productivity .could be ex-
pected to _be cleared up through observation,~. e~C~P,t: that :th~ 1ni-
tial perception of productivity differen!ials,h~.s pr_ob~blY, l~~, t9 a 
different assignment: the black or wom~n is. as.signed: to. a, lower 
paying, ''lower productivity'' job. 193 To the ex~~1;1JJhai; d!ff~r~nt 
ability or effort does not affect job performance, th.~ person's per-
formance will confirm the employer's perceptions. Moreover, 
even if the employer should notice increased p,rqduc.tivity o'r i.~di-
vidual employees, the perception of the group is-:unlikely Jo: be af-
fected, and the individual will be considered. the ·exception tliai 
proves the stereotype. There will be no accompanying expecta-
tion that others of the group will also be "ex~;aordin.;;i,r.y>' 194 
These illustrations of employers' risk-minimi_zing, through .re~ 
liance on stereotyped perceptions support the_ c9ncJ,1.i'sion that th~ 
community wage will reflect employers' racial/sexual percepti9ns 
just as it does their ''taste'' for discrimination. _ 
d. Imperfect Competition: Market Power, Job· Segregatio,n, 
and Wage Discrimination. The economic analyses. di_s~ussed 
above explains the imperfect operations of "free competitive 
markets.'_' However, the model of pure competition no loqger 
dominates economic thinking. For more than 40 year~, the idea of 
"imperfect" or "monopolistjc" competition - d~mina(ion of 
markets by a small number of firms th~t take. acouf!t of each 
others' actions - has become a standard model of the economic . . 
system. 
According to this model, employers exercise_ t·heir 1_11arket 
power to discriminate between groups of workers because- it will 
maximize profits. Firms acting in concert may regulc:1ie _'wa~~s 
1•• But see Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.·702 (19,78); Phii-
lips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); Pond v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 500 F.2d 
161 (5th Cir. 1974). . 
193 Phelps, supra note 191, at 660. Another model assumes that black and white males 
are equal in ability, but that predictors of probable productivity, such as years of scho_ol-
ing or test scores, are more variable for blacks than for whites. Thus; a risk-averse, 
profit-maximizing employer might shift the increased risk, of uncertainty to t_he·e-mployees 
by offering a lower wage to blacks than would be offered to whites. Aigner & Cain, St[!tis-
tical Theories of Discrimination in the Labor Market, 30 INDUS. AND LAB. REL. REV. 175 
(1977). 
1•• For a similar account of analogous exceptions which '-'prove''.. the stereotype, see 
Wallace, Sex Discrimination: Some Societal Constraints on Upward Mobility for Women 
Executives, in CORPORATE LIB: WOMEN'S CHALLENGE TO MA~AGEl'!fEN:r (E .. Ginzberg & 
A. Yohalem eds. 1973). 
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though they compete in other aspects. 195 Such agreements are 
usually rough and ready understandings in pr~ctice, often only 
"gentlemen's agreements" not to spoil the market by bidding up 
wages. 196 They are entered into because an employer can make 
money (or hire more workers) if the work force can be paid at dif-
ferent rates. Ideally, an employer should make individual bar-
gains with each employee, paying only what is necessary to hire 
that employee. Thus, people with equal efficiencies may be wil-
ling to accept different wages. This is what economists mean by 
''perfect discrimination.'' 197 
While "perfect discrimination" is rare in buying labor, "imper-
fect discrimination" may often be found. If additional workers 
are needed, it may be necessary to offer higher wages. In order to 
retain incumbent employees everyone will have to be given 
raises. Thus, each additional person hired may cost more than his 
or her individually bargained wage. To avoid this increase in the 
total wage bill without going to individualized bargaining, em-
ployers may seek to divide the work force so that some are paid 
less. Sex or race is an easy and obvious way to differentiate 
within the work force if men and women or blacks and whites re-
spond differently to changes in wage rates. If, for instance, 
women are initially willing to accept lower wages, and will not 
leave if they do not get raises when men do, then in this sense 
they are more exploitable, 198 and the employer can balance the 
male and female work force to make the greatest profit from the 
same total wage bill. 199 The chief mechanism for wage discrimina-
tion is thus through occupational differentiation and job segrega-
tion. 
190 J. ROBINSON, ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION, 218 (2d ed. 1969). Wage dif-
ferentials can occur when lack of competition on the employers' side (the demand for 
labor) allows employers to influence the going rate by their hiring policies. Robinson cal-
led the employers' collective power a "monopsony." 
196 See E. BROWN, supra note 15. The fact that employers can act in their commonly 
understood interest without open collusion is well understood by the law, viz., the doc-
trine of "conscious parallelism" under the Sherman Act (15 U .S.C. § 107 (1976). See 
Madden, Discrimination -A Manifestation of Male Ma;ket Power?, in SEX, DISCRIMI-
NATION AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR (C. Lloyd ed. 1975). The analogy is even more 
forceful because, unlike producers, agreeing on prices, employers, labor, and wage set-
ting have been excluded from the coverage of antitrust law. For example, it is not illegal to 
agree openly to maintain levels of wages; information about current wages is part of every 
wage setting; and industry-wide and pattern bargaining techniques are popular in some 
industries. 
197 To an economist it may be perfect discrimination; to the judge, not illegal discrimina-
tion, since, though each employee had an individually bargained rate, there was no con-
centration of wage rates by either race or self; white, black, male, and female were scat-
tered through the schedule. 
198 See Madden, supra note 196, at 153. See also J. MADDEN, THE EcoNOMICS OF SEX 
.DISCRIMINATION (1973). 
199 J. ROBINSON, supra note 195, at 302-03. 
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If women and blacks are restricted to narrower ranges of jobs 
than are males and whites, their supply elasticities will be dif-
ferent by definition. That is, the wider range of job opportunities 
open to white men makes them potentially more mobile and there-
fore more likely to respond to changes in the wage rate, while 
women and minorities have fewer opportunities and will not be as 
mobile. Therefore, their labor supply will be perceived as rela-
tively inelastic, so that the employer can pay them less. This 
lower wage is part of the input to the community wage rate for 
jobs commonly identified as black or female. The circle is com-
pleted when employers restrict job opportunities and thus main-
tain the immobility of minorities and women upon which the 
lower wage rates depend. 200 
The restriction on female and minority occupational mobility is 
accomplished largely by a complex interaction of law and custom 
that both induces and supports it. 201 Since certain occupational 
roles are considered socially appropriate for women or blacks, 
jobs can be informally identified as "women's work" or "black· 
jobs" to discourage white men from applying. 202 In addition, a 
sex- or race-linked requirement can be set for particular jobs. For 
example, requiring a high school diploma in an area where few 
blacks graduate from high school will tend to exclude blacks. In 
the same way, job requirements inconsistent with women's life 
styles will tend to exclude women. For example, since women are 
likely to want time out to bear and possibly to raise children, an 
employer can separate workers by sex by offering lower wages to 
workers who are not in "lifetime" jobs and who are unable to 
200 Additionally, Madden sees all-male unions as instrumental in blocking female oppor-
tunities. Unions with monopoly power may encourage sex-defined jobs. They cannot 
allow lower wages to be paid to women than to their members in the same job because the 
employer might hire women instead of union members. But if women are barred from un-
ionized jobs, and assigned to separate occupations, the union can negotiate high wages for 
members and disproportionately lower wages for the women. The same analysis, of 
· course, applies to white unions and black jobs. Madden suggests union discrimination has 
the added advantage of providing psychic income to workers who would rather not as-
sociate with the excluded group. See Madden, supra note 196, at 149-50. 
• 0 • Probably the most important governmental enforcement of sex roles in the work-
place has been state protective legislation. See notes 13-17 and accompanying text supra. 
See also Madden, supra note 196, at 159. These laws, Madden says, have not only been 
instrumental in prescribing working conditions and opportunities for women, but have 
been the means to enforce discrimination and maintain collective monopsony power inex-
pensively. Employers who might otherwise be tempted to hire females in male jobs, 
thereby profiting from their lower price at the expense of the other employees, are pre-
vented from doing so. Thus, every employer can make the monopsonist's profit which 
depends on the depressed wages of one employee group. See also L. THUROW, POVERTY 
AND DISCRIMINATION (1969) (race discrimination is related to apartheid and segregation 
laws). 
• 0 • See text accompanying notes 160-61 supra. 
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work during the "peak performance" years from 25 to 35. 203 This 
economic incentive to distinguish the work force by sex can rein-
force faulty perceptions described above so that the employer will 
not hire women for the "lifetime jobs" because of a belief that 
they are not attached to the labor market. The structure of the job 
and benefit plans are thus tailored to the stereotyped expecta-
tions. This, in turn, makes the stereotypes self-fulfilling 
prophesies. By treating women who become pregnant as if they 
have quit, thus forcing them to resign or to take mandatory leaves 
without disability coverage, sick leave, or retention of seniority, 
the employer until recently could insure that most women would 
conform. 204 
e. Segregation and the Theories of Non-Competing Groups. In 
1874, John Elliot Cairnes modified classical economic analysis to 
incorporate the concept of non-competing groups. 205 He 
suggested that when workers were segregated into different job 
categories on a basis such as race, sex, or class, the wages within 
the group would be equalized by the competitive labor market 
forces, but have no effect on other groups. Since it is assumed 
that there is no mobility from one occupational classification to 
another, an excess of labor in one category, though it will drive 
down the price in that group, cannot directly affect the wage in 
another occupation. This theory was applied to explain women's 
low wages and segregated jobs during the British suffragette 
movement and the World War I work push. 206 The present day 
intellectual descendants of the theory of non-competing groups 
include the dual labor market theory and the occupational crowd-
ing theory. 207 
Institutional economists pointed out that the classical bargain 
for labor on a single open market was a gross oversimplification of 
modern industrial relations practices which operate within a dual 
labor market. 208 The primary market tends to be associated with 
larger, better established firms and industries, the secondary 
203 "Peak performance" years are those between the ages of 25 and 35. See Madden, 
supra note 196, at 163. 
204 See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). Madden points to the one place 
where the parallel between blacks and women fails, viz., the unique relationship of men 
and women in the family relationship which, Madden suggests, allows men to influence 
women's choices of occupations in a way that has no analogy in white/minority relations. 
See Act of October 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (amending Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include pregnancy and childbirth within the prohibition 
against sex discrimination). 
20~ J. CAIRNES, SOME LEADING PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY NEWLY EX-
POUNDED (1874). See also Oaxaca, supra note 189, at 16. 
208 Fawcett, Equal Pay for Equal Work, 28 EcoN. J. I (1918). 
207 Oaxaca, supra note 189, at 17. 
208 INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS, supra note 61, at 178. 
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market with smaller, more marginal firms and industries. Jobs in 
the primary sector are more likely to be unionized than are those 
in the secondary sector. 
Jobs in the primary market are characterized by high wages, 
good working conditions, employment stability, chances of ad-
vancement, equity, and due process in the administration of work 
rules. By contrast, jobs in the secondary market tend to have the 
opposite characteristics: low wages and fringe benefits, poor 
working conditions, high labor turnover, little chance of ad-
vancement, and often arbitrary and personalized supervision. 
· Disadvantaged workers are confined to the secondary market be-
cause of residence, poor skills and work habits, or discrimination. 
Employment in the secondary sector itself encourages and rein-
forces bad work patterns, decreasing any possibility of upward 
mobility. Wages are depressed in part because workers are plenti-
ful, they require little or no training, and are not costly to re-
place. 209 There are few and weak interconnections between the 
primary and secondary markets. 210 
In the primary market, jobs tend to be designed and clustered 
so that on-the-job training proceeds up a job ladder. 211 Promo-
tions are given mainly to insiders and wage rates are structured in 
relation to each other rather than to the community. Since the in-
ternal promotion, transfer, and training sequences, and their re-
lated wages, are insulated from the operation of the general labor 
market, it has been argued that each constitutes a separate in-
ternal labor market. 212 
In the secondary market there are three kinds of employment 
situations. 213 Some secondary employment is completely un-
structured, and operates in a manner akin to that postulated by 
the competitive model; these include employment such as dish-
20• Id. at 169-77. 
210 Primary employers can, however, convert·primary into secondary employment 
through devices such as sub-contracting and temporary employment, thus transferring the 
costs of economic instability to temporary jobs. Id. at 173. 
211 The primary and secondary labor markets separated because job-specific and firm-
specific skills required on-the-job training. The employer and employee share the cost of 
this specific training because they both have an interest in employment stability. Work 
rules, grievance procedures, and seniority systems are developed to further this mutual 
interest by keeping turnover through voluntary quits and layoffs low. But the combination 
of training costs and discharge restrictions increases the need for careful selection, so re-
cruiting, screening, and hiring costs go up. This increases incentives to make hiring deci-
sions on the basis of race or sex stereotypes. See generally Arrow, supra note 191; Phelps, 
supra note 191. These race and sex assumptions become self-supporting since most of the 
white males hired will be able to do the job, but the employer will never know whether the 
people who did not apply or were not hired might not have done as well or better. 
212 INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS, supra note 61, at 167-69. 
213 /d.atl67. 
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washing and domestic work. Some jobs lie in labor markets which 
possess formal internal structures, but tend to have many entry 
points, short promotion ladders, and generally low paying, un-
pleasant work. Typical of such jobs are blue-collar jobs in found-
ries, sewing and other jobs in the apparel industries, and menial 
work in hospitals. Finally, sometimes secondary market jobs 
which have few, if any, promotion or transfer rights are attached 
to internal labor markets. In manufacturing, for instance, there 
may be one department composed of such secondary jobs such as 
a labor department with less stringent entry requirements. 214 
· 7. The Crowding Theory-The theory of non-competing groups 
has been applied to modern race and sex job segregation. Women 
and minorities who are shut out of the better jobs reserved for 
white males are therefore crowded into the few remaining jobs. 
The supply for these jobs increases and this tends to depress the 
wage rate for entry leve_l jobs. 215 Men who take jobs normally 
categorized as women's jobs will be paid the same wage as the 
women. However, if a woman or black gets a traditional white 
man's job, she or he may not be paid the same wages as the men 
because of fewer opportunities to change jobs. Assuming that low 
paying jobs denote low productivity jobs, these women or blacks 
in traditional jobs receive their marginal productivity and, in 
economists' terms at least, are not being exploited. However, 
since their wages are depressed because of the artificially in-
creased labor supply, it has been maintained that even in 
economic terms this constitutes discrimination and thus, what 
looks like occupational discrimination is also wage discrimination 
in disguise. 
Economists are now satisfied that discrimination infects the 
process of setting wages, particularly where jobs are segregated. 
This conclusion makes untenable the classic notion that the wage 
structure is the result of the free play of supply and demand. 
Whatever else may be involved, discrimination is a significant 
factor in wage differentials between men and women and blacks 
and whites. This conclusion is crucial in our legal analysis of the 
21 • The laboring department at the Duke power plant is an example. See Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co:, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In paper mills, jobs in the work yard which historically 
were considered as black jobs provide another example. See Local 189, United Paper-
makers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 
U .s. 919 (1970). 
215 See Bergmann, The Effect on White Incomes of Discrimination in Employment, 79 J. 
POLITICAL ECON. 294 (1971). See also To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 46, at 57; 
Bergmann, Occupational Segregation, Wages and Profits When Employers Discriminate 
by Race or Sex, l EASTERN EcoN. J. 103 (1974); Bergmann & Adelman, The /973 Report of 
the President's Council of Economics Advisors: The Economic Role of Women, 63 AMER. 
ECON. REV. 508 (1973). 
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impact of Title VII on the wage setting process. 216 The 
economists, however, have not been specific in assessing the ex-
tent to which discrimination has infected the wage rate structure. 
The following section outlines the views of several economists 
who have addressed this question. 
8. Economic Analyses of the Extent of Wage Rate 
Discrimination-In the last decade a number of economists esti-
mated the extent to which income differences between whites and 
blacks and men and women are due to discrimination. These 
studies have used varying methods and different data which make 
comparisons difficult, but most of the studies conclude that be-
tween one-third and one-half of the earnings differential is due to 
discrimination because it is not explainable by other factors. 217 
Many of the studies, however, defined discrimination to include 
only actions motivated by ill will. Discrimination identified by a 
showing of adverse effect on minorities and women is excluded 
from these analyses, which view it as "premarket" discrimina-
tion. Hence, the conclusions reached may be understated because 
the analyst had not considered the "adverse effect" of the em-
ployers' practices to constitute discrimination. On the other 
hand, since unexplained wage differences are attributed to dis-
crimination, the omission of legitimate variables such as skill, ef-
fort, and responsibility might result in overstatement of the effect 
of discrimination. These studies tended to focus on "pure" wage 
discrimination, a denial of equal pay for equal work as defined by 
job title, or "occupational discrimination," meaning job segrega-
tion and lack of upward mobility. The studies rarely examined the 
interaction of wage discrimination and restrictions on upward 
mobility together, which has been the focus of Part I of this arti-
cle. 
These studies confirm that there is a significant relationship be-
tween job segregation and wage discrimination against the 
minorities ;;tnd women holding the segregated jobs. The extent of 
that discrimination is a subject of debate among the 
economists. 218 
218 See Part II infra. 
217 But see Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), in which the Court 
held that the making of a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of Title VII was 
not an ultimate finding of fact. 
218 Three excellent surveys of the economic literature have appeared recently. See note 
189 supra. One, by Professors Kahne and Kohen, concluded that, while the job of synth-
esizing the findings remains to be done, "the sole consistent result of the melange of em-
pirical studies surveyed is that sex discrimination in the form of unequal pay for equal 
work is of little, if any, quantitative significance." However, while the studies also reach 
a consensus that occupational differentiation is an important source of the observed 
male-female earnings disparity, it is not clear to what extent the differentiation is pro-
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In another study, both race and sex discrimination studies were 
reviewed and their data and results correlated so that they could 
be compared. 219 It concludes that much of the difference between 
the studies is explainable because of different notions of what are 
legitimate productivity characteristics. One's choice of variables, 
in fact, can eliminate discrimination completely. 220 
In the development of remedies, the economists' judgment as 
to the range of discrimination may be useful to assist a court in 
framing a remedy, subject to the cautionary note on the reliability 
of the data suggested above. Furthermore, as will be explained in 
more detail in Part II, no mechanical application of any percent-
age figure as a basis for establishing the extent of discrimination 
in a particular case would be appropriate. At the most, the 
economists' views might provide a useful starting point in the 
shaping of a remedy which will be based on the facts before the 
court, not abstract economic considerations. 
The conclusion to be drawn from the totality of the evidence 
discussed above conforms to a common sense understanding of 
the way in which discrimination works and to a review of the facts 
concerning patterns of discrimination which have been developed 
in cases decided under Title VII. It is not only that the jobs into 
duced by labor market discrimination (for example, in promotions) or by sex role dis-
crimination (for example, in the home and schools). Kahne & Kohen, supra note 11, at 
1261. 
219 Oaxaca, supra note 189, at 27-29. 
120Jd. at 24-25. In general, the more characteristics controlled for, the smaller the "un-
explained" difference, and hence the smaller the role that discrimination is allowed to 
play in accounting for wage differentials. For example, controlling for occupational affili-
ation will often significantly lower the estimated effects of discrimination. The effects of 
minority concentration in low-paying occupations are subsumed under productivity dif-
ferences by this method. Consequently, occupational discrimination would be ignored. 
Presumably, the researcher regards occupational differences as nondiscriminatory, vol-
untary labor-supply responses, or else the objective is the estimation of pure wage dis-
crimination. Professor Oaxaca's findings and conclusions follow: 
[O)n average males earn 67 percent in excess of female wages. On average, 50 
percentage points of the average gross differential cannot be explained by the sex 
differences in the selected personal characteristics. If we estimate the MDC 
[Marginal Discrimination Coefficient) to be around 0.50, females on average 
should have earned wages 50 percent higher than their actual wages. Accord-
ingly, discrimination would account for 75 percent of the original 67 percent 
gross wage differential. On average, whites earn wages 55 percent in excess of 
the wages of blacks. Of this 55 percent wage gap, 33 percentage points cannot be 
explained by race differences in personal characteristics. Since blacks should 
have received wages at least a third larger than their actual wages, direct labor 
market discrimination is estimated to account for about 60 percent of the original 
55 percent white/black differential. 
Id. at 25. 
The following table, compiled by Oaxaca, gives a picture of labor market discrimination 
as viewed by various economists: 
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which women and minorities have been traditionally segregated 
are lower payingjobs, but it is that they are lower paying, in part 
at least, because they are the jobs which have been reserved for 
minorities and women. The social, historical, and economic 
studies have demonstrated the high degree of likelihood that the 
220 (Continued) TABLE 1 





Gross plained + Gross 
Differ- Differ- Differ-
Source Sample ential• entialb ential 
Male/Female 
Blinder [10] White workers over age 25. 1967. 0.57 o.58· 1.02 
Cohen [12] Nonprofessional workers aged 0.74 0.544 0.73 
22-64 who worked 35+ hours 
per week. 1969. 
Fuchs [16] Nonfarm employed workers. 0.67 o.51· 0.85 
1959. 
Malkiel& Professional workers in a single 0.53 0.24f 0.45 
Malkiel [20] firm. 1971. 
Oaxaca [22, 23] White urban workers. 1967. 0.54 0.40" 0.74 
Oaxaca [24] White, year-round, full-time 
urban workers. 1960. 0.79 0.56h 0.71 
1970. 0.85 0.63h 0.74 
White I Black 
Blinder [10] Male workers over age 25. 1967. 0.66 0.43• 0.65 
Oaxaca (un- Male urban workers. 1967. 0.36 0.22• 0.61 
published Male year-round, full-time 
results) urban workers. 1960. 0.66 0.37h 0.56 
1970. 0.53 0.29h 0.55 
• The gross differential is calculated as the male (white) /female (black) wage 
ratio minus one. 
• The unexplained differential is calculated as the estimated female (black) wage 
in the absence of discrimination/actual female (black) wage ratio minus one. 
• Control variables: age, geographic region, parental income, father's educa-
tion, place of birth/place grew up, number of siblings, labor market conditions, 
geographic mobility, seasonal employment. 
• Annual hours of. work, fringe benefits, absenteeism, seniority, education, 
unionization. 
• Race, schooling, age, city size, marital status, class of work, length of trip 
to work. 
t Schooling, experience, degree held, publications, marital status, field of study, 
absenteeism. · 
• Schooling, potential experience, health, part-time employment, migration, 
marital status, number of children for females, size of urban area, geographic 
region. 
• Same as in fn. g minus health. 
Id. at 26. 
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jobs of minorities and women are considered to be of lesser worth 
because they are female or minority jobs, and th_e analysis of both 
job evaluation and the general method of setting wages has estab-
lished how this value judgment is applied in the setting of wages. 
PART II 
Part II will examine the application of Title VII and the EPA to 
wage discrimination which results from job segregation in the 
manner which has been established in Part I. First, the issue of 
whether· the facts outlined in Part I establish a violation of Title 
VII will be examined, beginning with the standards necessary to 
establish a prima facie case. Second, various defenses which may 
be asserted by employers will be explored, including the applica-
tion· of the "Bennett Amendment" 221 by which Congress related 
Title VII to the EPA. Finally, problems of formulating appropri-
ate remedies will be analyzed. 
A. Liability Under Title VII 
1. The Theory-Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to 
discriminate with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment" or to "limit, segregate, or classify" 
employees or applicants for employment ''in any way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
121 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). This subsection refers to the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1963). 
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ployee," because of race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin. 222 Thus, discrimination with respect to compensation is pro-
hibited by the statute in exactly the same manner as other forms 
of discrimination. 223 
A case of discrimination may be made out either by establishing 
disparate treatment of two groups or by a showing that seemingly 
neutral employment practices have a disparate impact. 224 Under 
222 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964). In a series of cases starting with Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Supreme Court has established that the statute is to be 
broadly construed to effectuate the strong congressional purpose to eradicate discrimina-
tion "in whatever form." Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,763 (1976). In 
Griggs, the Court was faced with the question of whether an employer was prohibited by 
Title VII from requiring a high school education or the passing of a standardized general 
intelligence test as a condition of employment in or transfer to jobs when a) neither stand-
ard was shown to be significantly related to successful job performance, b) both require-
ments operated to disqualify blacks at a substantially higher rate than white applicants 
and, c) the jobs in question formerly had been filled only by white employees as part of a 
long-standing practice of giving preference to whites. 401 U.S. at 425-26. In the landmark 
decision, the Court ruled that if an employment practice which operates to exclude blacks 
cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited by Title VII. 
Id. at 431. The decision is notable for its liberal interpretation of Title VII. The Court con-
strued Title VII as directed not only at employers' motivation in their employment prac-
tices, but also at the consequences of those practices, stating that "good intent or absence 
of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms 
that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring 
job capability." Id. at 432. See also Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 
U.S. 702 (1978); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 
433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (the central stat-
utory purposes of Title VII are: ''eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and 
making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination." Id. at 421. The 
Court stated that Title VII is "[a] complex legislative design directed at a historic evil of 
national proportions:" Id. at 416; Alexander v. Gardiner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 
(1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) ("[i]t is abundantly 
clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise."); Phillips v. 
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971). . 
223 Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978). See also 
United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.S.C. 1977), aff 'd sub nom. Na-
tional Educ. Ass'n v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978). 
22 • International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 355 n·.15 (1977). See 
generally B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1-25 & 65-181 
(1976); Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of 
Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 66-71 (1972). 
Cases that have applied the disparate treatment concept to compensation differentials 
include: Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); James v. 
Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977); Homemakers, Inc., of Los 
Angeles v. Division of Indus. Welfare, 509 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
1063 (1976); Hays v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 465 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1972); and Quarles v. 
Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 509-10 (E.D. Va. 1968). Cf. Wade v. Mississippi 
Coop. Extension Serv., 528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1976) (disparate treatment concept applied 
to employment and promotion practices); Strain v. Philpott, 331 F. Supp. 836, 842 (M.D. 
Ala. 1971) (disparate treatment concept applied to employment and promotion practices 
and provision of services); United States v. Medical Soc'y of S.C., 298 F. Supp. 145, 
150-51 (D.S.C. 1969) (disparate treatment concept applied to hiring and promotion prac-
tices and admission and treatment of patients). The most obvious form of disparate wage 
treatment is the kind of dual wage structure maintained at one time by GM. See text ac-
companying note 108 supra. 
The disparate impact test has been applied to claims of discriminatory compensation. 
See, e.g., United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094, 1104-09, 1116 (D.S.C. 1977), 
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Title VII, the burden is on the plaintiff to make a prima facie case 
on either disparate treatment or disparate impact grounds. 225 This 
burden is the same in all Title VII cases whether they involve dis-
crimination based on race, national origin, or sex. 226 While the 
employer may have defenses which are applicable only to sex dis-
crimination cases, that fact does not alter the nature of the prima 
facie case. 227 The thesis outlined in Part I of this paper is that 
where jobs have been segregated the wages of the jobs to which 
minorities and women have been assigned have probably been 
depressed in light of the low status of the holders of the jobs. The 
establishment of present or past job segregation thus should 
create an inference of wage discrimination sufficient to constitute 
a prima facie case. Part I established that the ordinary process of 
establishing wages allows stereotypes and prejudices to operate 
in the valuation of segregated jobs, while the community wage 
rate reflects aggregate stereotyped judgments as to the value of 
·"men's" versus "women's" work, and of "white" versus 
"black" work. 
Thus, when the job evaluation-community wage system is used 
to set wages in jobs which are sex- or race-segregated, discrimi-
nation has more probably than not been a negative influence on 
the value of those jobs. The lower wage rate determination fol-
lows directly from the fact that the jobs in question are substan-
tially segregated by race or sex. To make a prima facie case of 
wage rate discrimination, then, a plaintiff should have to show 
only that the job has been and/or is presently identified as a minor-
ity or female job. 
Such a showing would demonstrate that a depressed wage was 
one of the adverse effects of job segregation prohibited by section 
703(a)(2). The demonstration of such a discriminatory wage rate 
would also establish a violation of section 703(a)(l). 228 No show-
ing of discriminatory purpose is required under a disparate impact 
theory with respect to either sections 703(a)(l) or (a)(2); likewise, 
although such a showing is "critical" under a disparate treatment 
aff 'd sub nom. National Educ. Ass'n v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978). Cf. Russell 
v. American Tobacco Co., 374 F. Supp. 286, 294-95 (M.D.N.C. 1973), aff'd in relevant 
part and modified in part, 528 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976) 
(disparate impact test applied to company disability benefit plan); EEOC Decision No. 
72-2066, [1973] EEOC DECISIONS (CCH) ,I6367, 4 FEP CASES (BNA) 1063 (1972) (dlsparate 
impact test applied to overtime and premium pay policy); EEOC Decision No. 70-110, 
[1973] EEOC DECISIONS (CCH) 116062, 2 FEP CASES (BNA) 225 (1969) (disparate impact 
test applied to overtime policy). 
m See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,329 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 
424 U.S. 747, 772 (1976); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973); 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971). 
228 Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (race), with Dothard v. 
Rawlinson Co., 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (sex). 
••• See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,329 (1977). 
228 See note I supra, for the text of both sections. 
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theory, such motive can, in some situations, be inferred from dif-
ferences in treatment. 229 However, in a non-class action indi-
vidual case charging discrimination in compensation based only 
on a theory of disparate treatment, the plaintiff would have to 
show that the depressed wage was racially or sexually moti-
vated. 230 Thus, the establishment of job segregation is the crucial 
fact which makes the prima facie case of wage rate discrimination 
under both subsections of 703(a). 
2. Establishing Job Segregation-Under this theory, total job 
segregation would provide the clearest illustration of a situation 
where the wage structure was probably influenced by the same 
discriminatory factors which produced the segregation. "Pure" 
job segregation, however, is not necessary for the application of 
the theory. Rather, the touchstone of wage rate discrimination 
analysis is the perception which employers and employees have 
of the sexual or racial character of the job. If ajob which has been 
historically segregated is still understood to be a "woman's job" 
or a "black job," the wage rate will reflect that fact, even though 
some members of the majority group have that job. 231 
Today, the strict segregation of jobs by race or sex which was 
common before the passage of the Civil Rights Act has begun to 
break down. 232 Where the breakdown is complete, whatever 
wage rate discrimination previously existed will ultimately dissi-
pate and the job will come to be valued without regard to the race 
or sex factor. However, in the transition period, not only are 
many jobs still substantially segregated, but the time lag in wage 
rate revision means that for most of those jobs the wage structure 
still reflects the depressed rate which was associated with its 
segregated character. There may come a time, however, when 
sufficient numbers of the majority have taken previously segre-
gated jobs so that the jobs have lost their identity as minority or 
female and the inference of discrimination is no longer justified. 
No single statistic identifies the conditions under which prior 
job segregation should no longer give rise to an inference of wage 
rate discrimination. However, the experience of the courts in the 
229 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). See 
also Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 581-83 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) 
("[C]ongress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, 
not simply the motivation."). On motive in Title VII cases, see generally Blumrosen, 
Strangers No More: All Workers Are Entitled to "Just Cause" Protection Under Title 
Vil, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 519 (1978). For a discussion of proof of intent in disparate treat-
ment cases, see B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 224, at 1153-54 (1976). 
uo Id. 
231 See notes 113-14 and accompanying text supra. 
232 See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra. See also To FORM A MORE PERFECT UNs 
ION, supra note 42, at 58-60; Joes FOR AMERICANS, supra note 3, at 151-52. But see So-
CIAL INDICATORS, supra note 17, at 39-47. 
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use of statistics to establish a prima facie case of discrimination 
under Title VII may provide some guidance. The ultimate consid-
eration is whether the situation disclosed by the statistics is suffi-
ciently likely to have resulted from illegal action to require the de-
fendent to justify its action on a non-discriminatory, business-
related ground. 233 
Where histor'ically segregated jobs are partially integrated, it is 
likely that previously established discriminatory wage rates are 
continuing in effect if the wages of the segregated jobs have not 
changed relative to other jobs. This is particularly likely to be the 
case so long as approximately 70 to 80% of the occupants of the 
job continue to be minorities or women. 
A practical guide or "rule of thumb" will be useful in this area, 
as it is in connection with the determination of "adverse impact" 
under the federal government's Uniform Guidelines on Employee 
Selection Procedures - 1978. 234 In the Uniform Guidelines, the 
government takes the position that it will find "adverse impact" 
when the selection rate for the disfavored group is less than 80% 
of the selection rate for the most favored group. Tbe Women's 
Bureau of the Department of Labor has utilized the figure of 70% 
female job occupancy as their basis for identification of segre-
gated jobs. 235 This figure was also used in a comparable worth 
study done for the State of Washington. 236 While a prima facie 
133 See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 229, 305-14 (1977); Interna-
tional Bhd: of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20, 356-62 (1977). 
m UGESP § 4D. Under§ 4D, 
[a] selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths 
( 4/o) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will gene-
rally be regarded by federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact, 
while a greater than four-fifths rate will generally not be regarded by federal en-
forcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact. 
The "selection rate" is "[T]he proportion of applicants or candidates who are hired, pro-
moted or otherwise selected." 43 Fed. Reg. 38,308 (1978) (to be codified in 29 CPR Part 
1607, § !6R). 
235 See Waldman & McEaddy, supra note 33, at 10-11. 
238 See N. WILLIS, STATE OF WASHINGTON COMPARABLE WORTH STUDY (1974). See 
also N. WILLIS, COMPARABLE WORTH STUDY: PHASE II (1976), which was a study done in 
connection with the State of Washington's Civil Service Commission that examined job 
classifications deemed either male- or female-dominated. Any job was considered 
"dominated" by one sex if more than 70% of its workers were members of one sex. The 
study concluded that "women's jobs" tended to be paid at a lower rate than "men's jobs" 
by about 20%. Concerning the same study, see H. Remick, "Comparable Worth: Equal 
Pay for Equal Worth" (paper presented at Annual Meeting of the American Association 
for Affirmative Action, 1977); G. Taber & H. Remick, Beyond Equal Pay for Equal Worth: 
Comparable Worth in the State of Washington (unpublished paper presented at the Con-
ference on Equal Pay and Equal Opportunity Policy for Women in Europe, Canada, and 
the United States, at Wellesley College, May 1978). 
Except where the actual numbers are so small that percentages are meaningless or mis-
leading, any job that is 70% or more female or minority should be considered segregated. 
Even when the absolute numbers are small, however, a historical pattern can identify a 
job as a minority or female jol?. 
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case of wage rate discrimination could consist simply of proof of 
segregated jobs and the wage rate of those jobs, a plaintiff may 
offer additional evidence to strengthen the inference that job 
segregation influenced the wage rate. 
Such evidence might show that the job in question is segregated 
not only by the defendant employer but by other employers in the 
same labor market. Testimony that these jobs are viewed as "wo-
men's jobs" or "black jobs," or that they were so viewed at some 
relevant point in history, could be presented by experts on labor 
market practices, such as a director of a state employment 
agency, or a director of a job-supplying organization such as the 
Urban League. Evidence of formal segregation of jobs-at the time 
of the establishment of the wage pattern would strengthen the in-
ference that the wage structure was itself influenced by the segre-
gation. The relationships between the wage rates of different jobs 
may have been established during the time when race or sex dis-
crimination was open and lawful. · 
Even though no showing of motive is required in a Title VII 
case based on disparate impact, 237 evidence of past deliberate dis-
crimination, past overt maintenance of dual wage structures with 
lower female or minority rates, or past intentional job segregation 
,, on the part of the employer or the relevant employment commun-
ity may suggest that the overall pattern of discrimination influ-
enced the present day setting of wages as well as other aspects of 
the employment relationship. The plaintiff may also be able to 
show specific pay practices that constitute disparate treatment or 
that have a disparate impact. The most obvious of these is paying 
less to women or minorities than to men or whites for the same 
job. 238 Disparate treatment in the job evaluation process could 
137 The pertinent language of Title VII provides: 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or natural origin; 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). The cases make clear that proof of motive is not required 
under the disparate impact theory. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 
431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971). 
238 For example, see the orderly-nurses aide cases under the EPA cited in Brennan v. 
Owensboro-Daviess County Hosp., 523 F.2d 1013, 1029-30 (6th Cir. 1975), in which the 
hospitals' policies of paying higher wages to orderlies than to nurses aides were struck 
down. See also B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 224, at 382-83. 
Both Title VII and the EPA prohibit unequal pay for equal work because of sex. The 
EPA does not cover race. Because of the confusion over the relationship between the two 
acts, see note 257 infra, however, plaintiffs may wish to avoid combining a Title VII claim 
with an equal pay claim. Any suggestion that specific jobs should be compared is likely to 
lead the judge to focus on EPA requirements, not on a Title VII segregated job-
discriminatory compensation claim. 
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also be shown: that the employer applied one rule, policy, or 
practice to men's jobs and another to women's jobs (for example, 
an education increment might be given to meri who finish high 
school, but a lower one, or none at all, to women); that the em-
ployer determined women's pay by a woman's standard, and 
men's pay by a man's standard; that the employer set pay rates 
for jobs predominantly employing blacks by reference. only to 
other "black" jobs while white pay rates are similarly keyed to 
each other. It may also show evidence of the disparate impact of 
neutral practices, for instance, that choice of factors or the opera-
tion of an evaluation plan results in an increased evaluation of the 
worth of jobs held by majority males. 
The foregoing elements would establish a prima facie case in 
accordance with usual Title VII standards as applied to actions 
based on a "disparate impact" theory. In such a case, the plaintiff 
may establish a prima facie case by identifying the practice which 
is being challenged, and demonstrating that it impacts more heav-
ily on minorities or women than on white males. Thus, in Griggs 
v. Duke Power Co., the practice of requiring a high school di-
ploma and the passing of standardized aptitude tests was held il-
legal on the basis of evidence that 34% of whites but only 12% of 
blacks in the relevant labor force had completed high school, and 
that in one EEOC case, 58% of whites but only 6% of blacks had 
passed the tests. 239 In Dothard v. Rawlinson, height and weight 
requirements were held discriminatory on evidence that they 
excluded less than 1% of men but 41% of women. 240 In neither 
case was the employer able to justify the practice on grounds of 
business necessity. 241 
At least one court has held that when jobs have been shown to 
A job may be segregated even though men and women both perform essentially the 
same work but with different titles and pay. Since a court will look through _titles to job 
content under the EPA, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976), ajob may be found to be "substantially 
the same" so that it meets the narrow EPA test for equal work. Since, however, the work 
force is sex segregated by titles, the disparate impact expected from segregated jobs 
would still be likely. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
If the jobs are indeed the same or substantially identical, and men are being paid more, it 
is probably easier to file an equal pay claim. There is also a possibility of double damages 
under the EPA, unlike under Title VII. See 29 U .S.C. § 216(b) (1976). More often, how-
ever, the work in segregated jobs is not sufficiently like any other to qualify under the 
EPA text for equal work, which is quite narrow, and so the only remedy- if there is to be 
one at all - for historically segregated jobs must be found in Title VII. 
239 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971). 
2 • 0 433 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1977). 
241 In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the Court did recognize a limited de-
fense based on the bona fide occupational qualification exemption of§ 703(e) of Title VII 
(42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976)), holding that the state could exclude women from "con-
tact positions" in a situation in which sex offenders were mixed with other offenders in an 
atmosphere which had been characterized as a "jungle" by a federal district court. Id. at 
334-37. 
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be segregated, no showing of economic harm is necessary in order 
for the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case. 242 The Fifth Cir-
cuit has stated: 
[A] Title VII plaintiff does not have to show economic 
loss to prove discrimination . . .. The key for this case is 
whether there was past discrimination .... Going 
further and requiring plaintiffs to prove that past assign-
ment practices produced lower pay checks is contrary to 
law and precedent. ... Title VII contains neither re-
quirement nor implication that economic harm must be 
shown before a class can be found to have made out a 
prima facie case of racially discriminatory job assign-
ment. Indeed, the statutory prohibitions of the enactment 
are explicitly broader than economic harm. 243 
The Eighth Circuit has held that "[s]tatistics which show segre-
gated departments and job classifications establish a violation of 
Title VII. 244 Thus, when the existence of segregated jobs has been 
shown, statistically or otherwise, there is a prima facie violation 
of Title VII. 
In addition, courts have recognized in Title VII cases that em-
ployer decisions made on the basis of subjective considerations 
provide opportunities for discriminatory considerations to oper-
ate. When, as in Rowe v. General Motors, 245 the cumulative ef-
242 Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77, 89-93 (5th Cir. 1976). 
143 /d. at 89-90. The Fifth Circuit has not been uniform in its treatment of Title VII-cases 
involving segregated jobs. In James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th 
Cir. 1977), the court compared the treatment of black workers, who had been confined to 
lower paying, more distasteful jobs, to those of white employees who had been assigned 
better jobs, and had no difficulty concluding that the black workers were victims of illegal 
discrimination. However, in EEOC v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 578 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1978) (per 
curiam), in analyzing a situation in which the airline had assigned women only to the 
stewardess classification and then adopted a no-married stewardess rule, the court did not 
compare the treatment of the stewardesses to that of the flight personnel, which would 
have been consistent with the analysis used in James. Rather, the court held that, because 
only women were employed in the stewardess category, the no-maried rule did not consti-
tute a violation of Title VII because there were no male stewards who were treated dif-
ferently. Cf. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 
U.S. 991 (1971) (no-married rule not applied to any other category of airline personnel). 
The court stated: 
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment be-
tween men and women resulting from sex stereotypes. Section 703(a)(l) subjects 
to scrutiny and eliminates such irrational impediments to job opportunities and 
enjoyment which have plagued women in the past. The effect of the statute is not 
to be diluted because discrimination adversely affects only a portion of the pro-
tected class ... or through the unequal application of a seemingly neutral com-
pany policy. 
Id. at 1198 (citations omitted). 
u. Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721, 723 (8th Cir. 1973). 
2 u 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972). Rowe makes clear the suspect nature of subjective 
judgments; when such decisions made by members of the majority have adverse effects 
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feet of a series of such decisions is to favor whites or males at the 
expense of minorities or women, the courts wH} draw the infer-
ence that discriminatory considerations were involved in those 
decisions .. As Part I of this article established, the process of job 
evaluation contains many points at which the subjective judgment 
of employer representatives is crucial in determining the relative 
valuation of jobs held by minorities or women as compared to the 
valuation of jobs held by whites or males. Here, as in Rowe, the 
extent of subjective procedures in setting wages provides a ready 
mechanism for discrimination. 
Und~r these cases, the range of subjective judgments which 
culminate in the establishment of lowered wage rates for segre-
gated jobs justifies the inference that discriminatory considera-
tions were involved. This inference is not conclusive, but is suffi-
cient to require the employer to demonstrate that the relative 
rates were established without consideration of discriminatory 
factors. 
Pay discrimination and job segregation are thus so linked that 
both must be dealt with together. A whole complex of adverse ef-
fects flow from job segregation. One of these is undervaluation of 
those segregated jobs. Where jobs are segregated, it is likely that 
the pay rate is influenced by the black or female character attri-
buted to the job. Therefore, evidence of segregated jobs justifies 
an inference of discrimination in compensation. Previously, 
segregation was viewed as a violation of section 703(a)(2) c1nd 
wage discrimination was viewed, separately, as a violation of sec-
tion 703(a)(l). It is now clear that the sections are addressed to 
different aspects of the same underlying phenomena: the dis-
criminatory radiations from job segregation encompass not only 
restrictions on job opportunities but a depressed wage for the jobs 
which the disfavored groups were allowed to hold. 
B. A Critical Analysis of the Wage Discrimination Theory 
This section will examine challenges to the theory that wage 
rate discrimination is sufficiently linked to job segregation to war-
rant the inference that the segregation influenced the wage rate in 
a discriminatory manner. These challenges will include: (a) that 
the claim is too theoretical and that it is unfair to apply it to an 
employer in the absence of any specific evidence that the rates for 
its previously segregated jobs are undervalued, (b) that the jobs 
actually reflect the value of the wor~, not the characteristics of 
upon members of the minority, those decisions should be subject to judicial scrutiny. See 
generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 224, at 166-81. 
248 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964). 
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the people who perform them, and (c) that the Bennett Amend-
ment246 to Title VII precludes the use of the foregoing analysis 
and requires that the plaintiff show that the jobs require equal 
work in order to prevail in a sex/wage discrimination case .. 
1. Plaintiff Must Prove What the Rate Would Have Been in the 
Absence of Segregation-Employer representatives will argue 
that the thesis that wage discrimination may be inferred from job 
segregation is too abstract a proposition to justify a finding of lia-
bility under Title VII. To avoid this abstract quality, they may ar-
gue, the plaintiff should be required to show as part of the prima 
facie case that the value of the segregated jobs would be higher in 
the absence of segregation. The plaintiff would have to show the 
"true" (intrinsic) value, or the non-discriminatory value, of the 
segregated jobs before a court would be justified in concluding 
that the wage was discriminatorily depressed. While Title VII liti-
gation ought not to turn on an unproven socio-economic assump-
tion, this assumption is not unproven. Not only is there probative 
force in the studies described in Part I, but both common sense 
and precedent suggest that the analysis is true, and that the mar-
ket forces which contribute to the setting of wage rates of segre-
gated jobs are themselves infected with discrimii;iation. 
Congresses that have dealt with these matters were aware that 
long standing beliefs, customs, and assumptions had consigned a 
substantial group of Americans to low paying, segregated jobs 
and that the interaction of segregation and low pay affected both 
personal and national interests. The legislative histories of the 
EPA, Title VII, and the 1972 amendments reflect a realization of 
the need to improve the socio-economic status of minorities and 
women, a status measured by the extent of job segregation and 
earnings differentials. 247 The interconnection between discrimi-
247 H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1963), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 5, at 2148-49; S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted 
in HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS., LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963 36-41 (Comm. Print 1963); Equal Pay Act of 1963: 
Hearings on S. 882 and S. 910 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on 
Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-21 (1963) (statement by Assistant Sec-
retary of Labor Esther Peterson); id. at 9-11 & 16 (statements by Secretary of Labor W. 
Willard Wirtz); S. REP. No. 92-415, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in HISTORY OF 
EEO, supra note 5, at 415-17; H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted 
in HISTORY OF EEO, supra note 5, at 64-65; 117 CONG. REC. 32094-95 (1971) (remarks of 
Representative Fauntroy); 118 CONG. REC. 590 (1972) (remarks of Senator Humphrey); 118 
CONG. REC. 564 (1972) (testimony of EEOC chair William H. Brown III cited by Senator 
Saxbe); 118 CONG. REC. 580 (1972) (remarks of Senator Javits). See generally Berg, Equal 
Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 62 
(1964); Gitt & Gelb, Beyond the Equal Pay Act: Expanding Wage Differential Protections 
Under Title VII, 8 LOY. CHI. L.J. 723 (1977); Margolin, Equal Pay and Equal Opportunity 
for Women, 19 N.Y.U. LAB. CoNF. 297 (1967); Ross & McDermott, The Equal Pay Act of 
1963: A Decade of Enforcement, 16 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 1 (1974); Vaas, Title VII: 
Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 431 (1966). 
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nation, attitudes toward identifiable groups, job segregation, and 
economic deprivation examined by economists, sociologists, and 
industrial relations analysts was the premise underlying the adop-
tion of the three acts. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress intended to 
address situations in which stereotypes produce job segregation 
or a depressed wage. In deciding a Title VII case, the Court has 
stated: 
Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, an em-
ployer could fashion his personnel policies on the basis of 
'assumptions about the differences between men and wo-
men, whether or not the assumptions were valid. 
It is now well recognized that employment decisions 
cannot be predicted on mere "stereotyped" impressions 
about the characteristics of males or females. Myths and 
purely habitual assumptions about a woman's inability to 
perform certain kinds of work are no longer acceptable 
reasons for refusing to employ qualified individuals, or 
for paying them less. 248 
In a recent decision, United Steelworkers of America v. 
Weber, 249 the Court affirmed the right of an employer to under-
take affirmative action programs where there have been tradition-
ally segregated job categories. Mr. Justice Blackmun, concurring, 
wrote: 
[T]he Court considers a job category to be ''traditionally 
segregated'' when there has been a societal history of 
purposeful exclusion of blacks from the job category, re-
sulting in a persistent disparity between the proportion of 
148 Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978) (footnote 
omitted and emphasis added). See also Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 
(1974). In construing the EPA, the Court stated that Congress had adopted the Act be-
cause of concern about the effect of women's depressed wages. Id. at 206. In Corning, 
although men and women did the same work, the jobs had been segregated, with women 
working only during the day and men only at night. Originally, a state protective law had 
prevented women from working at night. Men were paid more for their night work; this 
differential continued after passage of the EPA. Pointing out that the stereotyped belief 
that women are not worth as much as men persists even in the most obvious case - when 
they do exactly the same work - the Court said: 
Congress' purpose in enacting the Equal Pay Act was to remedy what was per-
ceived to be a serious and endemic problem of employment discrimination in pri-
vate industry - the fact that the wage structure of "many segments of American 
industry has been based on an ancient but outmoded belief that a man, because of 
his role in society, should be paid more than a woman even though his duties are 
the same." 
417 U.S. at 195, quoting S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. I (1963). 
149 __ U.S. __ , 99 S.Ct. 2721 (1979). 
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blacks in the labor force and the proportion of blacks 
among those who hold jobs within the category. 250 
The belief that the true value of a job should be part of the plain-
tiffs case argues tharthe plaintiff must show damages as part of 
the primafacie case. 251 But the Supreme Court has indicated that, 
in Title VII cases, it is proper to establish liability separately and 
prior to consideration of questions of remedy. 252 
The Court, mindful that a prima facie case does not determine 
whether the plaintiff will prevail but only requires employers and 
others to justify their practices, has imposed burdens of proof 
which permit judicial scrutiny of practices and procedures where· 
a likelihood of discrimination exists. 253 Thus, where a plaintiff 
has established thatjobs have been segregated in the past or pre-
sent, that jobs are identified as female or minority jobs, that a 
wage rate structure exists for the segregated jobs which is low in 
the employer's overall structure, or that a job is traditionally re-
served for minorities or women throughout the labor force, the in-
ference that segregation influenced the pay rate is sufficient to re-
quire the employer to present evidence as to how the wages were 
set. 254 
The burden of proof properly shifts- at this point because the 
employer has unique access to, possession of, and control over 
this evidence. Discovery by the plaintiff may well be inadequate 
because the plaintiff will not know where to seek the evidence. In 
Title VII matters, the Court has emphasized that one important 
element in determining whether there is a prima facie case, and 
whether the burden of proof should shift to the defendant, is the 
possession by the defendant of knowledge of facts on which the 
decision should turn.255 
2. The Argument That the Market Rate Reflects the Value of a 
Job-The second argument of employers against the thesis that a 
court may inf er wage discrimination from job segregation is that 
there is no reasonable method by which value can be fairly deter-
mined except by reference to the job market. Therefore, even if 
race or sex discrimination is ·among the factors influencing wage 
rates, there is no alternative for the market rate except to engage 
in wholesale judicial supervision of every wage structure in the 
250 Id. at 2732 (footnote omitted). 
251 Courts have also recognized that subjective judgments incorporate societal pre-
judices, and are therefore suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Rowe 
v. Geneal Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972). 
252 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,342 n.24, 360 (1977). 
253 Id. at 360. 
••• Id. 
••• Id. at 359 n.45. 
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country-a result Congress did not intend. When the same Con-
gress passed the EPA in 1963, the year before it.passed Title VII, 
it limited the EPA coverage to cases involving claims of equal 
work to avoid the prospect of judicial supervision of all wage 
rates. The equal work requirement provides some assurance that 
there is an easily identifiable instance of wage rate discrimination 
to ·serve as a basis for legal intervention. Except where there is a 
high probability that discrimination is taking place, Congress did 
not intend to interfere with market forces. This concept of limited 
interference with the market forces was implicitly grafted onto 
Title VII by the Bennett Amendment. While the scope of the 
Bennett Amendment is unclear, it is argued that Congress did not 
change its mind within one year as to the extent to which it wished 
to regulate wage practices. 
Furthermore, the argument runs, placing the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission256 and, ultimately, district judges 
in the position of setting wage rates in every employment situa-
tion covered by Title VII must give great concern. The courts lack 
the resources and the expertise to review wage structures, and 
there are no standards on which courts can rely. Judicial supervi-
sion would create conflict within each work place and would dis-
place collective bargaining, where unions exist, as the prime pro-
cess for establishing wages. 
This line of argument has commended itself to the courts which 
have reviewed claims of wage discrimination that were outside 
the EPA. 257 The first issue in evaluating the argument is whether 
258 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was established pursuant to Title 
VII to administer and implement its provisions. As of July 1, 1979, the EEOC also has 
jurisdiction over EPA. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807 (1978) and 
Executive Order 12067, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,967 (1978). 
257 None of the cases which have dealt with the issue of whether Title VII is restricted 
by the equal work requirements of the EPA have dealt with the theory of liability dis-
cussed in the text.Many of the cases which express a requirement that a Title VII plaintiff 
prove equal work rely on the decision in Ammons v. Zia, 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971). 
Ammons, however, was a case in which the plaintiff's theory was that she had to prove 
equal work in order to recover under Title VII. Therefore, the court was never faced with 
the necessity for deciding whether equal work was a necessary part of plaintiff's case. In a 
number of other cases, the plaintiff assumed it was necessary to prove equal work and 
either succeeded in bearing that burden, see, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 
429 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce of Greater Kansas City, 416 
F.Supp. 844 (W.D. Mo. 1976), ajf 'd, 568 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1977), or failed, see, e.g., Cal-
age v. University of Tenn.; 544 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1976); Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, 
Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 449 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Molthan v. Temple Univ., 442 F. Supp. 448 (E.D. 
Pa. 1977); Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 15 FEP CAs. (BNA) 914 (W.D.N.C. 1976), 
aff 'd, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977)). Most of these cases that 
failed to show equal work were brought as individual actions, not as class actions alleging 
discrimination against a group identified by sex or race. 
Beginning with Ammons, many of the cases have adopted the following line of argu-
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Congress by Title VII intended to intrude on market forces be-
yond the situations covered by the EPA. The courts have consi-
dered this question primarily in the context of claims based on sex, 
rather than race. The existence of the EPA and the Bennett 
Amendment has in tHese situations encouraged courts to put a 
ment. First, Title VII and the EPA must be read in pari materia. Quoting from Shultz v. 
Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970), for the prop-
osition that the statutes should be construed in harmony, Ammons said that ''to establish 
a case of discrimination under Title VII, one must prove a differential in pay based on sex 
for performing 'equal work.' " Wheaton Glass, the source of the in pari materia doctrine, 
however, drew the opposite conclusion, holding that Title VII was not restricted by the 
EPA. Id. at 266. 
The second line of reasoning concludes that the Bennett Amendment requires that Title 
VII be construed in harmony with the EPA. See Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 
511 F.2d 166, 170-71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Molthan v. Temple Univ., 
411 F. Supp. 448, 454 (E.D.Pa. 1977). The court in Mo/than not only cites Ammons and 
Orr, but holds that the Bennett Amendment requires that a Title VII claim fail if it does 
not amount to a violation of the EPA since only claims that do not "run afoul of" that Act, 
i.e., are not prohibited by the Act, are "authorized." Id. at 455. The court in International 
Union of Elec., Radio, & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Corp., 17 FEP-CAS. (BNA) 16 
(N.D.W.Va. 1977), relied on the congressional intent as evidenced by the change in EPA 
language from "comparable" to "equal" to argue that the Bennett Amendment under-
scored the desire of Congress to apply the equal work standard to Title VII cases. The 
cases that have followed this line of conclusions test whether the plaintiffs have made a 
prima facie case by comparing the jobs according to EPA standards. The inadequacy of 
this analysis is discussed in the text accompanying notes 311-13 infra. 
For a recent case which was decided on the theory that the Bennett Amendment did not 
incorporate the EPA's equal work formula into Title VII, but rather incorporated the 
EPA's four affirmative defenses but not its equal work standard into Title VII, see 
Gunther v. County of Washington, 600 F.2d __ (9th Cir. 1979), 48 U.S.L.W. 2175 (Aug. 
16,1979). Gunther involved a claim by prison matrons that they were denied equal pay for 
equal work with male guards. The matrons contended that even if their jobs were not sub-
stantially equal to those of the male guards, they should be allowed to prove that some of 
the wage discrepancy was due to sex discrimination. The court rejected this contention, 
holding that the record showed that greater amounts of clerical work and a differ.ent 
prisoner/guard ratio made the position of male guard qualitatively different from the posi-
tion of matron. 
The third line of reasoning is summed up by Judge Bright's pithy comment in Christen-
sen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977), that 
We find nothing in the text and history of Title VII suggesting that Congress in-
tended to abrogate the laws of supply and demand or other economic principles 
that determine wage rates for various kinds of work. We do not interpret Title 
VII as requiring an employer to ignore the market in setting wage rates for 
genuinely different work classifications. 
Id. at 356. The court, without comment, approved the lower court's finding that plaintiffs 
made no showing that the work "is substantially equal." See also Lemons v. Denver, 17 
FEP CAs. (BNA) 906 (D.C. Colo. 1978) (transcript of oral opinion); Chrapliwy v. Uniroy-
al,lnc., 71 F.R.D. 461 (N.D. Ind. 1976). 
Some cases suggest that a statistical proof of pay differentials may establish a Title VII 
violation. These have tended to be cases alleging systemic discrimination against a group, 
usually brought as a class action. See, e.g., Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp.894 
(D.C.N.J. 1978), in which the court found a Title VII sex discrimination violation where 
the plaintiffs gave statistical proof of segregated jobs and discrimination in compensation, 
and proved individual bias and company policy that encouraged assignments on the basis 
of sex. Other cases which suggested the possibility of establishing discriminatory com-
pensation against women as a group, but held that the plaintiff had not produced the re-
quisite proof, include Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977); Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 442 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 
1977); and Calage v. University of Tenn., 400 F. Supp. 32 (D.C. Tenn. 1975), aff'd, 544 
F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1976). 
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gloss on Title VII that might not have been considered if the 
claims had first arjsen in the context of racial discrimination. 258 
However, the Supreme Court has established that Title VII must 
be construed and applied in the same way to all kinds of discrimi-
nation259 and has answered affirmatively the question of whether 
Congress intended to interfere with the market or employer's 
wage setting process under Title VII. In a sex discrimination case, 
the Court specifically addressed the question by using a racial 
precedent: "[A] statute that was designed to make race irrelevant 
in the employment market . . . could not reasonably be construed 
to permit a take-home-pay differential based on a racial classifica-
tion. '' 260 
Title VII applies to all employment practices which "adversely 
affect" employment opportunities and which "deprive or tend to 
deprive" persons of such opportunities. 261 The Court has made 
clear that employment opportunities may not be deni~d on the 
basis of stereotyped thinking about race or sex. Stereotyped 
thinking may affect the wage setting process in precisely this way 
where the jobs are segregated, as it can affect the basic decision to 
employ and to assign a person to a.segregated job. For example, 
in one case, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 262 an employer's 
rule against hiring women with pre-school children came under 
attack. No such rule was applicable to men. The Court criticized 
the rule on the grounds that the employer was treating women 
with pre-school age children differently from men with pre-school 
age children. If, instead of not hiring them at all, the employer in 
Phillips had decided to pay women with pre-school age children a 
lower rate of pay than men because of a perceived risk of greater 
absenteeism, the logic of the Phillips decision would require a 
finding that the lower rate of pay was as discriminatory as the de-
cision not to hire. Such disparate treatment in compensation was 
in fact the basis of the.Manhart decision. 263 
The fact is that Title VII has significahtly interfered with the 
operation of the labor market. It has upset recruitment proce-
158 Courts have generally been more willing to find discrimination and to grant relief in 
those cases where wage differentials followed race-based distinctions than in those cases 
where wage differentials followed sex-based distinctions. Cf. Lemons v. Denver, 17 FEP 
CAS. (BNA) 906 (D.C. Colo. 1978) (transcript of oral opinion) (sex-based distinctions); 
Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1978) (race-based distinctions). 
••9 See Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.702 (1978). 
280 Id. at 709. 
281 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was aimed at all forms of discrimination. See 
S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.10 (1964). 
282 400 U.S. 542 (1971). 
283 Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
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<lures which were time-honored, such as "word of mouth" re-
cruiting;264 it has struck down employment selection procedures 
such as pre-employment tests which were viewed as essential to 
the operation of industry;265 it has required changes in seniority 
systems which were the fruit of national policy favoring the col-
lective bargaining process;266 and it has required psychological 
adjustments by millions of workers and thousands of employers 
who have had to abandon the application of their beliefs concern-
ing the place of minorities and women. It has worked a major re-
vision in our industrial relations systems. Furthermore, this 
heavy impact on traditional ways of doing business was known to 
the Congress which in 1972 expanded Title VII and strengthened 
the EEOC. 267 Thus, the suggestion that Title VII was not in-
tended to interfere with the operation of the wage setting process 
is without foundation. This conclusion applies with equal force to 
both race and sex discrimination. While there is no detailed legis-
lative history behind the introduction of prohibitions of sex dis-
crimination into Title VII, Title VII was generally understood to 
be a wholesale attack on all forms of discrimination. 268 Further-
more, Congress rejected an amendment which would have shar-
ply restricted its application to sex discrimination cases. 269 
••• See generally Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 465 (1978). See also Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 
433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970), in which the court found that the employer made a good faith 
effort to recruit black employees after a Title VII suit was commenced. 
280 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
••• See text following note 183 supra. 
287 Prior to the adoption of the 1972 amendments, the Senate Committee stated: 
In 1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of isolated 
and distinguishable events, for the most part due to ill-will on the part of some 
identifiable individual or organization .... Employment discrimination as 
viewed today is a far more complex and pervasive phenomenon. Experts familiar 
with the subject now generally describe the problem in terms of "systems" and 
"effects" rather than simply intentional wrongs, and the literature on the subject 
is replete with discussions of, for example, the mechanics of seniority and lines 
of progression, perpetuation of the present effect of pre-act discriminatory prac-
tices through various institutional devices, and testing and validation require-
ments. 
S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971). 
288 The amendment adding prohibitions of sex discrimination to Title VII was proposed 
by Representative Smith of Virginia. His maneuver may well have been intended to frus-
trate either passage or the subsequent enforcement of Title VII, rather than to further the 
interests of women. 
However, in proposing the addition of prohibitions of sex discriminations to Title VII, 
Representative Smith reasoned: "I think we all recognize and it is indisputable fact that 
all throughout industry women are discriminated against in that just generally speaking 
they do not get as high compensation for their work as do the majority sex." 110 Co NG. 
REC. 2577 (1964). 
••• The day following the addition of prohibitions relating to sex discrimination to the 
House bill, Representative Griffin (R.-Mich.) introduced an amendment which would 
have recognized women's role as a secondary labor force, and would have put Congress' 
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The initial administrative interpretations of Title VII by the 
EEOC were hesitant about the reach of the sex discrimination 
provision, 270 and this hesitancy was reflected in lower court deci-
sions such as Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. 211 There, the 
court characterized an employer rule denying employment to 
women with pre-school children as involving not sex discrimina-
tion, but "sex plus" another factor, the presence of pre-school 
children, which factor precluded a finding of a violation. This 
analysis in effect required that sex be the sole cause of the dis-
crimination in order for a claim to be actionable under Title VII. 
No such limitation was intended with respect to race discrimina-
tion cases272 or to Title VII cases generally. 273 The Supreme 
Court, in reversing the lower court's decision, refused a narrow 
reading of the sex provision, and required that the same Title VII 
analysis be applied to women as to minorities. The sweep of this 
requirement of even application of Title VII was demonstrated in 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 274 where the Court applied the adverse ef-
fect test of Griggs 275 to standards which had exclusionary effects 
on women. Thus, there is no warrant in the statute as adopted or 
interpreted to suggest today that the sex discrimination provi-
sions, because of their qrigin, should be treated more narrowly 
than the provisions prohibiting race or other forms of discrimina-
tion. 276 This broad sweep of the sex discrimination provisions 
imprimatur on that economic role. The Griffin amendment provided that no unlawful em-
ployment charge "claiming discrimination on the basis of sex shall be considered unless 
the person filing such charge ... signs a statement under oath certifying that the spouse, 
if any, of such person is then unemployed and was unemployed when the alleged unlawful 
employment practice occurred." 110 CONG. REC. 2728 (1964). The amendment was over-
whelmingly defeated by 96 to 15 in a division vote. 
210 See Hernandez, supra note 24. 
271 400 u .s. 542 (1971). 
272 See, e.g., King v. Laborers Int'I Union, Local 818,443 F.2d 273 (6th Cir. 1971), in 
which the court reasoned that where the aggrieved party can show that discrimination on 
the basis of race was, in part, a causal factor in a discharge or a refusal to hire, the ag-
grieved party is entitled to damages. 
273 Three days after adoption of the Bennett Amendment, the Senate rejected a pro-
posed amendment by Senator McClellan (D.-Ark.) which would have made it illegal to 
discriminate against an individual solely because of his race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin. The amendment was rejected by a roll call vote of 39 for, 50 against. 110 
CONG. REC. 13837-38 (1964). 
In an early case involving sex discrimination, the Seventh Circuit explained, "[t]he 
scope of Section 703(a)(I) is not confined to explicit discrimination based 'solely' on sex.'' 
Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F. 2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 
(1971). 
274 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
m Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
278 When the Supreme Court did interpret the sex provision narrowly (see, e.g., Gilbert 
v. General Elec. Co., 429 U.S. 125 (1976)), Congress immediately corrected that interpre-
tation by passing the 1979 amendment to Title VII, known as the "Pregnancy bill," which 
specifies that the definition of sex discrimination shall include discrimination on account 
of pregnancy or child bearing. See Act of October 31, 1978,"Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 
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was reaffirmed by Congress in 1972, when it reviewed and 
adopted mainly procedural amendments to Title VII. 277 Thus, 
"intrusion" into the market is no more a factor in wage cases than 
in other cases. 
The second facet of the argument described above is more 
complex. It is that by adopting the Bennett Amendment, Con-
gress intended to disrupt market forces which influence wages 
only in narrowly defined circumstances regardless of the impact 
of Title VII on other employment practices. The Bennett 
Amendment states: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchap-
ter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to apply different standards of compensation, 
or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or 
a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality 
of production or to employees who work in different loca-
tions, provided that such differences are not the result of 
an intention to discriminate because of race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it. be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer to give and to act 
upon the results of any professionally developed ability 
test provided that such test, its administration or action 
upon the results is not designed, intended or used to dis-
criminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin. It shall not be an unlawful employment practice 
2076 (1978) (amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include pregnancy and 
childbirth within the prohibition against sex discrimination); Conference Report, H.R. 
REP. No. 95-1786, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). 
277 The House Report on the amendment stated: 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has progressively involved 
itself in the problems posed by sex discrimination, btit its efforts here, as in the 
area of racial discrimination, have been ineffective due directly to its inability to 
enforce its findings. 
In recent years, the courts have done much to create a body of law clearly dis-
approving of sex discrimination in empioyment. Despite the efforts of the courts 
and the Commission, discrimination against women continues to be widespread, 
and is regarded by many as either morally or physiologically justifiable. 
This Committee believes that women's rights are not judicial divertissements. 
Discrimination against women is no less seriou6 than other forms of prohibited 
employment practices and is to be accorded the same degree of social concern 
given to any type of unlawful discrimination. 
H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in HISTORY OF EEO, supra 
note 5, at 64-65. See also S. REP. No: 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in HISTORY 
OF EEO, supra note 5, at 416-17. Furthermore, the Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 
1746, The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, stated: "In any area where the 
new law does not address itself, or in any areas where a specific contrary intention is not 
indicated, it was assumed that the present case law as developed by the courts would con-
tinue to govern the applicability and construction of Title VII." 118 CONG. REC. 7166 
(1972). 
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under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate 
upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the 
wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of 
such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the · 
provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29. 278 
Arguments based on the Bennett Amendment have succeeded in 
many cases279 and at least one race case. 280 In essence, the argu-
ments intepret 1963 and 1964 actions by Congress as reflecting a 
desire to permit the· continued operation of market forces in set-
ting wages except where prohibited by the EPA. Thus, the scope 
of Title VII in wage discrimination cases is restricted to the scope 
of the EPA. This argument turns the EPA, which was intended as 
a sword against a certain form of discrimination, into a shield for 
other forms of wage discrimination. Its validity can best be as-
sessed by examining the text and history of the Bennett Amend-
ment. 
3. The Argument That the Bennett Amendment Restricts Title 
VII to the Scope of the EPA-This argument is based on two as-
sumptions: first, that Congress carefully drafted the EPA so that 
it would apply only to a narrow set of circumstances, and second, 
that the Bennett Amendment carried forward this concept of nar-
row coverage into Title VII. The first point has considerable val-
idity. The EPA ·has been considered to be narrower than the bills 
which had been introduced on the subject over a twenty-year 
period. As proposed, the bill would have required equal pay for 
"comparable work. " 281 However, Congress adopted the equal 
pay requirement for "equal work." While at least one proponent 
of the Act thought that the shift from "comparable" to "equal" 
was a broadening of the Act, many believed it was more restric-
tive. 282 The Act incorporated four exceptions, under which an 
278 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964). 
179 See cases discussed in note 257 supra. 
280 Patterson v. Western Dev. Laboratories Div., 13 FEP CAS. (BNA} 772 (N.D. Cal. 
1976). 
tel See HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND ~ABOR, 88TH CONG., )ST SESS., LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963 (Comm. Print 1963). See also Shultz v. 
Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970); International 
Union ofElec., Radio, and Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Corp. 17 FEP.CAs., (BNA) 16 
(N.D.W. Va. 1977); Gitt & Gelb, supra note 247, af736-42. 
282 The language "comparable work" evidently originated with the National War Labor 
Board (see text accompanying note 107 supra). Under the "comparable work" standard, 
the Board had approved some male-female wage differentials, even for the same jobs. 
Moreover, it had moved against Westinghouse and GE for paying women"sjobs too little 
under its more general mandate to correct inequities rattier than under the banner of 
"comparable work." Thus, some legislators were skeptical of the term "comparable" 
and thought "equal" stronger, broader, and less likely to be nibbled away by an un-
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employer could pay unequal pay for equal work. These included 
situations where such differences were based on a seniority sys-
tem or a merit system, systems which measured earnings by 
quantity or quality of production, and those where the differential 
was based on ''any other factor other than sex. " 283 The EPA was 
also made a part of the Fair Labor Standards. Act, 284 which did 
not cover all workers who were within the reach of congressional 
power. 
· Perhaps more importantly, Congress took pains to harmonize 
the new statutory requirement of "equal pay for equal work" 
with the existing job evaluation process used by industry. 285 This 
process involved the assessment of equal work by examining the 
skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions under which it 
is performed. These terms of art from the job evaluation industry 
were inserted into the bill, which had initially included only the 
concept of skill as the basis for establishing job equality. Thus, as 
adopted, the EPA required a showing of equal skill, effort, re-
sponsibility, and working conditions, rather than only of equal 
skill. This arguably was a narrowing of the proposed bill. 
As a matter of initial interpretation of the Act, however, these 
"limitations" might have been far less restrictive of the scope of 
the Act than the interpretations which the administrators and the 
lower courts have adopted. Job evaluation practice, which was 
incorporated into the EPA, permits the cumulation of point values 
for the four areas of skill, effort, responsibility, and working con-
ditions in order to identify total point values as a basis for compar-
friendly judiciary. See remarks of Representative St. George, 109 CONG. REc. 9197-98 
(1963). Compare Representative Goodell's understanding of the scope of the Act, at 109 
CONG. REC. 9197 (1963), with Senator McNamara's understanding, at 109 CONG. REC. 9219 
(1963). 
283 The Equal Pay Act provides, in part: 
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall 
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, 
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such 
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of 
the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of 
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed 
under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant 
to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earn-
ings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other 
factor other than sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate dif-
ferential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the pro-
visions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee. 
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). 
284 29 U .S.C. §§ 201-19 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FLSA]. The EPA was enacted as 
§ 206(d) of FLSA, and was amended by Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235, effective July I, 
1972, which extended the coverage of EPA (but not the rest of the FLSA) to "bona fide 
executive, administrative, or professional" employees. 
286 See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). 
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ing jobs to determine compensation. Jobs which have different 
levels of skill, effort, and responsibility would be considered 
equal for compensation purposes if the total point values for the 
four elements were the same. 286 Under job evaluation practice, it 
is not the "job" which must be the same, but rather the evalua-
tion totals. In short, job evaluation practice permits a comparison 
ofjobs which involve different work. By contrast, both the ad-
ministrators' interpretation of the EPA and the interpretation of 
that Act by most courts in the period subsequent to the adoption 
of Title VII have adopted a narrower interpretation of the statute 
by requiring that the work be the same, i.e., that the skill levels, 
effort levels, responsibility levels, and working conditions each 
be the same in the jobs being compared and, moreover, that the 
jobs "look alike." A cumulative total similarity in evaluation 
points, which might suffice under a job evaluation system, will 
not suffice under this interpretation of the EPA. 287 
In the early months of 1964 when Title VII was under consider-
ation, it was not clear that such a narrow interpretation would re-
sult. If the administrators and the courts had adopted the broader 
interpretation used in the job evaluation industry, the sweep of 
the EPA would have bee_n much greater than it has become, and 
consequently, the limiting effect of the Bennett Amendment 
would have been less. Thus, the narrowness of the EPA may be 
due to administrative interpretation rather than to congressional 
intent. Therefore, even if the Bennett Amendment is viewed as a 
restriction on Title VII, the scope of that restriction need not be 
coextensive with the scope of the EPA as initially interpreted by 
the Department of Labor. Nevertheless, it is clear that the EPA 
was not the broad attack on all forms of discrimination that Con-
gress was to adopt the following year in the Civil Rights Act. It 
was a narrower legislative response to one particular aspect of 
discrimination in employment. Regardless of congressional intent 
concerning the scope of the EPA, however, the adoption of the 
Bennett Amendment did not mean that Title VII was to be re-
stricted to its scope. 
The prohibition on sex discrimination was added to Title VII 
without extensive debate. An amendment which would have vi-
tiated the addition of sex to Title VII was defeated. 288 Thereafter 
288 See generally Part I and NAS REPORT, supra note 85. See also Corning Glass Works 
v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). 
287 See 29 CFR § 800.121 (1978). A case that required work to be substantially equal was 
Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970). Courts, however, vary on how 
equal "substantially equal" is. See. e.g., Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 
1164 (3d Cir. 1977). See also B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 224, at Ch. 13. 
288 See note 269 supra. 
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debate on Title VII did not single out sex discrimination for spe-
cial consideration until the following exchange between Senators 
Dirksen and Clark occurred: 
Objection. The sex antidiscrimination provisions of the 
bill duplicate the coverage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963. 
But more than this, they extend far beyond the scope and 
coverage of the Equal Pay Act. They do not include the 
limitations in that act with respect to equal work on jobs 
requiring equal skills in the same establishments, and 
thus, cut across different jobs. 
Answer. The Equal Pay Act is part of the wage hour law, 
with different coverage and with numerous exemptions 
unlike Title VII. Furthermore, under Title VII, jobs can 
no longer be classified as to sex, except where there is a 
rational basis for discrimination on the ground of bona 
fide occupational qualification. The standards in the 
Equal Pay Act for determining discrimination as to 
wages, of course, are applicable to the comparable situa-
tion under Title VII. 289 
There thus was a recognition that the EPA did not cover most 
segregated jobs. There was also a clear understanding that after 
passage of Title VII, segregated jobs would not be legal, unless 
sex was a bona fide occupational qualification for the job. 
Moreover, even those jobs that could legally be segregated could 
not, according to the language of section 703(a)(2), be segregated 
in such a way that employment opportunities or status would be 
denied or adversely affected as a consequence of the segregation, 
unless the factor that makes sex a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation also requires those adverse effects. 290 
Two months later, Senator Bennett offered a "technical correc-
tion" to Title VII which became the Bennett Amendment. 291 In a 
cryptic debate, three senators focused on different considera-
tions. Senator Bennett was concerned that the provisions of the 
289 110 CONG. REC. 7217 (1964). Senator Clark here distinguished between Title VII, 
which covers segregated jobs, and EPA, which does not, before he recognized an area of 
overlap. The definition of that overlap is left ambiguous. Compare Senator Dirksen's 
questions here with his comment after the final reading of the Bennett Amendment, 110 
CONG. REC. 13647 (1964) (quoted at note 329 infra). 
290 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e2-(a)(2), -2(e). See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination, 29 
CFR §§ 1604.2(a), 1604.3(a) (1978). 
291 110 CONG. REC. 13647 (1964). The text of the amendment read: 
It shall not be an ·unlawful employment practice under this title for any em-
ployer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the 
wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such 
differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 6 (d) of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, as amended (29 U.S.C. 206(d)). 
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EPA not be ''nullified.'' It is not clear whether he was referring to 
the scope of the Act, which had not yet been interpreted, or to the 
Act's four exceptions. Senator Dirksen, a key figure in the Title 
VII debate, was concerned with the problem of the different 
coverages of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 292 Senator Hum-
phrey, in a later colloquy with Senator Randolph, interpreted the 
amendment to permit differences in treatment on sex grounds 
under pension and benefit plans, a matter different from the con-
siderations which Dirksen and Bennett expressed. 293 
Id. 
292 The text of the debate follows: 
Mr. BENNETT. Mr President, after many years of yearning by members of 
the fair sex in this country, and after very careful study by the appropriate com-
mittees of Congress, last year Congress passed the so-called Equal Pay Act, 
which became effective only yesterday. 
By this time, programs have been established for the effective administration 
of this act. Now, when the civil rights bill is under consideration, in which the 
word "sex" has been inserted in many places, I do not believe sufficient atten-
tion may have been paid to possible conflicts between the wholesale insertion of 
the word "sex" in the bill and in the Equal Pay Act. 
The purpose of my amendment is to provide that in the event of conflicts, the 
provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be nullified. 
I understand that the lea4ership in charge of the bill have agreed to the 
amendment as a proper technical correction of the bill. If they will confirm that 
understand [sic], I shall ask that the amendment be voted on without asking for 
the yeas and nays. 
Mr. HUMPHREY. The amendment of the Senator from Utah is helpful. I be-
lieve it is needed. I thank him for his thoughtfulness. The amendment is fully ac-
ceptable. 
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute. 
We were aware of the conflict that might develop, because the Equal Pay Act 
was an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Fair Labor Standards 
Act carries out certain exceptions·. 
All that the pending amendment does is recognize those exceptions, that are 
carried in the basic act. 
Therefore, this amendment is necessary, in the interest of clarification. 
293 The text of the colloquy follows: 
Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, I wish to ask of the Senator from Minnesota 
[Mr. HUMPHREY], who is the effective manager of the pending bill, a clarifying 
question on the provisions of Title VII. 
I have in mind that the social security system, in certain respects, treats men 
and women differently. For example, widows' benefits are paid automatically; 
but a widower qualifies only if he is disabled or if he was actually supported by 
his deceased wife. Also, the wife of a retired employee entitled to social security 
received an additional old age benefit; but the husband of such an employee does 
not. These differences in treatment as I recall, are of long standing.· 
Am I correct, I ask the Senator from Minnesota, in assuming that similar dif-
ferences of treatment in industrial benefit plans, including earlier retirement op-
tions for women, may continue. in operation under this bill, if it becomes law? 
Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes. That point was made unmistakably clear earlier today 
by the adoption of the Bennett amendment; so there can be no doubt about it. 
Mr. RANDOLPH. I am grateful for the reply. 
110 CONG. REC. 13663-64 (1964). 
This colloquy was referred to by the Court in General Elec. Co. v Gilbert. 429 U.S. 
125 144 (1976) to support giving weight to the Wage and Hours Administrator's interpreta-
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Whatever the concerns of the senators, it does not appear that 
they believed that the amendment carved out an exception to sec-
tion 703(a), making sex discrimination in compensation lawful un-
less it was also prohibited by the EPA. If Congress had intended 
this it would be reasonable to expect that it would have drafted 
specific statutory language and that there would be a legislative 
history making clear to members of Congress who would vote on 
the amendment that such a drastic cutback was contemplated. 
There are no such indicia of congressional intent. In fact, there is 
significant evidence to the contrary. 294 
First, far from making a record of an intention to limit substan-
tively Title VII and to undercut women's protections, Senator 
Bennett characterized his amendment and the leadership ac-
cepted it as a "technical correction." Since Senator Bennett in-
troduced the amendment by reminding the Senate of how long 
women had worked and waited for the equal pay protections, his 
amendment should be interpreted as preserving the protections 
afforded women in the EPA, not as restricting women's rights 
under Title VII. 295 
Second, it is unlikely that the women who so strongly and 
elequently spoke in favor of including sex in Title VII would have 
remained silent if they had understood that the substantive reach 
of that amendment would be limited to the EPA, which they had 
already suggested did not go far enough. 296 
Third, after debate, Congress had rejected attempts to restrict 
the reach of the sex provision, and had rebutted efforts to restrict 
the reach of the entire statute to situations where the discrimina-
tion was based "solely" on the prohibited classifications. 297 
Fourth, when Congress considered extending the bona fide oc-
cupational qualification exception to race and sex, the language of 
tions of the EPA in a Title VII case. But see Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), in which the Court rejected the argument based on this 
dialogue: 
His statement cannot, however, fairly be made the sole guide to interpreting the 
Equal Pay Act, which had been adopted a year earlier; and it is the 1963 statute, 
with its exceptions, on which the Department ultimately relies. We conclude that 
Senator Humphrey's isolated comment on the Senate floor cannot change the ef-
fect of the plain language of the statute itself. 
Id. at 714. 
294 The most that can be said from the legislative history is that there seems to have 
been an abundance of uncertainty. This is reinforced by a colloquy between Senators 
Clark and Bennett a year later, in which it is clear only that they still could not agree on 
what had been meant. 111 CoNG. REC. 18261-63 (1965). 
295 110 CONG. REC. 13647 (1964) (quoted at note 292 supra). 
296 See 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 
247, at 3213-32. 
297 110 CoNG. REC. 2778 (1964) (amendment offered by Representative Dowdy was de-
feated). 
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the amendment and legislative history indicates that the excep-
tion was intended to be a narrow one. Even so, there was some 
exploration of its ramifications before provisions regarding sex 
were added, and considerable heated debate before the amend-
ment adding race was defeated. 298 This sharply contrasts with the 
total lack of attention given the Bennett Amendment; a strange 
co·ntrast, indeed, if the Bennett Amendment had been understood 
to permit sex discrimination in compensation. Thus, any interpre-
tation of the Bennett Amendment that restricts section 703(a) to 
the one factual situation covered by the EPA, 299 is contrary to the 
broad congressional intent concerning Title VII, and to the lead-
ership's acceptance of the amendment as a technical correction. 
This interpretation seems, however, to be what many courts have 
accepted. 300 
The language of the Bennett Amendment does little to clarify 
the legislative intent. The amendment states that wage dif-
ferentials which are authorized by the EPA are not unlawful 
under Title VII. But the term "authorized" is ambiguous. There 
are three possible ways to construe the term in this context: 
(1) All differences in wages and compensation which are not 
prohibited by the EPA are authorized by it, and therefore do not 
violate Title VII. Under this interpretation, a plaintiff claiming 
sex discrimination in compensation under Title VII would have to 
meet the EPA requirements that the work be equal and be per-
formed in the same establishment. 301 
(2) The EPA prohibits wage differentials where there is equal 
work but then lists four exceptions to this prohibition. Any jus-
298 110 CONG. REC. 2550 (1964) (attempt by Representative Williams in the House); 110 
CONG. REC. 13825 (1964) (Senator McClellan's approach in the Senate). See also Blumro-
sen, supra note 244, at 82-83. 
299 The EPA requires that an employer not pay different rates for equal work. Equal 
work, as defined in the Act, requires that the work be performed in the same establish-
ment, be on jobs which require performances equal in skill, effort, responsibility, and 
which are performed under similar working conditions. 29 U .S.C. § 206(d) (1976). Since 
there is no warrant in the EPA for treating any element as less important than any other, it 
is assumed that if the Bennett Amendment restricts Title VII to the equal work provisions 
of the EPA, the work would have to meet all of the EPA definitions, otherwise some 
rationale other than the language of the amendment must be present. 
300 See cases cited in note 296 supra. Most of those decisions, however, pre-date the 
Supreme Court decisions which decided what constitutes discrimination in compensation 
under Title VII and the effect to be given the Bennett Amendment. See, e.g., Los Angeles 
. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 
429 U .s. 125 (1976). 
301 Another way to reach this result would be to assume that the term "authorized" in 
the Bennett Amendment refers only to the four exceptions, as set out below in arguments 
(2) and (3), but then to conclude that since the exceptions were applicable in cases of equal 
work, Congress must have intended the exceptions to carry the restriction to equal work. 
This "tail wags the dog" argument would produce the same result as the first interpreta-
tion set forth above. 
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tification falling under one of the four exceptions is authorized by 
the Act and hence is not a violation of Title VII. Under this in-
terpretation, a plaintiff with an equal pay claim could not avoid an 
EPA defense by bringing the action under Title VII. 
(3) The four exceptions to the EPA are available not only in 
equal pay cases, but in any case of "wage or compensation" dis-
crimination under Title VII. Under this interpretation, the plain-
tiff could make a normal Title VII prima facie case involving 
compensation although the work was not equal, and the defen-
dant could then assert as a defense any of the four exceptions set 
out in the EPA. 
The first interpretation above, that the term "authorized" re-
fers to all differentials not prohibited by the EPA, involves an as-
sumption that the power of the employer to set wages derives 
from Congress. Only then could a wage rate which is not prohib-
ited by the Act be said to be authorized by Congress. But the 
basic premise of our constitutional system is to the contrary. 
Governmental authorization is not necessary in order to engage in 
the ordinary economic and social activities of life. The concept of 
our government as one of limited powers presupposes a freedom 
of action in the absence of governmental regulation rather than an 
ability to act only with permission or authorization from the gov-
ernment. 
The more conventional meaning of the term "authorized" is 
the second interpretation, which encompasses activity that is 
within the four exceptions in the EPA itself. 302 Since such un-
equal pay would be illegal under the Act in the absence of these 
exceptions, it is appropriate to conclude that these unequal pay-
ments are, indeed, authorized by Congress. 
The difficulty with the second interpretation is that it leaves 
open the possibility that an equal pay claim brought under Title 
VII might not be subject to the four exceptions, and therefore, 
that an employer's liability would depend upon which statute was 
invoked. This is the risk that Senator Bennett wished to avoid. 
For example, in 1964, the meaning of the term "bona fide senior-
ity or merit system" under Title VII was not clearly understood 
and it was therefore possible that it would be given a narrower 
reading than .the term "seniority system" under the EPA. 303 In 
302 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 122 (5th ed. 1979), defines "authorize" as: "To em-
power; to give a right or authority to act." In Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 
429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), where a cause ofaction was found under both the EPA and Title VII, 
the court stated: ''Indeed, Title VII refers specifically to the Equal Pay Act and states that 
a sex-predicated wage differential is immune from attack under Title VII only if it comes 
within one of the four enumerated exceptions to the Equal Pay Act." Id. at 446. 
303 See, e.g. 110 CoNG. REC. 7218 (Senator Clark's response to Senator Dirksen's 
memorandum questioning some provisions of Title VII), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE Hts-
TORY, supra note 247, at 3015. 
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such a case, an employer sued for unequal pay under Title VII 
might not have a defense that is available under the EPA. Since 
the Bennett Amendment was intended to avoid this, the second 
interpretation may be too narrow. 
The third interpretation, that the term "authorized" encom-
passes the four exceptions to the EPA and makes them applicable 
to all Title VII claims, not only those which involve equal work, 
would avoid the risks of possible inconsistent interpretations of 
the EPA and Title VII and assure that, in the event a case involv-
ing unequal pay for equal work were brought under Title VII, the 
EPA defenses would be available. 304 This interpretation is consis-
tent with the use of the term "wages or compensation" in the 
Bennett Amendment to describe the type of cases in which the de-
f en se s would be available. Since the EPA applies only to 
"wages," the effect of the Bennett Amendment would be to ex-
tend those defenses to cases of "compensation," which are cov-
ered by Title VII but might be outside the EPA. For example, at 
one time, the EPA was interpreted not to cover "fringe bene-
fits, " 305 while Title VII was interpreted from the beginning to 
cover such benefits. Some fringe benefit programs are geared to 
wage rates. Without the broadening effect of the Bennett 
Amendment, it might have been possible to argue that an em-
ployer who had a "merit system" defense to an equal pay claim 
had violated Title VII with respect to fringe benefits if the term 
"merit systems" was differently construed in the two statutes. 
The use· of the broader term "compensation" makes clear. that 
Congress did not intend this result. 
The Supreme Court opinions which have dealt with the rela-
tionship between the EPA and Title VII appear to have adopted 
this third interpretation and to have rejected the first and second 
interpretations sub silentio. 
The first interpretation-that plaintiff cannot establish a case of 
compensation discrimination under Title VII without making a 
showing of equal work which would satisfy the EPA-was totally 
disregarded in the two sex wage discrimination cases which the 
Court has decided, General Electric Co. v.Gilbert 306 and Los 
Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart. 307 In neither case 
was there any allegation or consideration of whether the female 
employees were doing equal work with the male employees, 
though it was probable that they were not. Yet, in both cases, the 
30• The same conclusion is reached by Vaas, supra note 247, at 449. 
305 Conversation with Wage and Hour Administrator in Washington, D.C. (July, 1965). 
308 429 u .s. 125 (1976). 
307 435 u. s. 702 (1978). 
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Court examined the question of whether the plaintiff had estab-
lished a prima facie case of Title VII violation, without referring 
to any need to show that the work was equal. In both cases, the 
defendants addressed problems under the EPA, so that the in-
terpretation of that Act was before the Court. 
In Manhart, the Court held that the female plaintiffs had estab-
lished a prima facie case under Title VII of differential compensa-
tion by showing that the employer withheld more from their pay 
than from that of male employees for pension payments. The 
question of whether the male and female employees did the same 
work was not considered. However, the Court held that the em-
ployer could assert one of the exceptions to the EPA as a defense 
to the Title VII action. The defense asserted by the employer was 
that the differential was based on longevity, a "factor other than 
sex." The Court allowed this defense but rejected it on the merits, 
holding that longevity itself was sexually based and could not, 
therefore, be a "factor other than sex. " 308 
The Court thus allowed a defense under the fourth exception to 
the EPA to be raised against a Title VII claim which was not 
based on the EPA. This constituted a rejection of the second in-
terpretation, that the EPA defenses are available only in EPA 
cases, and an adoption of the third position, that EPA defenses 
are available in any sex discrimination case involving wages or 
compensation under Title VII, even if the plaintiffs case-in-chief 
does not fall under the EPA. 
This interpretation of the Bennett Amendment to incorporate 
defenses under the EPA into Title VII is also consistent with the 
treatment of the other provisions of the same section of Title VII 
in which the amendment appears. 309 These provisions, dealing 
with the conditions under which a "bona fide seniority system" 
and "professionally developed ability tests" may be used have 
both been interpreted by the Supreme Court, which has treated 
them as affirmative defenses to be established by the employer. 310 
It is reasonable to treat the Bennett Amendment similarly as an 
affirmative defense to be established by the employer. 
This interpretation is also consistent with the general proposi-
tion that exceptions to social or remedial legislation are to be nar-
rowly construed to avoid restricting achievement of the overall 
purpose of the statute. 311 Thus, given alternative possible mean-
303 Id. at 712-13. 
309 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000--2(h) (1976). 
310 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (senior-
ity); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U,S. 405 (1975) (testing); Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (testing). 
311 See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 208 (1974). 
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ings of the term "authorized," its application to the defenses 
under the EPA rather than to the conduct prohipited by the EPA 
would have lesser restrictive impact on the remedial objectives of 
Title VII while preserving the vitality of the EPA defenses. How-
ever, this analysis implicitly rejects the contention that a plaintiff 
must establish as part of its prima facie case that the defendant did 
not pay equal pay for equal work. If the Bennett Amendment 
creates only affirmative defenses, then this contention is not part 
of the prima facie case, which may be made out without reference 
to the "equality" of the work. 
The following conclusions may be drawn concerning the 
Bennett Amendment: (a) it recognizes as affirmative defenses 
under Title VII the exceptions in the EPA, but does not otherwise 
restrict Title VII wage discrimination claims; (b) since it creates 
defenses, the amendment does not address the nature of the prima 
facie case required of a plaintiff under Title VII, and lower court 
decisions to the contrary are in error;312 and (c) the fourth excep-
ti.on under the EPA ("any other factor other than sex") does not 
encompass factors which themselves are based in whole or in part 
on sex. 313 This exception would not be available in a case where it 
was established that the segregation of the jobs influenced and 
depressed the wages of those jobs, unless the employer demon-
strates which factors other than sex actually influenced the wage 
rate. 314 
- There is one other argument concerning the Bennett Amend-
ment which must be examined. It is that the Congress in 1963 
comprehensively examined the problem of discrimination in 
wages against women and made a decision to legislate only with 
respect to the narrow area where discrimination could be easily 
identified, i.e., where the work was equal. This.decision to legis-
late in a limited way in the complex area of wage setting was pre-
served, perhaps with inartful language, in the Bennett Amend-
ment. Putting aside technicalities of the meaning of the term "au-
thorized," the underlying objective of the amendment was to pre-
serve the limited intrusion into the wage structure which had been 
311 See, e.g., Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 479 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 904 (1977); Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971). See also cases 
cited at note 296 supra, which have required plaintiff to show equal work as part of the 
prima facie case. · 
313 Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Corning Glass 
Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). 
3 " See Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce of Greater Kansas City. 416 F. Supp. 844, 
853 (W.D. Mo. 1976), a.ff' d, 568 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1978), where the court held that even if 
differences in the jobs precluded a finding of equality, the grossly disproportionate 
salaries paid for the difference in duties is evidence of discrimination because of sex. 
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carefully crafted in 1963. The technical way in which this can be 
done is for the courts to require the plaintiff to bring herself within 
the ambit of the EPA before requiring her employer to justify its 
actions. This line of reasoning has been adopted by the courts that 
have faced the problem. 315 
This argument is flawed in several ways. Title VII clearly is a 
broader statute than the EPA, and Senator Bennett's "technical 
correction'' should not be construed as a major limitation on the 
later Act without a better foundation in legislative history or stat-
utory language. Further, the location of the amendment as part of 
a section dealing with affirmative defenses, rather than in the 
exemption section, 316 confirms its limited role. The Court's in-
terpretation of the amendment in Manhart is consistent with this 
limited view. 31 7 When Congress reviewed the administration of 
sex discrimination provisions of Title VII during the process of 
adopting the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 318 it 
demonstrated an awareness of and concern for the problems of 
sex discrimination which are inconsistent with a broad interpreta-
tion of the Bennett Amendment. The seriousness with which 
Congress viewed the continuation of wage and job discrimination 
against women was underscored by both the House and Senate 
reports and speeches. The statistics showing a continued earnings 
gap, lopsided job segregation, and the persistence of the unem-
ployment ratios for minorities and women were carefully consid-
ered. 319 These were characterized as "disappointing in terms of 
what minorities and women in this country have a right to ex-
pect,' ' 320 and were the reasons behind the granting of enforce-
ment power to the EEOC. In this context, the Senate report said: 
While some have looked at the entire issue of women's 
rights as a frivolous divertissement, this Committee be-
lieves that discrimination against women is no less seri-
ous than other prohibited forms of discrimination, and 
that it is to be accorded the same degree of concern given 
to any type of similarly unlawful conduct .... 321 
318 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976). 
219 H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong.', 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1963), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 5, at 2148-51. For a discussion of these statistics as they refer to 
minorities, see Blumrosen, supra note 7, at 681-82, and Tables, Appendix. 
320 H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in HISTORY OF EEO, 
supra note 5, at 65. 
321 S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in HISTORY OF EEO, supra 
note 5, at 416. 
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The House report found as follows: 
Women are subject to economic deprivation as a class 
... [w]omen are placed in the less challenging, the less 
responsible and the less remunerative positions on the 
basis of their sex alone. 
Such blatantly disparate treatment is particularly ob-
jectionable in view of the fact that Title VII has specifi-
cally prohibited sex discrimination since its enactment in 
1964.322 
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Although both the House and the Senate discussed whether the 
EPA should be continued as a separate statute or absorbed into 
Title VII, no reference was made to the Bennett Amendment. The 
section-by-section analysis of the proposed changes which com-
pared the 1964 Act with the proposed amendments does not note 
the Bennett Amendment although the other exceptions were 
quoted. 323 
For all its ambiguities, the Bennett Amendment represents 
congressional recognition of the real problem of the appropriate 
relationship between the EPA and Title VII, given the fact that 
their coverage of the same subject matter overlaps. If there had 
been no Bennett Amendinent, the courts would still have had to 
work out the relationship, under the doctrine that statutes in pari 
materia should be construed so as to accomplish the overall legis-
lative objectives set forth in both statutes. The treatment of the 
Bennett-Amendment as authorizing recognition of EPA defenses 
in Title VII cases best accomplishes this objective. This was re-
cognized early in Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., in which the court 
said, "Since both statutes serve the same fundamental purpose 
against discrimination based on sex, the Equal Pay Act may not 
be construed in a manner which by virtue of section 703 (h) would 
undermine the Civil Rights Act. " 324 
322 H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in HISTORY OF EEO, 
supra note 5, at 64. 
323 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 2046-49, 2067. In 1972, following the 
passage of the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act, the EEOC published amended 
sex guidelines. See Sex Guidelines, 27 Fed. Reg. 6835 (1972) §§ 1604.1-.10. 
In the House, amendments were offered to consolidate all antidiscrimination legislation 
so as to afford a complainant a single cause of action and/or a single forum. Representa-
tive Green (R.-Ore.) objected that the women still needed all the protection they could get 
against wage exploitation, and that EPA added to that protection. See LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 5, at 286-87. Senator Hart responded by assuring that there was no in-
tention to cut back women's rights. See Senator Hart's statement and Senator Williams' 
answer in HISTORY OF EEO, supra note 5, at 1075-76. These several statements are con-
sistent only with the conclusion that Congress intended to support a broad interpretation 
of Title VII. 
324 421 F.2d 259, 266 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970). Wheaton Glass first 
used the concept ofin pari materia to broaden the interpretation of the EPA relying on the 
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4. Reliance on Standard Job Evaluation Techniques or on the 
Market Rate-Employers required to justify wage structures 
under Title VII will argue that in fact the jobs are worth what they 
are paid and that the differences are justified on economic 
grounds independent of considerations of discrimination. If an 
employer demonstrates that the wage structure in a facility where 
. jobs are segregated has the same characteristics as the wage 
structure in a facility where jobs are integrated, this would negate 
the inference that the wages in the "black" or "womens" jobs 
were discriminatorily depressed. The employer would thereby 
demonstrate that the rates were set by factors unrelated to dis-
crimination. If no such evidence is available, the employer will 
contend that it was simply paying the market rate and state that 
this is a nondiscriminatory basis or a "factor other than sex." 
This argument will not prevail if the premise of this article, that, 
absent a showing to the contrary, the market rate reflects dis-
criminatory factors where the jobs are segregated, is accepted. 
In its first interpretation of the EPA, the Supreme Court faced 
precisely this issue: whether the market rate, economic condi-
tions, or the depressed wage at which women were willing to 
work were ''factors other than sex,'' and therefore provided a de-
fense to an EPA claim. In Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,325 the 
employer argued that its reliance on the market price of female 
labor was a ''factor other than sex'' that justified the differential 
involved in that case. But the Court rejected the contention, stat-
ing: 
The differential arose simply because men would not 
work at the low rates paid women inspectors, and it re-
flected a job market in which Corning could pay women 
less than men for the same work. That the company took 
advantage of such a situation may be understandable as a 
matter of economics, but its differential nevertheless be-
came illegal once Congress enacted into law the principle 
of equal pay for equal work . . .. 
As the Second Circuit noted, Congress enacted the Equal 
Pay Act "[r]ecognizing the weaker bargaining position of 
many women and believing that discrimination in wage 
rates represented unfair employer exploitation of this 
source of cheap labor." 474 F.2d, at 234. In response to evi-
dence of the many families dependent on the income of 
working women, Congress included in the Act's statement 
broader scope of Title VII. It is ironic that it has been the authority relied on by every case 
that has restricted Title VII to the confines of EPA. See note 257 supra. 
m 417 U.S. 188 (1974). 
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of purpose a finding that "the existence ... of wage dif-
ferentials based on sex ... depresses wages and living 
standards for employees necessary for their health and ef-
ficiency." Pub. L. 88-38, § 2(a)(l), 77 Stat. 56 (1963). And 
Congress declared it to be the policy of the Act to correct 
this condition. § 2(b) .... The whole purpose of the Act 
was to require that these depressed wages be raised, in 
part as a matter of simple justice to the employees them-
selves, but also as a matter of market economics, since 
Congress recognized as well that discrimination in wages 
on the basis of sex "constitutes an unfair method of com-
petition." Pub. L. 88-38, supra, § 2(a)(5). 
The Equal Pay Act is broadly remedial, and it should be 
construed and applied so as to fulfill the underlying pur-
poses which Congress sought to achieve. 326 
489 
Thus, the Court decided that under the EPA reliance on the 
"community wage structure" is no defense. The same principle 
should apply under Title VII, which is recognized as a broader 
statute than the EPA. 327 
Finally, the employer may contend that, even if there is adverse 
impact on wage rates as a consequence of job segregation, there is 
no practical method of identifying and eliminating it. The use of 
conventional job evaluation techniques, reliance on the commun-
ity wag~ structure, and the market rate for wages is a "business 
necessity" within the meaning of Title VII, because there is sim-
ply no available alternative with a lesser adverse impact. Fur-
thermore, the employer may argue that it is unreasonable to make 
illegal reliance on job evaluation procedures which Congress ap-
proved by specific amendments to the EPA in the course of its 
adoption. 
The arguments are invalid. Congress intended to permit the use 
of only those job evaluation techniques which themselves did not 
contain discriminatory features. Congress did not give blanket 
approval to job evaluation procedures any more than to profes-
sionally developed tests or to seniority systems. The concept of 
discrimination in job evaluation procedures simply had not been 
developed at that time. 
328 /d. at 206-08. 
327 But cf. Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that female plain-
tiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of illegal sex discrimination under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 even though the state university's practice was to pay clerical workers, 
who were exclusively female, less than the amount it paid physical plant workers, who 
were predominantly male, for jobs of equal value to the employer because of higher wages 
paid latt~r employees in labor market). 
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The question of alternative methods of establishing wages 
which would eliminate the adverse effect of the use of job evalua-
tions or community wage structures is more serious. If a court 
could devise an appropriate remedy, 328 employers could do so 
without awaiting court action. Any such alternative wage struc-
ture would require a review and evaluation of wage rates. Be-
cause of the plethora of court decisions restricting Title VII to the 
reach of the EPA, an employer has good reason at present to as-
sume that its use of job evaluations or community wage structure 
is lawful under Title VII. But this fact suggests only that any rem-
edy should be made prospective. The Supreme Court adopted this 
approach in Manhart, where prior inconsistent judicial and ad-
ministrative precedents justified the employers' belief that Title 
VII was not applicable. Where there is a consistent line of author-
ity in the lower courts insulating the wage structure, albeit er-
roneously, from Title VII, prospective but not retroactive relief is 
appropriate. 
C. Remedies 
1. The General Principle-Once the plaintiff has introduced 
evidence sufficient to create an inference that the wage structure 
for traditionally segregated jobs has been discriminatorily de-
pressed, the employer must either rebut the inference of discrimi-
nation or justify the wage structure on grounds of business neces-
sity. If the employer fails in this effort, the Supreme Court has 
stated that the plaintiff is entitled at that point to prospective re-
lief in the form of an injunction or some other appropriate or-
der. 329 
In addition to injunctive relief to assure that discrimination 
does not exist in the future, district courts are authorized to 
award back pay for the purpose of "making persons whole for in-
juries suffered through past discrimination. " 330 An injunction 
against discriminatorily depressed wage rates and a determination 
328 See Section C. (Remedies) infra. 
319 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,361 (1977). 
The Court stated that: 
[i]f an employer fails to rebut the inference that arises from the Government's 
prima facie case, a trial court may then conclude that a violation has occurred 
and determine the appropriate remedy. Without any further evidence from the 
government (or private plaintiff) a court's finding of a pattern or practice justifies 
an award of prospective relief. Such relief might take the form of an injunctive 
order against continuance of the discriminatory practice ... or any other order 
"necessary to ensure the full enjoyment of the rights" protected by Title VII. 
330 Albemarle v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 420 (1975). 
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of the amount of back pay due the victims of discrimination both 
involve calculating the extent to which the discrimination de-
pressed the wage rate. Therefore, the court decisions that address 
the problem of establishing back pay are appropriate precedents 
in wage cases dealing with both issues. 331 The opinions which 
deal with the difficulty of establishing the amount of back pay are 
also apt in considering the difficulty in determining the amount by 
which wages were discriminatorily depressed for the purposes of 
injunctive relief. 
During the first years of Title VII, remedies were developed for 
cases of discriminatory assignment to segregated jobs, primarily 
in cases involving the operation of seniority systems. 332 The 
opening of promotional opportunities and provision of back pay 
based on the denial of such opportunities were assumed to be suf-
ficient remedies for the discriminatory assignment and resulting 
job segregation. In these cases the courts not only made no provi-
sion for wage discrimination in the segregated jobs, but some 
judges incorrectly assumed that the statute did not encompass 
such a remedy. 333 
A decade of experience with these remedies suggests that this 
assumption was oversimplified and that these remedies may not 
be adequate. Many economic, human, and legal circumstances 
have contributed to the inadequacy of these remedies. First, they 
depend upon the opening of vacancies in higher paying jobs. 
These vacancies may not be available when they are needed, or, 
in a static or declining employment situation, may never become 
available. 334 Second, the number of vacancies in higher paying 
jobs will rarely equal the number of claimants, for there are usu-
ally fewer places as one moves toward the top of the job pyramid. 
Third, the underlying qualifications and interests of the victims of 
discrimination may have changed during years of working in 
segregated jobs. Whatever might have been the case at the time of 
their initial assignment, the workers may no longer be interested 
in, or perhaps qualified for, those jobs which they might have held 
but for the discrimination. Fourth, the Supreme Court decision in 
Teamsters v. United States sharply restricts the situations where 
331 The "two stage trial" outline in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), 
in which liability is determined first and back pay is considered in a second stage proceed-
ing, is appropriate to wage discrimination cases. 
332 -See note 5 supra. 
333 See, e.g., Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 461 (N.D. Ind. 1976). 
334 See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 920 (1976). 
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promotional opportunity remedies can be granted at all. 335 
The focus on promotional opportunities during the first decade 
under Title VII was based on the assumption that the wrong was a 
denial of promotions. Therefore, the courts and agencies did not 
address the issue of wage discrimination. Neither injunctions, nor 
opening jobs for future promotions, nor back pay awards pre-
mised on vacancies in and qualifications for the jobs from which 
victims of discrimination had been excluded, were intended to 
remedy wage discrimination. Each of these remedies leaves the 
victims of discriminatory assignments continually subject to the 
discriminatorily depressed rate until such time, if ever, as promo-
tion is achieved. For many such victims, relief from wage dis-
crimination will be the only effective remedy because of the legal 
or practical unavailability or inadequacy of the promotional re-
medy. 
The Supreme Court has endorsed the need to concentrate on 
the injury in fashioning relief: 
[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it 
has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be 
alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary 
relief. ... Wh~re racial discrimination is concerned, 
"the [district] court has not merely the power but the 
duty to render a decree which will so far as possible 
eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as 
bar like discrimination in the future .... [W]here a legal 
injury is of an economic character, "the general rule is 
that when a wrong has been done, and the law gives a re-
medy, the compensation shall be equal to the injury. The 
latter is the standard by which the former is to be mea-
sured. 336 
2. Where the Evidence Establishes the Extent of the Injury-In 
some cases, the proof of the amount by which wages were de-
pressed will be included in the plaintiffs case on the issue of lia-
bility. Proof of discrimination often points the way to the re-
medy. 337 The following are examples: 
(a) Proof offered under Title VII may have established a viola-
335 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). However, 
Teamsters has no application to wage rates. In Teamsters the Court specifically reaf-
firmed the Griggs principle in all instances except where § 703(h) explicitly requires an 
intent to discriminate; i.e., though the Griggs principle is not applicable to seniority sys-
tems, it is applicable to discriminatory wage rates generally, and particularly to those that 
are effects of traditional job segregation. 
338 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,417 (1975). 
337 See Blumrosen & Blumrosen, The Duty to Plan for Fair Employment Revisited: 
Work Sharing in Hard Times, 28 RUTGERS L. REv.1082, 1101 (1975) .. 
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tion of the EPA. In such a case, the remedy is to raise the lower 
wage to the rate of the higher wage. This is consonant with the 
remedy mandated by the EPA, and may be required under Title 
VII by the Bennett Amendment. 338 The amount of the discrimina-
tion is the difference between the rate for the "woman's job" and 
the rate for the "man's job." 
(b) Proof may establish that an employer in the past had main-
tained a dual wage structure but had then integrated wage rates 
into a single structure. In the unified wage structure differentials 
may persist which are traceable to the historical dual wage struc-
ture. 339 It may be possible to show that the wage rates for female 
and minority jobs in comparison to the rates for the white and 
male jobs perpetuate the historical wage differential. Those dif-
ferentials may, in fact, have been increased since the wage struc-
ture was integrated. Percentage increases, for example, would in-
crease any original differentials, while raises in equal amounts 
would reduce them. Tracing the amount of increase and the way 
in<;reases were handled after overtly sex- or race-based dif-
ferentials were abolished may be possible. Where the amount of 
the gap can be traced to its ancestral roots, the remedy is to elimi-
nate the differential by raising the depressed rate in accordance 
with the evidence. 340 
(c) Proof may show that an employer has used a job evaluation 
system that incorporates discriminatory features. One possible 
remedy would be to eliminate the discriminatory features and 
apply the reformed evaluation system to the segregated jobs. This 
338 The EPA states: "Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential 
in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this sub-
section, reduce the wage rate of any employee." 29 U .S.C. § 206(d)()) (1976). 
In Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 207 (1974), the Court explained: 
The purpose of this proviso was to ensure that to remedy violations of the Act, 
"[t]he lower wage rate must be increased to the level of the higher." ... Com-
ments of individual legislators are all consistent with this view. Representative 
Dwyer remarked, for example, "The objective of equal pay legislation ... is not 
to drag down men workers to the wage levels of women, but to raise women to 
the levels enjoyed by men in cases where discrimination is still practiced.'' Rep-
resentative Griffin also thought it clear that "[t]he only way a violation could be 
remedied under the bill ... is for the lower wages to be raised to the higher." 
(citations omitted). 
At least two courts have concluded that the requirement that the EPA and Title VII be 
read in pari materia means that the principle of the EPA proviso prohibits the lowering of 
wages where a violation of Title VII has been found. Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas 
Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973); Hays v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 465 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 
1972). 
338 See notes I 15 & 201 and accompanying text supra (discussion of dual wage struc-
tures). 
340 See J. ROBINSON, supra note 195, at 302 (discussion of situations where part of a 
wage differential is due to discrimination). See also Rathbone, The Remuneration of Wo-
men· s Services, 27 ECON. J. 55 (1917). 
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may be difficult if the system has incorporated stereotyped think-
ing about women's jobs or black jobs. The Supreme Court has 
made it clear that "myths and purely habitual assumptions about 
a woman's inability to perform certain kinds of work are no longer 
acceptable reasons for refusing to employ qualified individuals, or 
for paying them less. " 341 Therefore, the reform of the job evalua-
tion system would have to be supervised carefully. 
(d) Proof may establish that the employer used different factors 
or different plans to establish the value of men's and women's 
jobs, or of black and white jobs. For instance, there may have 
been one plan to evaluate office and administrative work and 
another to evaluate production jobs. 342 One appropriate remedy 
would be to evaluate all the jobs on the same scale, so that the 
same standard would measure all jobs. 343 Alternatively, if within 
each evaluation grouping the jobs had been fairly evaluat~d, so 
that the office and administrative jobs were in proper relationship 
to each other even though no comparison had been made of the 
relative worth of office and production jobs, it may be possible to 
relate the groupings as they are in the federal civil service system 
when various classifications are reduced to eighteen grades for 
pay purposes. 344 Care must be taken, however, that the method 
chosen to correlate the worth of jobs does not depend on or in-
corporate the market rate or other known biases. 
(e) Proof may establish that the employer made a partial use of 
the job evaluation process rather than using it to determine the 
wages of all the jobs for which wages were set. If the job evalua-
tion system is utilized differently for male and white jobs from its 
utilization in female and minority jobs, the job evaluation system 
may provide a measure of the extent to which the employer's 
wages are discriminatory. For example, an employer may deny 
nurses a wage which a job evaluation system would produce be-
cause the market rate for nurses is lower than the rate which the 
evaluation system identified. In such a case, the difference be-
tween the market rate and the rate which the evaluation system 
produced would be evidence of the extent to which the market for 
the job which is generally considered a women's job is dis-
criminatorily depressed. Similarly, after conducting a job evalua-
tion, an employer may conclude that he must pay more for male/ 
white jobs than for fem,ale/minority jobs even though they were 
341 Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
342 See text accompanying note 196 supra. 
343 N. WILLIS, supra note 236. One purpose of the Willis study was to devise such a 
single scale. NAS REPORT, supra note 85 at 27-29. 
344 See note 131 and accompanying text supra. 
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evaluated in the same way, because the market rate for the male 
and white jobs is higher. 345 In such a case as well, the evaluation 
of th~ jobs as similar suggests the extent to which the female job 
rate is discriminatorily depressed. 
3 .. Where the Extent of Injury Is Unclear-There are cases in 
which job segregation and low wage rates attached to the segre-
gated jobs can be established but in which the extent to which 
wage rates have been discriminatorily depressed cannot be as 
clearly established as in the situations discussed in the preceding 
section. This uncertainty, like uncertainty in back pay cases, may 
invoke competing legal principles. One principle is that where 
damages are uncertain the court will not order recovery because 
there is not a sufficient basis to justify a recovery. The counter-
vailing principle is that once liability has been established there 
should be a remedy. Uncertainty as to the amount of the damage 
should not relieve the wrongdoer of responsibility. Damages are 
assessed on the most reasonable basis available, and the wrong-
doer should bear the risk of error arising from the uncertainty. 
The Supreme Court held in Teamsters that, once discrimination 
has been found, "[t]he force of that proof does not dissipate at the 
remedial stage of the trial." 346 This holding suggests that once 
liability has been determined the risk of uncertainty as to the ex-
tent of liability is on the defendant. This was the position of the 
Fifth Circuit in connection with uncertain back pay claims in 
Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.: 
The constant tendency of the court is to find some way in 
which damages can be awarded where a wrong has been 
done. Difficulty of ascertainment is no longer confused 
with right of recovery .... Of course, many equitable 
considerations will enter into any resolution of entitle-
ment, but onerous and speculative li_mitations should not 
be utilized as a bar to the restoration process. 347 
This analysis is particularly relevant in an action seeking an in-
crease in wages in the future. 
If the premise that uncertainty will not bar relief is accepted, 
there still must be a rationale for determining the extent to which 
the discrimination affected the wage rates. The rationale must re-
late to the defendant's wage structure, and may not be based sole-
345 Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. i977). 
346 International Bhd. of Tamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361 (1977). 
347 Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d· 1364-80 (5th Cir. 1974) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 565-66 
(1931)). See also Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978). 
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ly on considerations of wage discrimination in society in general. 
While those general considerations discussed in Part I are useful 
in assessing the extent of wage discrimination, the remedy must 
be rooted in the realities of the defendant's wage structure. 
Therefore, the formulation of the remedy should take as its start-
ing point the wage rate which the employer pays for certain other 
jobs. These jobs are jobs which are not segregated, or are oc-
cupied by whites or males. 
For example, an employer may have several entry level jobs, 
such as common laborer, that do not require any previous educa-
tional skill or training. Some of these jobs are open only to men 
and some only to women, or some only to blacks and others only 
to whites. Since at the time of their hiring all entry employees 
possess similar quantities and qualities of skill, with any learning 
to be acquired on the job, there is a presumption that at this time 
one employee is as valuable as another to the employer, disre-
garding the factors of race or sex. 348 
The pay for the unskilled, common labor white men's jobs is 
presumably either the lowest wage that an employer would pay 
white men, or the lowest wage for which white men would work. 
But women or minorities should not be paid less because of their 
sex or race. Therefore, their wages should be equalized to the 
white men's entry level pay even though the jobs to which they 
are assigned have different duties and might not qualify as suffi-
ciently similar in content to be considered "equal" under the 
EPA. Obviously, if women's or minorities' jobs require higher 
qualifications but are paid less than the lowest paid white men's 
jobs, appropriate proportionate adjustments should be made. 
Other jobs related to those entry level jobs should then also be 
adjusted. 349 
The jobs whose pay rates should be used as the starting point in 
the remedial analysis are those which, on the facts of the case, are 
rationally related to the segregated jobs. For example, if light as-
semblers, all women, receive $3.00 per hour while heavy as-
semblers, all men who work on the same product and in closely 
related areas, receive $4.00 per hour, and there are no other non-
segregated jobs more closely related to the segregated job, the 
starting point for the analysis of a discriminatory wage difference 
would be $1.00 per hour. However, any mechanical conclusion 
148 Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 906-11 (D.N.J. 1978). 
349 For jobs that require previous training, the entry level for professional, technical, 
managerial, or skilled men's jobs might be a preferred measure for female and minority 
jobs in those general categories. 
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that the women's wages should be raised $1.00 per hour would not 
be supportable. It is usually not clear that, but for discrimination, 
the "lightjob" would have been paid the same rate as the "heavy 
job." Thus, the starting point in the analysis is not its end. Opti-
mally, the parties might negotiate a resolution within the 
framework of the $1.00 per hour maximum. If, however, the par-
ties insist on a judgment as to the amount of the wage raise re-
quired, the court should consider the following factors: 
(a) From 20% to 50% of the wage differential between men and 
women has been attributed to factors which cannot be justified on 
grounds unrelated to discrimination;350 
(b) The more nearly alike the work of the two jobs, even where 
they are not "equal" within the meaning of the EPA, the greater 
the likelihood that the non-discriminatory wage rate is close to 
the rate of the other job; 
(c) The less similar the two jobs chosen for comparison, the less 
likelihood there is that the rates would be similar; 
(d) Where the employer has typically given percentage increases, 
these increases exacerbated the monetary differences in wage 
rates in the past. This should be taken into account in fixing the 
appropriate increase. 
These standards are not as firm as the formula for determining 
back pay liability under Title VII. Nevertheless, this approach is 
supported by several considerations. First, there is considerable 
room for judicial discretion in formulating damage remedies under 
Title VII even where the law appears to be more clearly articu-
lated. Second, the sting of the wage increase is reduced to the ex-
tent that it is not retroactive. Third, the employer and the union (if 
there is one) may take additional steps in the future to deal with 
the need to adjust the pay rates. While the employer cannot re-
duce the rates on the jobs which are compared, 351 it may make 
other overall adjustments in its wage policy to absorb the addi-
tional costs or it may deal with them in some other way. 
Once ajudgment has been made with respect to the basic wage 
increase which must be given to those in "women's jobs" or 
"black jobs," there remains the task of applying the remedy to 
the various jobs. For example, the segregated jobs may have had 
a wage rate structure of their own. An employer may have keyed 
300 See text accompanying notes 152-83 & 188-220 supra. 
351 See note 338 supra. See Act of October 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 
(1978) (amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include pregnancy and 
childbirth within the prohibition against sex discrimination); House Conference Report, 
H.R. REP. 95-1786, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CoNG. & Ao. 
NEWS 4765. 
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all men's jobs to other men's jobs, and all women's jobs to wo-
men's jobs. Within each group the relationships between jobs are 
established as a function of a certain number of points. Within this 
point system, the women's jobs group may have been slotted 
farther down the pay scale than the men's jobs group, but with the 
same point spread between jobs. Once the non-discriminatory 
entry level rate has been established, rates for the higher women's 
jobs may be calculated by reference to the point spread between 
each of the women's jobs. 
These internal relationships may themselves sometimes be dis-
criminatory. The point spreads for women's and men's jobs or for 
black and white jobs may not be the same, or they may not be the 
same throughout the wage hierarchy. This may occur if a man's 
job and a woman's job, e.g., chief of security and supervising 
nurse at a large clinic, though different, are considered roughly 
equivalent by the employer. The principle of even pay steps 
would require that the two supervisors be paid the same salary. 
To avoid this result, the employer may restrict the top of the 
female or black rates by allotting fewer points between jobs at the 
top of the women's or the black pay lines than elsewhere in the 
wage structure. The remedy would be to apply the same standard 
to both male and female or black and white pay lines. Care must 
be taken in devising remedies to include revisions for all related 
jobs, so that the pay line is not inequitably squeezed from either 
the top or the bottom. 
One possible consequence of remedying the discriminatory rate 
for the segregated jobs might be pressure from the union and/or 
the male employees to maintain the old relationships between the 
women's and the men's jobs. Since the evaluation of the job and 
the attendant pay and status are relative, maintaining the old rela-
tionships simply continues the prior discrimination at a higher 
level352 and would not meet the demands of Title VII. 
4. Whites in Black Jobs; Men in Women's Jobs-Where there 
are men or whites in predominantly women's or black jobs, 
should they also get raises if the victims of discrimination are 
given an increase? Traditionally segregated jobs are now being 
opened to formerly excluded groups. While women and 
minorities have begun to penetrate formerly all-white male 
sanctuari~s. some men are becoming telephone operators, nurses, 
airline flight attendants, and even typists. The movement is slow 
and thus is unlikely to change the race and sex stereotypes 
351 Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). 
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rapidly. 353 Employers would probably echo one commentator 
who noted that when whites or males were found in traditionally 
black or female jobs they probably were low productivity 
people. 354 This cannot be ture if, in fact, it is thejob which has 
been undervalued because of attitudes toward the kinds of people 
with whom it is identified. Since the artificially depressed wage 
rate is attached to the job, anyone, without regard to personal 
characteristics, will be offered the discriminatory rate for that 
job. There might, therefore, be an expectation that if the jobs be-
come increasingly integrated the perception of the jobs as wo-
men's or black would change, and the wage rate would go up. 
This, however, does not happen quickly. 
Once blacks or women in predominately segregated traditional 
jobs get raises, the case for the few men or whites already in those 
jobs (at the women's or black rate) is clear. They, too, should re-
cieve the same remedial raise. 
Two theories support this relief for men in traditionally wo-
men's jobs or whites in black jobs. If the men are doing the same 
work as the women who receive wage increases, they could estab-
lish a violation of the EPA. 355 That Act requires that the lower 
wage be increased to match the higher one. Under Title VII, if the 
women or blacks are given a raise because they have been dis-
criminated against on account of their sex or race, whereas men in 
the same jobs do not get such a raise, the men are deprived of a 
raise they would have gotten "but for" their sex. This constitutes 
a violation of Title VII. 356 
5. Totally Segregated Employment and the Wage Discrimina-
tion Problem-Where there is total segregation-where only 
minorities or women are employed-there will be no "bench-
mark" jobs filled by whites or men to use as a basis for analysis. 
Similarly, where jobs have extremely different requirements of 
professional credentials, it would be inappropriate to use the pay 
in one job as a basis for analysis of depressed rates in the other. 
Thus, in a "sewing shop" with an all-female work force, or a con-
sulting firm with all-female clericals and all-male engineering 
consultants, a comparison of job rates within the same company 
would not assist in resolving the issue. 
The thorough segregation of such jobs increases the likelihood 
that the rate of pay for the minority or women's jobs has been in-
353 Even the increase of 2% in the number of men in an occupation such as telephone 
operator leaves it 96% female. Women and Poverty, supra note 40, at 60 (1974). 
354 Bergmann, supra note 215, at 298. 
355 See text of EPA at note 3 supra. 
356 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-81 (1976). 
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fluenced by race or sex. The relationship between totally segre-
gated jobs and depressed wages has been carefully identified by a 
BLS study of male-female earnings differentials. For all estab-
lishments studied, males had 18% higher earnings than females in 
each of the ten occupations examined. For the same occupations, 
however, the male advantage declined to 11% in establishments 
which employed both men and women, and rose to 22% in estab-
lishments which were totally segregated. 357 
This study reinforces the conclusion that total segregation leads 
to a wage structure which has a greater adverse effect on women 
or minorities than does an integrated job situation. But the fact of 
total segregation requires that one look elsewhere for integrated 
"benchmark" jobs. Comparisons may be available in other firms 
in which the jobs at issue are integrated, or where there are the 
kind of benchmark jobs described above. 358 If the jobs are defi-
nitely gender or race specific, however, the wages for similar jobs 
in other firms may reflect the same discriminatory influences. 
There are many jobs, such as clerical work, which tend to be 
performed by females, for which there will not be any integrated 
employer whose wage structure can be used for comparative pur-
poses. In such a situation, the court may consider such factors as 
the economic analysis which suggests that 20% to 50% of the na-
tional male-female, black-white wage gap cannot be explained 
except by discrimination. 359 Such general statistics alone, how-
ever, are not a sufficient basis for a remedy. There must be some 
evidence bearing more closely on the employer's own wage struc-
ture. 
An analysis of the State of Washington Comparable Worth 
Study discloses that job evaluation points were related to the 
community wage rates, but that the relationship was different for 
men's jobs and women'sjobs. 360 The extent of this difference is a 
measure of the extent to which the market rate discounts the 
value of women's jobs. The analysis concludes that the study 
demonstrated a pervasive 20% difference in pay standards based 
on sex throughout the state. If the relationship between the worth 
307 Buckley, Pay Differences Between Men and Women in the Same Job, 94 Mo. LAB. 
REV. 36 (1971). 
358 See text accompanying note 377 supra. Such a comparison of the defendant's rate 
structure with the rate structure in other facilities characterized at least one early race 
case. See International Chem. Workers Union v. Planters Mfg. Co., 259 F. Supp. 365 
(N.D. Miss. 1966), motion to dismiss denied, 55 LAB. CAS. [CCH] 9046 (N .D. Miss. 1967). 
The suit was dismissed by consent after a conciliation agreement was executed which in-
creased rates of pay of black employees by changing job classifications. 
359 See note 220 supra. 
380 See Remick, supra note 234. 
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of predominately or totally segregated jobs and the community 
wage can be so identified, the method may provide a foundation 
for similar studies elsewhere. While one study in a single state is 
probably not a sufficient base from which to predict whether the 
correlation was peculiar to that state or is more generally applica-
ble, more research along these lines might provide the beginnings 
of a national comparison grid. 
Comparable studies of key job rates in the labor markets which 
include totally segregated jobs may provide a more concrete basis 
for identification of differentials in particular cases. Such studies 
would provide a practical means for establishing the upper limit 
for any finding of wage rate discrimination in segregated jobs. The 
court could then take into account any other relevant factors in 




The underlying forces which restrict opportunities of minorities 
and women to segregated jobs also assure that the wages of those 
jobs will reflect their low status. Thus, job segregation encompas-
ses wage discrimination. Where such discrimination is estab-
lished under Title VII, an appropriate remedy would include, 
inter alia, an injunction raising the pay of those in the segregated 
jobs sufficiently t9 dissipate the discriminatory factor in the wage 
rate. This article has explored some of the theoretical and practi-
cal problems involved in implementing these conclusions. None 
are insurmountable, and the judiciary which has solved many dif-
ficult problems under Title VII is clearly competent to handle 
them. 
More, however, is needed. Guidelines issued by the EEOC in 
this area would serve to alert employers, unions, minorities, wo-
men, and the courts to this problem and to provide specific guid-
ance on the solution to some of the problems discussed in this ar-
ticle. The Supreme Court has suggested that EEOC guidelines 
and interpretations which were made contemporaneously with 
the initial implementation of Title VII are entitled to more weight 
than those developed in later years. 361 It would be unfortunate if 
such an attitude were shown toward the theory of Title VII liabil-
381 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 76 n.11 (1977); General 
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-45 (1976). 
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ity here outlined. It is only recently that the inadequacies of the 
remedy of opening promotional opportunities have become appa-
rent under Title VII, and that concentrated attention has been 
given to the problem of the wages paid for segregated jobs. 362 The 
interpretation of Title VII should not be constricted by the per-
ceptions existing at the time of its initial implementation, for our 
knowledge of discrimination was elementary and inadequate at 
that time. 363 As our understanding unfolds, so too should our 
capacity to address those problems which come newly into focus. 
381 In NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1952), the Court upheld the 
NLRB modification of its back pay remedy based on its experience in administering the 
National Labor Relations Act. Labor Act precedents are often highly influential under 
Title VII despite some differences in the administrative process under the two laws. See, 
e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co:, 424 U.S. 747 (1967). While some of the problems 
posed by the differential in income distribution were identified in 1974, no solution was 
then proposed. See Blumrosen, supra note 319, at 696; Newport News Shipbuilding and 
Drydock Co., concilliation agreement in A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 3, at 367-77 (1970); Gitt 
& Gelb, supra note 247. 
363 See H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) reprinted in HISTORY OF EEO, 
supra note 5, at 65; S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong.,lst Sess. (1971), reprinted in HISTORY 
OF EEO, supra note 5, at 416, on the need for the 1972 amendments to Title VII. 
